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Gene Ellis

"Which Eurobonds?" by Jeffrey Frankel | Project Syndicate - 0 views

www.project-syndicate.org/...which-eurobonds-

jeffrey project syndicate

shared by Gene Ellis on 16 Jun 12 - No Cached
  • Any solution to the eurozone crisis must meet a short-run objective and a long-run goal. Unfortunately, the two tend to conflict.Illustration by Paul LachineCommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThe short-run objective is to return Greece, Portugal, and other troubled countries to a sustainable debt path (that is, a declining debt/GDP ratio). Austerity has raised debt/GDP ratios, but a debt write-down or bigger bailouts would undermine the long-term goal of minimizing the risk of similar debt crises in the future.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph
  • it is hard to commit today to practice fiscal rectitude tomorrow. Official debt caps, such as the Maastricht fiscal criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), failed because they were unenforceable.
  • The introduction of Eurobonds – joint, aggregate eurozone liabilities – could be part of the solution, if designed properly. There is certainly demand for them in China and other major emerging countries, which are desperate for an alternative to low-yielding US government securities.
  • ...12 more annotations...
  • But Germany remains opposed on moral-hazard grounds: a joint guarantee of Eurozone members’ liabilities would strengthen individual national governments’ incentive to spend beyond their means.
  • The German Council of Economic Experts has proposed a European Redemption Fund (ERF). The plan would convert into de facto 25-year Eurobonds the existing sovereign debt of member countries in excess of 60% of GDP, the threshold specified by the Maastricht criteria and the SGP.
  • But this seems upside down.
  • it offers absolution precisely on the 60%-of-GDP margin where countries will have the most trouble resisting temptation.
  • the main explanation for the absence of US moral hazard is that the right precedent was set in 1841, when the federal government let eight states and the Territory of Florida default.
  • Ever since 1841, the market requires that US states running up questionable levels of debt pay an interest-rate premium to compensate for the default risk.
  • Had the ECB operated from the outset under a rule prohibiting it from accepting SGP-noncompliant countries’ debt as collateral, the entire eurozone sovereign-debt problem might have been avoided.
  • the expansion in the US took place at the federal level, where spending today amounts to 24% of GDP, compared to just 1.2% of GDP for the European Union budget.
  • The version of Eurobonds that might work as the missing long-term enforcement mechanism is almost the reverse of the Germans’ ERF proposal: the “blue bonds” proposed two years ago by Jacques Delpla and Jakob von Weizsäcker. Under this plan, only debt issued by national authorities below the 60%-of-GDP threshold could receive eurozone backing and seniority. When a country issued debt above the threshold, the resulting “red bonds” would lose this status.
  • The point is that the enforcement mechanism would be truly automatic: market interest rates would provide the discipline that bureaucrats in Brussels cannot.
  • Of course, the eurozone cannot establish a blue-bond regime without first solving the problems of debt overhang and troubled banks. Otherwise, the plan itself would be destabilizing, because almost all countries would immediately be in the red.
  • But one thing seems clear. German taxpayers, whose longstanding suspicion of profligate Mediterranean euro members has been vindicated, will not be happy when asked to pay still more for the cause of European integration. At a minimum, they will need some credible reason to believe that 20 years of false assurances have come to an end – that this is the last bailout.
Gene Ellis

Central banks prepare for turmoil after Greek vote | Reuters - 0 views

www.reuters.com/...e-crisis-idUSBRE85D0CA20120616

central banks turmoil greek vote reuters

shared by Gene Ellis on 16 Jun 12 - No Cached
  • ECB President Mario Draghi, one of many policymakers gearing up for trouble after Sunday's vote in Greece, said his bank was ready to step in and fund any viable euro zone bank that gets in trouble.
  • At best, we are going to have a situation that is extremely serious on Monday," Swedish Finance Minister Anders Borg told journalists. "In all likelihood, whatever the outcome, we are going to have a government which is going to find it hard to live up to the agreements they (the Greeks) have signed up to."
Gene Ellis

