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Gene Ellis

PIMCO | - ​​TARGET2: A Channel for Europe's Capital Flight - 0 views

www.pimco.com/...or-Europes-Capital-Flight.aspx

shared by Gene Ellis on 09 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • Its full name is more than a mouthful. Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement System is better known as TARGET2 for short. It is the behind-the-scene payments system that conveniently enables citizens across the euro area to settle electronic transactions in euro. And at just over €500 billion, its TARGET2 claim on the Eurosystem is also the largest and fastest growing item on the Bundesbank’s balance sheet, as well as a source of much misunderstanding and debate.
  • The allocation of TARGET2 balances among the seventeen national central banks, which together with the ECB make up the Eurosystem, reflects where the market allocates the money created by the ECB. The fact that the Bundesbank has a large TARGET2 claim (asset) on the Eurosystem, while national central banks in southern Europe and Ireland together have an equally large TARGET2 liability, simply reflects that a lot of the ECB’s newly created money has ended up in Germany. Why? Because of capital flight.
  • Since the euro eliminated exchange rate risk among its member states, Germany has invested a substantial portion of its savings in Europe’s current account deficit countries. Some of those savings are now returning home. That’s the capital flight.
  • ...7 more annotations...
  • The ECB stepped into the void left by foreign investors pulling their savings out of these current account deficit countries by lending their banks more money.
  • When large capital flight to Germany occurred before the euro’s introduction, the deutschemark would appreciate against other European currencies. While pegged against the deutschemark, these exchange rates were still flexible. That flexibility disappeared with the euro. When capital flight occurs today, the Bundesbank effectively ends up with loans to the other national central banks that are reflected in the TARGET2 claims on the Eurosystem. 
  • Debt overhangs persist, growth is mediocre and the governance structure – a common monetary policy without a centralized fiscal policy – is a challenge.
  • The ECB has allowed banks to borrow as much money as they want for up to three years. Indeed, at the end of February banks were borrowing €1.2 trillion from the ECB, twelve times the amount of their required reserves. With so much excess liquidity in the money markets, further capital flight is likely to cause a disproportionable share of this money to end up in Germany
  • Concerned about the stability of the euro, Germany’s savers are shifting their money into real estate. German residential house prices and rents rose by 4.7% last year, the fastest increase since 1993’s reunification boom. So far, Germans are not leveraging to buy houses. Growth in German mortgages is paltry at just 1.2% per annum according to the ECB as of December 2011, but in our view all ingredients for a debt-financed house price boom are there. Distrust in the euro is rising,
  • The ECB’s generous monetary policy will delay the internal devaluation adjustment of the eurozone’s current account deficit countries.
  • Mexico’s current account deficit fell by 5.3% of GDP in 1995, according to Haver Analytics, in the wake of capital flight following the government’s decision to float the peso in 1994, while its recession lasted only one year.
Gene Ellis

An interview with Athanasios Orphanides: What happened in Cyprus | The Economist - 0 views

