Skip to main content

Home/ Gob Cvo/ Contents contributed and discussions participated by Adalberto Palma

Contents contributed and discussions participated by Adalberto Palma

Adalberto Palma

Reuters MF board seen beholden to Corzine as risk grew 2011.11.04 - 0 views

  • As recently as July, MF Global's Compensation Committee lauded his leadership as "exemplary" and praised the strategy he set for the firm, "including significant improvements in the reputation of the firm" and "its improved posture with regulators," according to its proxy statement ahead of its annual meeting.
  • GovernanceMetrics Inc gave MF Global a "D" grade for corporate governance and ranked the firm's risk management profile among the bottom 20 percent of U.S. companies before the past week's crippling blows.
  • The board's guidelines prohibit members of the audit and risk committee from serving on similar committees at more than two other public companies.
  • ...8 more annotations...
  • And yet two members of MF Global's five-person audit and risk committee, former HSBC Bank USA CEO Martin Glynn and former ICAP Plc Chief Operating Officer David Gelber, sit on the audit committees of three other public companies.
  • Corzine's compensation also raises red flags among governance experts, who contend the way he was paid had the potential to influence the executive's willingness to take risk.A source close to J.C. Flowers told Reuters that all four members of the compensation committee agreed unanimously on all decisions regarding Corzine's compensation.
  • he owned relatively little company stock
  • "A cynic would say that he had the incentive to take a lot of risks," said Alan Johnson, a New York-based executive compensation consultant who works with Wall Street firms.
  • "It just feels like they gave him carte blanche," he said.
  • One board member's connections raise questions of conflict of interest from the start,
  • All of the eight board members had years of financial sector experience, including a former bank CEO and a former insurance company CFO.
  • critics say the brokerage and clearing firm's board tolerated at least one possible conflict of interest, bent its own rules and failed to rein in Corzine as he drove the company into dangerous bets.
Adalberto Palma

Lex FDIC v. bank directors: where do we stand? 2011.08.10 - 0 views

  • WesCorp had purchased very large amounts of Option ARM-based mortgage-backed securities without regard to conducting sufficient analysis of the creditworthiness of the underlying securities or concentration limits in the institution’s portfolio.
  • former directors countered that they had acted in good faith and in the exercise of their business judgment in overseeing the credit union and that as a consequence the directors' actions were protected by the business judgment rule. 
  • A director owes a threefold duty to a corporation the director serves:  a duty of obedience, a duty of loyalty and a duty of care.  This threefold concept is encompassed in the doctrine of the fiduciary duty owed by a director. The duty of obedience requires that the director act in a manner that does not extend the entity’s activities beyond those authorized by the entity’s organization document and by law.  The duty of care requires the director to be informed with all the material information concerning any issue before the board before making a business decision. The duty of loyalty raises the expectation of director independence and the lack of any conflict of interest.  A failure by a director to adhere to these duties raises the specter of personal liability unless, as permitted in Delaware, the corporation has adopted an exculpatory provision in its certificate of incorporation.  For bank directors, no such exculpatory protection is permitted because of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. 
  • ...6 more annotations...
  • that directors permitted an unsustainable growth strategy designed to exploit the real estate market but failed to protect the bank from the substantial inherent risk associated with that growth, by overconcentrations in acquisition, development and construction loans, which in at least one case was over 80% of the bank’s entire loan portfolio, or lack of supervision of senior management and undue reliance on them in loan originations without assurances of core competencies in areas of credit administration and risk underwriting and without adequate policies and procedures to enforce prudent lending, informed decisions and adequate monitoring. that directors neglected to heed warnings from bank regulators, particularly those contained in reports of examinations and exit interviews, about deteriorating asset quality and capital, or failed to make corrective changes in accordance with the directions of regulatory authorities. that directors permitted the making of “insider” loans without adequate analysis or documentation. that directors declared dividends payable to the bank’s holding company at a time when asset quality was declining significantly and the required capital ratios were being reduced.
  • recurring themes
  • gross negligence would encompass a complete disregard of the institution’s statutory mandate and permitting it to engage in conduct which violates the law.
  • The lesson for directors or prospective directors of existing banks is that these FDIC-led challenges of past behavior help to delineate the boundaries of proper director fiduciary conduct expectations for banks. 
  • Directors have a broad responsibility for oversight of a bank and therefore service as a member of the board should not be seen as a “hobby” or a prestigious pseudo-club membership; significant amounts of time need to be dedicated for a director to adequately perform in accordance with FDIC expectations. Directors must not merely rely on the actions or recommendations of senior management but are charged with holding management’s feet to the fire in addressing strategic challenges and specific operational problems and proposing solutions. Directors must be exacting in their appraisal of the competency of senior management and must be in a position to make changes when incompetency is apparent, sooner rather than later. Directors must demonstrate that they are acting independently, free from any allegiance to management, and cannot allow themselves to be managed by a dominant CEO or controlling shareholder. Directors may not turn a blind eye to unsafe or unsound practices or to potential violations of law, particularly in those areas identified by bank examiners as warranting further attention or action. Directors must be very sensitive to the appearance of a conflict of interest and must leave all self-interest at the door.
  • FDIC officially has authorized lawsuits against 266 individuals with total damage claims totaling about $6.8 billion. 
« First ‹ Previous 81 - 100 of 143 Next › Last »
Showing 20 items per page