Banks' Fire Drill for Greece Election - NYTimes.com - 0 views

dealbook.nytimes.com/...fire-drill-for-greece-election

banks fire drill greece election nytimes nytimes com com

shared by Gene Ellis on 16 Jun 12 - No Cached
  • In New York and London, banks have set up dedicated crisis teams, and rehearsed elaborate responses.
  • Citigroup has $84 billion in loans, bonds and other types of exposure to troubled European countries, plus France. The bank’s filings indicate that all but $8 billion of that exposure is offset with collateral it has collected and hedges on the portfolio.
  • Some banks are testing their systems to deal with the possibility of new currencies and preparing guidance for clients on how to operate in such an environment.
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  • Banks like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are also looking into the severe legal challenges that would arise if a country exited the euro. Contracts that govern loans, bonds and derivatives in Europe rarely take into account such a situation.
  • Consider an Italian corporation that owed a foreign bank 5 million euros, with a loan agreement struck under Italian law. If Italy left the euro, the bank might have less chance of getting euros back after the exit. In that case, the financial firm might be exposed to a new, less valuable currency.
  • Recognizing that threat, some banks are trying to move contracts into new jurisdictions like the United States or Britain. By transferring such loan agreements to English law, the banks may increase the chances of getting repaid in euros after an exit, according to legal experts.
  • The banks are also trying to protect their balance sheets if they do get stuck with large amounts of assets denominated in a new, weaker currency.
  • By doing so, they can better match their assets (the loans) within a specific country with their liabilities (the deposits). Then if a country left the euro zone, the value of the loan might fall in euros, but the banks wouldn’t owe as much to depositors in euros.
  • Mr. Lim notes, however, that some large banks, including Deutsche Bank, still have a lot more loans than deposits in countries like Italy and Spain.
Gene Ellis

Greek Bank Withdrawals Accelerate - WSJ.com - 0 views

online.wsj.com/...3822204577464783282542366.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 14 Jun 12 - No Cached
  • "As we approach the last few days before the elections I expect deposit withdrawals to rise further," he added. "And I wouldn't be surprised if by Friday we saw outflows of €1 billion to €1.5 billion."
  • Since the start of Greece's debt crisis in late 2009, Greece's banks have lost about one-third of their deposit base as nervous savers have taken their money out of the banks and either sent it abroad, or else stashed it away for safekeeping.
  • In the past two years, deposit outflows have generally averaged between €2 billion and €3 billion a month, but have spiked during periods of political uncertainty.
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  • Faced with Greece's increasingly bleak prospects, Crédit Agricole SA is making contingency plans to abandon its troubled Greek bank in the event of Greece leaving the euro zone, according to a person with direct knowledge of the plans, in the first concrete sign of a foreign company signaling it could walk away from its Greek assets.
  • According to the senior banker, the current rate of deposit outflows--of €1 billion or less per day–remains "manageable" since the banks keep large cash buffers on hand to deal with the withdrawals.
Gene Ellis

Martin Feldstein: The Euro Zone's Double Failure - WSJ.com - 0 views

online.wsj.com/...3893404577098252697593684.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 31 May 12 - No Cached
  • but that they don't constitute an official EU treaty and therefore cannot be enforced by the commission and other EU institutions.
  • Italy has a good shot at persuading investors that it has a favorable long-term budget outlook. Its fiscal deficit is now less than 4% of GDP.
  • If the new government can now enact changes in labor rules and investment incentives that raise GDP growth to a 2% annual rate, Italy's ratio of debt to GDP could fall to 60% in less than 15 years.
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  • Greece cannot hope to get its deficit under control fast enough to stabilize its debt and attract private lenders. Instead of remaining a permanent ward of Germany and the IMF, Greece should default on its debt, leave the euro zone, and return to a more competitive drachma.
  • But he should also make it clear that lending against private collateral should not be used by commercial banks to free up funds to purchase newly issued government bonds
  • As Italy shows its determination and its ability to reduce future deficits, it should be welcomed back to the capital markets.
Gene Ellis