www.economist.com/...nterview-athanasios-orphanides

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • Cyprus had developed its financial center over three decades ago by having double taxation treaties with a number of countries, the Soviet Union for example. That means if profits are booked and earned and taxed in Cyprus, they are not taxed again in the other country. Russian deposits are there because Cyprus has a low corporate tax rate, much like Malta and Luxembourg, which annoys some people in Europe.
  • In addition, Cyprus has a legal system based on English law and follows English accounting rules
  • This government took a country with excellent fiscal finances, a surplus in fiscal accounts, and a banking system that was in excellent health. They started overspending, not only for unproductive government expenditures but also they raised implicit liabilities by raising pension promises, and so forth.
  • ...11 more annotations...
  • The size of the banking sector and exposure to Greece were known risks but at that time there was no banking problem in Cyprus
  • The containers were part of a shipment going from Iran to Syria that was intercepted in Cypriot waters after a tip from the U.S. The president took the decision to keep the ammunition. [NOTE: An independent prosecutor found that Christofias has ignored repeated warnings and pleas to destroy or safeguard the ammunition, apparently in hopes of one day returning it to Syria or Iran.]
  • Instead, they started lobbying the Russian government to give them a loan that would help them finance the country for a couple more years, and Russia came through, unfortunately,
  • I say unfortunately because as a result the government could keep operating and accumulating deficits without taking corrective action.
  • The next important date was the October 26-27, 2011 meeting of the EU council in Brussels where European leaders decided to wipe out what ended up being about 80% of the value of Greek debt that the private sector held. Every bank operating in Greece, regardless of where it was headquartered, had a lot of Greek debt.
  • For Cyprus, the writedown of Greek debt was between 4.5 and 5 billion euro, a substantial chunk of capital.
  • The second element of the decision taken by heads of states was to instruct the EBA to do a so- called capital exercise that marked to market sovereign debt and effectively raised abruptly capital requirements. The exercise required banks to have a core tier-1 ratio of 9%, and on top of that a buffer to make up for differences in market and book value of government debt. That famous capital exercise created the capital crunch in the euro area which is the cause of the recession we've had in the euro area for the last 2 years.
  • The Basle II framework that governments adopted internationally, and that the EU supervisory framework during this period also incorporated, specifies that holdings of government debt in a states' own currency are a zero-risk-weight asset, that is they are assigned a weight of zero in calculating capital requirements.
  • the governments should have agreed to make the EFSF/ESM available for direct recapitalization of banks instead of asking each government to be responsible for the capitalization.
  • Following a downgrading in late June 2012, all three major rating agencies rated the sovereign paper Cyprus below investment grade. According to ECB rules, that made the government debt not eligible as collateral for borrowing from the eurosystem, unless the ECB suspended the rules, as it had done for the cases of Greece, Portugal and Ireland. In the case of Cyprus, the ECB decided not to suspend the eligibility rule.
  • The governments have created risk in what before last week were considered perfectly safe deposits. This is going to have a chilling effect on deposits in any bank in a country perceived to be weak. This will mean the cost of funding will increase in the periphery of Europe and as a result, the cost of financing for businesses and households will increase. That will add to the divergences we already have and make the recession in the periphery of Europe deeper than it already is. This is really a disaster for European economic management as a whole. 
Gene Ellis

Op-ed: The End of the Euro: A Survivor's Guide - 0 views

www.iie.com/...oped.cfm

EUROCRISIS

shared by Gene Ellis on 16 Jun 12 - No Cached
  • Ms. Lagarde's empathy is wearing thin and this is unfortunate—particularly as the Greek failure mostly demonstrates how wrong a single currency is for Europe.
  • The Greek backlash reflects the enormous pain and difficulty that comes with trying to arrange "internal devaluations" (a euphemism for big wage and spending cuts) in order to restore competitiveness and repay an excessive debt level.
  • During the next stage of the crisis, Europe's electorate will be rudely awakened to the large financial risks which have been foisted upon them in failed attempts to keep the single currency alive. When Greece quits the euro, its government will default on approximately 121 billion euros of debt to official creditors and about 27 billion euros owed to the IMF.
  • ...7 more annotations...
  • More importantly and less known to German taxpayers, Greece will also default on 155 billion euros directly owed to the euro system (comprised of the ECB and the 17 national central banks in the euro area). This includes 110 billion euros provided automatically to Greece through the Target2 payments system—which handles settlements between central banks for countries using the euro. As depositors and lenders flee Greek banks, someone needs to finance that capital flight, otherwise Greek banks would fail. This role is taken on by other euro area central banks, which have quietly lent large funds, with the balances reported in the Target2 account. The vast bulk of this lending is, in practice, done by the Bundesbank since capital flight mostly goes to Germany, although all members of the euro system share the losses if there are defaults.
  • But between Target2 and direct bond purchases alone, the euro system claims on troubled periphery countries are now approximately 1.1 trillion euros (this is our estimate based on available official data). This amounts to over 200 percent of the (broadly defined) capital of the euro system.
  • No responsible bank would claim these sums are minor risks to its capital or to taxpayers. These claims also amount to 43 percent of German Gross Domestic Product,
  • Jacek Rostowski, the Polish Finance Minister, recently warned that the calamity of a Greek default is likely to result in a flight from banks and sovereign debt across the periphery, and that—to avoid a greater calamity—all remaining member nations need to be provided with unlimited funding for at least 18 months. Mr. Rostowski expresses concern, however, that the ECB is not prepared to provide such a firewall, and no other entity has the capacity, legitimacy, or will to do so.
  • The most likely scenario is that the ECB will reluctantly and haltingly provide funds to other nations—an on-again, off-again pattern of support—and that simply won't be enough to stabilize the situation.
  • he automatic mechanics of Europe's payment system will mean the capital flight from Spain and Italy to German banks is transformed into larger and larger de facto loans by the Bundesbank to Banca d'Italia and Banco de Espana—essentially to the Italian and Spanish states. German taxpayers will begin to see through this scheme and become afraid of further losses.
  • there will be recognition that the ECB has lost control of monetary policy, is being forced to create credits to finance capital flight and prop up troubled sovereigns—and that those credits may not get repaid in full. The world will no longer think of the euro as a safe currency; rather investors will shun bonds from the whole region, and even Germany may have trouble issuing debt at reasonable interest rates.
Gene Ellis