Europe Can't Handle the Euro - 0 views

www.nber.org/...wj020800.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 31 May 12 - No Cached
  • When leaders of the 11 nations that agreed to combine their currencies gathered in January 1999, they predicted great things: the single currency would shift global portfolios to euro assets, depressing the value of the dollar relative to the euro, and the new eurozone would be a strong player in the global economy, reflecting the size of an integrated European market. Instead the euro plummeted, Europes economy remains weak, and unemployment is more than twice the U.S. level.
  • The ECB will eventually be judged not by its words but by whether it achieves low inflation and does so without increasing cyclical unemployment. I am not optimistic about either part of this goal.
  • The ECB must make monetary policy for "Europe as a whole," which in practice means doing what is appropriate for Germany, France and Italy, the eurozones three largest countries. Last year demand conditions in those countries were relatively weak, while demand conditions in Spain and Ireland were very strong. That meant a monetary policy that was too expansionary for Spain and Ireland, causing a substantial acceleration of their inflation and threatening their competitiveness.
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  • Such disparities of demand conditions will undoubtedly persist in the future because European countries differ substantially in industrial composition and in a variety of economic policies.
  • the time will come when the ECB will set a policy that is too tight for the outliers, leading to substantially higher unemployment than if they were free to set their own monetary policies. Even without discretionary monetary policies, the interest rates in countries with weak demand would naturally decline, and the external values of their currencies would fall, both acting as offsetting stabilizers of the countries weak demand. But this will not be possible within the EMU, where a single interest rate and a single exchange rate prevail. Result: higher average cyclical unemployment.
  • In the U.S., a fall in regional demand leads to lower wages, which help to maintain employment; to movements of labor to regions where demand is stronger; and to a net fiscal transfer from Washington (because lower regional income means lower federal tax liability). None of this happens in Europe, where wages are inflexible, mobility is severely limited by language and custom, and there are no significant fiscal transfers.
  • Politicians can now blame the ECB for high unemployment and complain that it is a powerful force beyond national control. Instead of seeking to make labor markets more flexible, European governments are talking more about "social wages," about mandatory 35-hour workweeks, and about rolling back even the small reductions in social benefits Germany achieved under Helmut Kohls government. Worse yet, there are attempts to eliminate differences in labor practices and even differences in wages among the EMU countries.
  • Moreover, these policies reduce the international competitiveness of many European industries and encourage the adoption of protectionist policies to keep out non-European products.
  • Forcing a single monetary policy on all of Europe will cause the countries that suffer what they regard as unnecessarily high unemployment to resent the actions of others. Attempts to force a Europewide tax system, especially if taxes are used to redistribute incomes among European countries, will compound the potential for conflict.
  • EMU is meant to be a marriage made in heaven with no possibility of divorce.
Gene Ellis

Why We Lie - WSJ.com - 0 views

online.wsj.com/...4840904577422090013997320.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 30 May 12 - No Cached
  • "I was amazed at how quickly and easily this guy was able to open the door," Peter said. The locksmith told him that locks are on doors only to keep honest people honest. One percent of people will always be honest and never steal. Another 1% will always be dishonest and always try to pick your lock and steal your television; locks won't do much to protect you from the hardened thieves, who can get into your house if they really want to. The purpose of locks, the locksmith said, is to protect you from the 98% of mostly honest people who might be tempted to try your door if it had no lock.
  • What we have found, in a nutshell: Everybody has the capacity to be dishonest, and almost everybody cheats—just by a little. Except for a few outliers at the top and bottom, the behavior of almost everyone is driven by two opposing motivations. On the one hand, we want to benefit from cheating and get as much money and glory as possible; on the other hand, we want to view ourselves as honest, honorable people. Sadly, it is this kind of small-scale mass cheating, not the high-profile cases, that is most corrosive to society.
  • It has shown rather conclusively that cheating does not correspond to the traditional, rational model of human behavior—that is, the idea that people simply weigh the benefits (say, money) against the costs (the possibility of getting caught and punished) and act accordingly.
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  • All of this means that, although it is obviously important to pay attention to flagrant misbehaviors, it is probably even more important to discourage the small and more ubiquitous forms of dishonesty—the misbehavior that affects all of us, as both perpetrators and victims.
Gene Ellis

Let Greece take a eurozone 'holiday' - FT.com - 0 views

www.ft.com/...30-11df-953f-00144feab49a.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 30 May 12 - No Cached
  • If Greece still had its own currency, it could, in parallel, devalue the drachma to reduce imports and raise exports, cutting the 15 per cent of GDP trade deficit. The level of Greek GDP and employment might then actually increase if the rise in exports and decline in imports added more to domestic employment and output than was lost through raising taxes and cutting government spending. But since Greece no longer has its own currency, it is not free to follow this strategy.
  • Bank balances and obligations would remain in euros. Wages and prices would be set in drachma.
  • Gene Ellis on 30 May 12
     
    Excellent FT piece by Martin Feldstein
Gene Ellis

EMU and International Conflict | Foreign Affairs - 0 views

www.foreignaffairs.com/...emu-and-international-conflict

shared by Gene Ellis on 30 May 12 - No Cached
  • Indeed, the adverse economic effects of a single currency on unemployment and inflation would outweigh any gains from facilitating trade and capital flows among the EMU members.
  • There is no sizable country anywhere in the world that does not have its own currency. A national currency is both a symbol of sovereignty and the key to the pursuit of an independent monetary and budget policy.
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