The delicate balance of fixing the eurozone | Martin Wolf's Exchange - 0 views

blogs.ft.com/...balance-of-fixing-the-eurozone

shared by Gene Ellis on 17 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • The euro itself was a leading cause of this crisis by ushering in a remarkably swift convergence in interest rates, which had the effect of directing too much capital into countries that formerly had had to pay high interest rates. This undermined the competitiveness of these countries through inflation and gave rise to huge deficits in their current accounts.
  • The euro is not suffering from a mere confidence crisis that can be resolved by assuaging the markets; it is experiencing a profound balance‐of‐payment crisis that is being prolonged by the expansion of public financial aid.
  • Since autumn 2007, long before the official bail‐out initiatives began, some of the crisis‐hit countries have replaced dwindling private capital imports and capital flight with their money‐printing presses (Target credits).
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  • 5. Export surpluses create no real value if they translate into claims vis‐à‐vis countries which ultimately cannot pay their debts,
  • 6. The ECB Council overstepped its mandate when it transferred to Eurozone national central banks, primarily the Bundesbank, the task of financing the public and private deficits of other countries.
  • 7. Germany’s liability for the bail‐out initiatives does not total 211 billion euros, as often cited, but is actually now close to 600 billion euros if the far larger bailout initiatives of the ECB are included in this figure.
  • 8. The Target credits and the purchase of government bonds by the ECB system transfer the investment risk of private investors and banks to the taxpayers of economically sound countries, posing a threat to the euro because they offer debtor countries incentives to advocate inflationary policies at the ECB Council which would help them defer their obligation to repay their foreign debts.
  • 9. Eurobonds would undermine debt discipline, lead to much higher interest burdens for the German state, and anew induce capital flows in Europe that would exacerbate the external imbalances.
  • ) Target debts are to be settled on an annual basis with interest‐bearing, marketable assets as in the US.
  • g) Countries that are not competitive enough to repay their foreign debts should, in their own interest, leave the Monetary Union.”
  • I also appreciate the fact that the declaration envisages a credit boom in Germany that would ultimately rebalance the eurozone economy. Nevertheless, this rebalancing is likely to prove painfully slow and certainly requires a prolonged period of relatively high inflation in Germany, to offset relatively low inflation in the vulnerable countries. It is far from clear that German public opinion is prepared for such an outcome.
  • More important, I do not believe a currency union that takes for granted the possibility of sovereign defaults and even exit would prove workable. It is a recipe for extreme financial instability, with huge runs on credit to banks, private non-banks and governments built in.
  • mechanisms of financing and adjustment. Permanent transfers from some countries to others, merely to offset a lack of
  • competitiveness (rather than accelerate income convergence), are indeed undesirable. Nevertheless, financing needs to be sufficiently large and generous to give vulnerable countries some chance of managing the adjustment to shocks, without sovereign default, mass private bankruptcies and implosion of financial systems.
  • Gene Ellis on 17 Jul 12
     
    The second major article on Professor Hans-Werner Sinn's attack on the premises of the eurozone. TARGET 2 analysis, plus...
Gene Ellis

Financial Globalization in Reverse? by Martin N. Baily and Susan Lund - Project Syndicate - 0 views

www.project-syndicate.org/...martin-n--baily-and-susan-lund

globalization financial Martin Baily

shared by Gene Ellis on 15 Jan 14 - No Cached
  • Cross-border capital flows abruptly collapsed. Almost five years later, they remain 60% below their pre-crisis peak.
  • After expanding across national borders with the creation of the euro, eurozone banks have now reduced cross-border lending and other claims within the eurozone by $2.8 trillion since the end of 2007. Other types of cross-border investment in Europe have fallen by more than half. The rationale for the euro’s creation – the financial and economic integration of Europe – is now being undermined.
  • Current trends seem to be leading toward a more fragmented global financial system in which countries rely primarily on domestic capital formation. Sharper regional disparities in the availability and cost of capital could emerge, particularly for smaller businesses and consumers, constraining investment and growth in some countries. And, while a more balkanized financial system does reduce the likelihood of global shocks creating volatility in far-flung markets, it may also concentrate risks within local banking systems and increase the chance of domestic financial crises.
Gene Ellis

Foreign Banks in U.S. Face Greater Restrictions - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...face-greater-restrictions.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 26 Apr 13 - No Cached
  • As for equity levels, in many cases a foreign bank might simply have to convert loans it had made to the American operation into equity investments. Suddenly the American operation would appear to be better capitalized.
  • European regulators who trusted Iceland to regulate its own banks wound up paying off depositors even though there is little hope Iceland will ever reimburse those payments.
  • It turns out that in the financial crisis, big banks with high leverage ratios — that is, more capital relative to assets — were significantly more likely to survive without needing bailouts.
  • ...2 more annotations...
  • “The current rules can be very easily gamed,”
  • thinks that regulators would be better off to seek simplicity through measures like leverage ratios, rather than allow banks to make calculations that depend on thousands of estimates to determine how much capital they need.
Gene Ellis

Europe's banking union: Till default do us part | The Economist - 0 views

www.economist.com/...s-it-solves-till-default-do-us

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • Almost a year ago, as the euro crisis raged, Europe’s leaders boldly pledged a union to break the dangerous link between indebted governments and ailing banking systems, where the troubles of one threatened to pull down the other.
  • Almost everyone involved agrees that in theory a banking union ought to have three legs.
  • a single supervisor
  • ...8 more annotations...
  • the powers to “resolve” failed banks
  • these powers also require a pot of money (or at least a promise to pay) to clean up the mess l
  • The third leg is a credible euro-wide guarantee on deposits to reassure savers that a euro in an Italian or Spanish bank is just as safe as one in a German or Dutch bank.
  • He dryly notes that Germany couldn’t even force its own savings banks to join its national deposit-insurance scheme.
  • Each country in the euro has its own bankruptcy code
  • Putting the European Central Bank (ECB) in charge of the region’s biggest banks should end the cosy relationship between banks and regulators that allowed Irish and Spanish banks to keep lending during property bubbles and the likes of Deutsche Bank to run with so little capital. If the ECB proves itself an effective supervisor
  • without ready access to a pot of money to fill these holes, the ECB could be reluctant to force banks to come clean. “It is madness to expose capital shortfalls if you don’t know where new capital is going to come from,” says one bank supervisor.
  • “If you wanted to challenge a decision, where would you go to court?” asks the head of a European bank regulator.
Gene Ellis

Business and government: The new age of crony capitalism | The Economist - 1 views

www.economist.com/...ent-years-crony-capitalism-may

shared by Gene Ellis on 25 Apr 14 - No Cached
  • Rent-seeking” is what economists call a special type of money-making: the sort made possible by political connections. This can range from outright graft to a lack of competition, poor regulation and the transfer of public assets to firms at bargain prices. Well-placed people have made their fortunes this way ever since rulers had enough power to issue profitable licences, permits and contracts to their cronies.
  • Capitalism based on rent-seeking is not just unfair, but also bad for long-term growth.
  • It identifies sectors which are particularly dependent on government—such as mining, oil and gas, banking and casinos—
  • ...2 more annotations...
  • Second, the financial incentives for businesses may be changing. The share of billionaire wealth from rent-rich industries in emerging markets is now falling, from a peak of 76% in 2008 to 58% today. This is partly a natural progression.
  • In China today the big money is made from the internet, not building heavy industrial plants with subsidised loans on land secured through party connections.
Gene Ellis

Hot Money Blues - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...krugman-hot-money-blues.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 25 Mar 13 - No Cached
  • for the time being, and probably for years to come, the island nation will have to maintain fairly draconian controls on the movement of capital in and out of the country.
  • It will mark the end of an era for Cyprus, which has in effect spent the past decade advertising itself as a place where wealthy individuals who want to avoid taxes and scrutiny can safely park their money, no questions asked.
  • To some extent this reflected the fact that capital controls have potential costs: they impose extra burdens of paperwork, they make business operations more difficult, and conventional economic analysis says that they should have a negative impact on growth (although this effect is hard to find in the numbers). But it also reflected the rise of free-market ideology,
  • ...2 more annotations...
  • It’s hard to imagine now, but for more than three decades after World War II financial crises of the kind we’ve lately become so familiar with hardly ever happened.
  • But the best predictor of crisis is large inflows of foreign money: in all but a couple of the cases I just mentioned, the foundation for crisis was laid by a rush of foreign investors into a country, followed by a sudden rush out.
Gene Ellis

Cyprus adds to Europe's confusion - FT.com - 0 views

www.ft.com/...4a-11e2-a4fa-00144feabdc0.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Mar 13 - No Cached
  • First, the eurozone does indeed have the capacity to do the right thing in the end, though not before first exhausting all the alternatives.
  • It protects the small deposits and imposes a rational resolution process.
  • Second, a euro is indeed not a euro everywhere.
  • ...6 more annotations...
  • A consensus on the principle that creditors, not taxpayers, should pay if a bank becomes insolvent does not yet exist across the eurozone. Does anybody imagine the German government would not rescue Deutsche Bank if it were in trouble? Of course it would.
  • Yet, as Guntram Wolff of Bruegel notes, a currency union with internal exchange controls is a contradiction in terms. Only the willingness of the European Central Bank to finance Cypriot banks without limit could end these controls in the near future. Will it be willing to act soon?
  • The outcome in Cyprus underlines the fact that the value of a euro of bank liabilities depends on the solvency of the bank itself and the solvency of the government standing behind the bank. If both bank and state are insolvent, lenders are likely not only to lose a big proportion of their money outright, but to find that the rest is frozen behind controls,
  • The ideal conclusion from the Cypriot imbroglio would be that all eurozone banks should have more capital.
  • A final lesson of this crisis is that what I have called the “bad marriage” that binds the eurozone members together has become worse.
  • Thus the eurozone limps on through crisis after crisis. Can – or will – this continue indefinitely? I do not know.
Gene Ellis

Op-Ed Columnist - The Euro Trap - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...30krugman.html

krugman euro trap nytimes

shared by Gene Ellis on 24 Apr 13 - Cached
  • The fact is that three years ago none of the countries now in or near crisis seemed to be in deep fiscal trouble.
  • And all of the countries were attracting large inflows of foreign capital, largely because markets believed that membership in the euro zone made Greek, Portuguese and Spanish bonds safe investments.
  • Then came the global financial crisis. Those inflows of capital dried up; revenues plunged and deficits soared; and membership in the euro, which had encouraged markets to love the crisis countries not wisely but too well, turned into a trap.
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • During the years of easy money, wages and prices in the crisis countries rose much faster than in the rest of Europe. Now that the money is no longer rolling in, those countries need to get costs back in line.
  • Now that Greece and Germany share the same currency, however, the only way to reduce Greek relative costs is through some combination of German inflation and Greek deflation. And since Germany won’t accept inflation, deflation it is.
  • The problem is that deflation — falling wages and prices — is always and everywhere a deeply painful process. It invariably involves a prolonged slump with high unemployment. And it also aggravates debt problems, both public and private, because incomes fall while the debt burden doesn’t.
  • Earlier this week, when it downgraded Greek debt, Standard & Poor’s suggested that the euro value of Greek G.D.P. may not return to its 2008 level until 2017, meaning that Greece has no hope of growing out of its troubles.
  • Until recently, most analysts, myself included, considered a euro breakup basically impossible, since any government that even hinted that it was considering leaving the euro would be inviting a catastrophic run on its banks. But if the crisis countries are forced into default, they’ll probably face severe bank runs anyway, forcing them into emergency measures like temporary restrictions on bank withdrawals. This would open the door to euro exit.
Gene Ellis

Europe's Irrelevant Austerity Debate by Daniel Gros - Project Syndicate - 0 views

www.project-syndicate.org/...ogoff-in-europe-by-daniel-gros

shared by Gene Ellis on 08 May 13 - No Cached
  • But the debate about austerity and the cost of high public-debt levels misses a key point: Public debt owed to foreigners is different from debt owed to residents.
  • If foreign debt matters more than public debt, the key variable requiring adjustment is the external deficit, not the fiscal deficit. A country that has a balanced current account does not need any additional foreign capital. That is why risk premiums are continuing to fall in the eurozone, despite high political uncertainty in Italy and continuing large fiscal deficits elsewhere. The peripheral countries’ external deficits are falling rapidly, thus diminishing the need for foreign financing.
  • And the evidence confirms that the euro crisis is not really about sovereign debt, but about foreign debt.
  • ...4 more annotations...
  • By contrast, in the case of debt owed to foreigners, higher interest rates lead to a welfare loss for the country as a whole, because the government must transfer resources abroad, which usually requires a combination of exchange-rate depreciation and a reduction in domestic expenditure.
  • But austerity can never be self-defeating for the external adjustment. On the contrary, the larger the fall in domestic demand in response to a cut in government expenditure, the more imports will fall and the stronger the improvement in the current account – and thus ultimately the reduction in the risk premium – will be.
  • Second, if foreign debt is the real problem, the escalating debate about the Reinhart/Rogoff results is irrelevant for the euro crisis. Countries that have their own currency, like the United Kingdom – and especially the United States, which can borrow from foreigners in dollars – do not face a direct financing constraint.
  • But the eurozone’s peripheral countries simply did not have a choice: they had to reduce their deficits, because the foreign capital on which their economies were so dependent was no longer available.
Gene Ellis

Kenen on the euro | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/kenen-euro

shared by Gene Ellis on 26 Jan 13 - No Cached
  • Early work on optimum currency areas by Robert Mundell had emphasised the symmetry or asymmetry of disturbances hitting different regional economies as a key criterion on which to gauge their suitability for sharing a common currency.
  • Peter took this insight further by arguing that disturbances were often sector specific and that the diversification of regional economies was therefore a key consideration in gauging their suitability for monetary union (the better diversified an economy was, the less likely it was to be badly destabilised by a sector-specific shock). (Kenen 1969).
  • We now know that Kenen flagged a problem for which the Eurozone could have been better prepared. With an outsized capital-goods producing sector, Germany benefitted from a strong positive shock as a result of China’s emergence onto the global stage, given the Chinese economy’s voracious appetite for capital goods.
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • Portugal and Italy, on the other hand, specialised much more heavily in consumer-goods producing sectors and felt the brunt of Chinese competition. No Eurozone member was sufficiently well diversified to shrug off this kind of shock, something that should have made the euro’s architects think twice.
  • Specifically, they should have thought again, Kenen argued, about the coordination of national fiscal policies, the need for a common Eurozone budget, and mechanisms for transferring fiscal resources from booming to depressed regions.
  • More than any other economist, Peter understood that monetary union was a legal as well as an economic construct. His careful parsing of the Maastricht Treaty explained to the economics profession exactly what the treaty did and did not allow (Kenen 1992).
  • Peter even anticipated the debate over TARGET2 imbalances, observing in 1999 that it was possible to “easily conceive of conditions…in which one [national central bank] would be reluctant to build up claims indefinitely on some other national central bank.” (Kenen 1999).
  • Finally, Peter observed that the possibility of a member state exiting from the Eurozone could not be ruled out but warned that European officials should be cautious in bandying about the idea (Kenen 1999). “The costs of defecting,” he wrote back in 1999, “could be very high.”
  • Gene Ellis on 26 Jan 13
     
    Good Eichengreen, Wyplosz EUVox article on Peter Kenen and insights on why the Euro might have difficuties.
Gene Ellis

Five lessons from the Spanish cajas debacle for a new euro-wide supervisor | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...bacle-new-euro-wide-supervisor

lessons spanish debacle supervisor vox

shared by Gene Ellis on 23 Oct 12 - No Cached
  • just the three most problematic Spanish cajas (Bankia, CatalunyaCaixa and Novagalicia) have had capital deficits (to be covered partly or fully by the taxpayer) of €54 billion – over 5% of Spanish GDP, a larger amount than what Spain will have to request from the European rescue funds.
  • Already the first entity that was intervened (CCM) as far back as March 2009, showed that the real NPL levels post intervention (17.6%) were more than twice as large as the reported ones. This should have been the point for the Banco de España to get ahead of the curve by ordering an audit of the whole sector
  • There is no intimation by anyone of outright corruption in the Banco de España supervisory role, and given the professionalism of the institution it is unlikely that there was any.
  • ...13 more annotations...
  • not surprisingly, Banco de España supervisors had little interest in discovering that Spain’s vaunted regulator had in fact missed the largest financial crisis in the history of the country
  • Unfortunately, often supervisors in charge of the failing entity in the years of the debt run up were the ones charged with uncovering the problems.
  • Spain was the leader in the introduction of a dynamic provision – a provisioning tool that forces banks to increase provisions without reference to any specific loan. The intention of this tool was twofold: to mitigate the bad times, and to cool the booms in the good times (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). Dynamic provisions were endorsed as part of the Basel III standards in December 2010, in part on the strength of Spain’s experience. And indeed the existing evidence (Jiménez et al. 2012) shows that the tool worked as intended, dampening the credit boom and softening somewhat the credit crunch. However, it is clear by now that their level was not nearly enough, as their size – 3% of GDP at their highest point (2004) – was simply not of a magnitude commensurate with the credit losses.
  • Without the provisions, the reality of the cajas' accounts would have become much faster a concern, and would have imposed itself on the regulator
  • Had the Banco de España ordered an audit of the system after uncovering numerous irregularities in CCM, it would have not been able to deal with the capital shortfalls uncovered as there was no appropriate resolution regime in Spain at the time
  • governance played a critical role in the development of the Spanish crisis. In the Spanish case, the supervisor, confronted with powerful and well connected ex-politicians decided to look the other way in the face of obvious building trouble.
  • More systematic evidence of the role played by these governance issues is provided in a 2009 paper (Cuñat and Garicano 2009b) where we showed that cajas with chief executives who had no previous banking experience (!), no graduate education, and were politically connected did substantially worse in the run up to the crisis (granting more real estate developer loan, up to half of the entire loan book in some instances) and during the crisis (with higher NPLs).
  • Even more important was the role of these political connections in diluting the role of the supervisor after the crisis started, in what was meant to be the crisis resolution stage but which was in fact a crisis cover up stage.
  • What are the takeaways
  • I would suggest five.
  • Second, career concerns of supervisors are crucial.
  • Third, dynamic provisioning is a good idea, but the supervisor must be mindful it may delay decision making in problem cases
  • Fifth, supervision and an appropriately tough resolution regime must go hand in hand.
Gene Ellis

Analysis: Euro zone fragmenting faster than EU can act - 0 views

www.theprovince.com/...story.html

analysis euro zone faster act

shared by Gene Ellis on 14 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • Deposit flight from Spanish banks has been gaining pace and it is not clear a euro zone agreement to lend Madrid up to 100 billion euros in rescue funds will reverse the flows if investors fear Spain may face a full sovereign bailout.
  • Many banks are reorganising, or being forced to reorganise, along national lines, accentuating a deepening north-south divide within the currency bloc.
  • Since government credit ratings and bond yields effectively set a floor for the borrowing costs of banks and businesses in their jurisdiction, the best-managed Spanish or Italian banks or companies have to pay far more for loans, if they can get them, than their worst-managed German or Dutch peers.
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • European Central Bank President Mario Draghi acknowledged as he cut interest rates last week that the north-south disconnect was making it more difficult to run a single monetary policy.
  • Two huge injections of cheap three-year loans into the euro zone banking system this year, amounting to 1 trillion euros, bought only a few months' respite.
  • Conservative German economists led by Hans-Werner Sinn, head of the Ifo institute, are warning of dire consequences for Germany from ballooning claims via the ECB's system for settling payments among national central banks, known as TARGET2.
  • If a southern country were to default or leave the euro, they contend, Germany would be left with an astronomical bill, far beyond its theoretical limit of 211 billion euros liability for euro zone bailout funds.
  • As long as European monetary union is permanent and irreversible, such cross-border claims and capital flows within the currency area should not matter any more than money moving between Texas and California does.But even the faintest prospect of a Day of Reckoning changes that calculus radically.In that case, money would flood into German assets considered "safe" and out of securities and deposits in countries seen as at risk of leaving the monetary union. Some pessimists reckon we are already witnessing the early signs of such a process.
  • Either member governments would always be willing to let their national central banks give unlimited credit to each other, in which case a collapse would be impossible, or they might be unwilling to provide boundless credit, "and this will set the parameters for the dynamics of collapse", Garber warned.
  • "The problem is that at the time of a sovereign debt crisis, large portions of a national balance sheet may suddenly flee to the ECB's books, possibly overwhelming the capacity of a bailout fund to absorb the entire hit," he wrote in 2010,
  • national regulators in some EU countries are moving quietly to try to reduce their home banks' exposure to such an eventuality. The ECB itself last week set a limit on the amount of state-backed bank bonds that banks could use as collateral in its lending operations.
  • In one high-profile case, Germany's financial regulator Bafin ordered HypoVereinsbank (HVB), the German subsidiary of UniCredit, to curb transfers to its parent bank in Italy last year, people familiar with the case said.
  • In any case, common supervision without joint deposit insurance may be insufficient to reverse capital flight.
Gene Ellis

Op-ed: Greece's Exit May Become the Euro's Envy - 0 views

www.iie.com/...oped.cfm

greece euro

shared by Gene Ellis on 18 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • The immediate consequences of Greece leaving or being forced out of the euro area would certainly be devastating. Capital flight would intensify, fuelling depreciation and inflation. All existing contracts would need to be redenominated and renegotiated, creating financial chaos. Perhaps most politically devastating, fiscal austerity might actually need to intensify, since Greece still runs a primary deficit, which it would have to correct if EU and International Monetary Fund financing vanished.
  • But this process would also produce a substantially depreciated exchange rate (50 drachmas to the euro, anyone?) And that would set in motion a process of adjustment that would soon reorient the economy and put it on a path of sustainable growth. In fact, Greek growth would probably surge, possibly for a prolonged period, if it adopted sensible policies to rapidly restore and sustain macroeconomic stability.
  • Just look at what happened to the countries that defaulted and devalued during the financial crises of the 1990s. They all initially suffered severe contractions. But the recessions lasted only one or two years. Then came the rebound. South Korea posted nine years of growth averaging nearly 6 percent. Indonesia, which experienced a wave of defaults that toppled nearly every bank in the entire system, registered growth above 5 percent for a similar period; Argentina close to 8 percent; and Russia above 7 percent. The historical record shows clearly that there is life after financial crises.
  • ...2 more annotations...
  • Today, Germany grudgingly does the minimum needed to keep the euro area intact. If exit to emulate Greece becomes an attractive proposition, Germany will be put on the spot—and the magnanimity it shows in place of its current miserliness will be the ultimate test of how much it values the euro area.
  • The answer might prove surprising. The German public might suddenly realize that the euro area confers on Germany not one but two “exorbitant privileges”: low interest rates as the haven for European capital and a competitive exchange rate by being hitched to weaker partners. In that case, Germany would have to offer its partners a much more attractive deal to keep them in the euro area.
Gene Ellis

Is Germany Responsible for the Euro Crisis? - Businessweek - 0 views

www.businessweek.com/...esponsible-for-the-euro-crisis

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • This narrative ignores one critical fact: Every irresponsible borrower is enabled by an irresponsible lender.
  • “Following the introduction of the euro,” he said, “a large amount of capital flowed into the countries which are now at the center of the crisis, such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus.” What he didn’t say was how much of that capital flowed from Germany. In the second quarter of 2010, German banks had more assets in Greece than banks from any other country except France. They had more assets in Ireland than banks from any other country except the U.K. And they had more assets in Spain than banks from any other country, period.
  • Before the euro, when Germans saved, their current account balance rose, and with it, the value of the deutsche mark. After 2002 you could save in euros in Dortmund, and without currency risk your bank would invest in euros abroad
Gene Ellis

Four rescue measures for stagnant eurozone - FT.com - 0 views

www.ft.com/...81-11e4-a882-00144feabdc0.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 18 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • Four rescue measures for stagnant eurozone
  • The EBA has a long record of stress tests that grotesquely underestimate the capital holes in EU banks.
  • Both the AQR and the stress test relied heavily on national regulators and supervisors – the very entities on whose watch the excesses that led to the financial crisis were allowed to fester and compound.
  • ...6 more annotations...
  • They were in charge of the regulatory leniency that permitted the banks in their jurisdictions to engage in lender forbearance (extend and pretend/delay and pray) and to overstate the fair value of their assets.
  • To avoid the cyclical stagnation in the eurozone turning into secular stagnation, four policies are required.
  • he first is a proper AQR and stress test followed by a speedy recapitalisation of the capital-deficient banks and a wave of consolidation in the eurozone banking sector to bring higher profitability
  • The second measure is a temporary fiscal stimulus (say 1 per cent of eurozone GDP per year for two years, concentrated in the countries with the largest output gaps, that is, in the periphery), which is permanently funded and monetised by the ECB.
  • this will be a reminder that the most important asset of central banks – the present value of future seigniorage profits – is off-balance sheet.
  • Finally, to achieve debt sustainability for the eurozone sovereigns, radical supply side reforms are required that boost the growth rate of potential output to at least 1.5 per cent in Italy, Portugal and other sclerotic countries.
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