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The second element of the debt-relief package would be more innovative: If Greece’s economy performs well, the generous extension of maturities can be clawed back or the interest rate raised. A formula for this could be linked to the debt/GDP ratio

Why bother? Because the very premise of the current deal and the expectations it sets out are wrong. First, the notion that there is a smooth transition path for the debt/GDP ratio from 200% to 124% is fanciful. Second, even if, by some miracle, Greece did reach the 124% mark by 2020, the claim that its debt will then be “sustainable” is absurd.

Make no mistake: policymakers’ track record on forecasting Greek economic performance during the crisis has been an embarrassment. In May 2010, the International Monetary Fund projected – presumably in concurrence with its European partners – that Greece’s annual GDP growth would exceed 1% in 2012. Instead, the Greek economy will shrink by 6%. The unemployment rate, expected to peak this year at 15%, is now above 25% – and is still rising. The debt/GDP ratio was expected to top out at 150%; absent the substantial write-down of privately held debt, which was deemed unnecessary, the ratio would have been close to 250%.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphIn September 2010, four months after the official Greek bailout was put in place, the IMF issued a pamphlet asserting that “default in today’s advanced economies is unnecessary, undesirable, and unlikely.” The conclusion was that official financing would carry Greece past its short-term liquidity problems. Calls for immediate debt restructuring went unheeded. Six months later, after substantial official funds had been used to pay private creditors, the outstanding private debt was substantially restructured.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphSuch were the errors committed over short time horizons.

And, again, even if Greece somehow did achieve the 124% milestone, its debt would still not be sustainable.

Staying the course, as Summers warns, will lead only to “needless suffering” before that course inevitably collapses, bringing Greece – and much else –­ crashing down.

the time will come when the ECB will set a policy that is too tight for the outliers, leading to substantially higher unemployment than if they were free to set their own monetary policies. Even without discretionary monetary policies, the interest rates in countries with weak demand would naturally decline, and the external values of their currencies would fall, both acting as offsetting stabilizers of the countries weak demand. But this will not be possible within the EMU, where a single interest rate and a single exchange rate prevail. Result: higher average cyclical unemployment.

In the U.S., a fall in regional demand leads to lower wages, which help to maintain employment; to movements of labor to regions where demand is stronger; and to a net fiscal transfer from Washington (because lower regional income means lower federal tax liability). None of this happens in Europe, where wages are inflexible, mobility is severely limited by language and custom, and there are no significant fiscal transfers.

Politicians can now blame the ECB for high unemployment and complain that it is a powerful force beyond national control. Instead of seeking to make labor markets more flexible, European governments are talking more about "social wages," about mandatory 35-hour workweeks, and about rolling back even the small reductions in social benefits Germany achieved under Helmut Kohls government. Worse yet, there are attempts to eliminate differences in labor practices and even differences in wages among the EMU countries.

Moreover, these policies reduce the international competitiveness of many European industries and encourage the adoption of protectionist policies to keep out non-European products.

Forcing a single monetary policy on all of Europe will cause the countries that suffer what they regard as unnecessarily high unemployment to resent the actions of others. Attempts to force a Europewide tax system, especially if taxes are used to redistribute incomes among European countries, will compound the potential for conflict.

But such a pact would be circumscribed to helping countries help themselves.

But government debt is still growing considerably. Doesn't this also increase the risk of inflation? Starbatty: That's what I assume. Inflation would be an elegant means of reducing debt, and many academics are discussing this scenario. But it becomes truly problematic when government bonds eventually lose their status as a safe haven. If China or Japan arrive at this conclusion and sell their bonds, a bubble could burst that is far more dangerous than any other bubble. If that happens, markets will plunge, and interest rates will shoot up.

Likewise, when it comes to assistance, I think we have a clear legal framework, according to which neither any member state nor the entire Union can be held liable for the debt of another member state.

Two huge injections of cheap three-year loans into the euro zone banking system this year, amounting to 1 trillion euros, bought only a few months' respite.

Conservative German economists led by Hans-Werner Sinn, head of the Ifo institute, are warning of dire consequences for Germany from ballooning claims via the ECB's system for settling payments among national central banks, known as TARGET2.

As long as European monetary union is permanent and irreversible, such cross-border claims and capital flows within the currency area should not matter any more than money moving between Texas and California does.But even the faintest prospect of a Day of Reckoning changes that calculus radically.In that case, money would flood into German assets considered "safe" and out of securities and deposits in countries seen as at risk of leaving the monetary union. Some pessimists reckon we are already witnessing the early signs of such a process.

Either member governments would always be willing to let their national central banks give unlimited credit to each other, in which case a collapse would be impossible, or they might be unwilling to provide boundless credit, "and this will set the parameters for the dynamics of collapse", Garber warned.

it was startling to see international investors fearful of getting their money back from members of the single currency.

He said the eurozone's total public sector debt will reach 90% at the end of the year compared to 106% in the US and 235% in Japan.

Mario Boselli, chairman of the Italian Chamber of Fashion, frets that larger emerging economies still account for only 10% of total Italian exports. "This is not enough" to offset the weakness in developed economies, he says.

Both Mr. Boselli and Philip Halpin, an adviser to the Irish Exporters' Association, say the euro would have to fall as low as $1.10 (from about $1.23 currently), to produce a robust export-led recovery.

Ludovic Subran, chief economist at French trade-credit insurer Euler Hermes, warns that might not be enough. Such a depreciation would have little effect in France because high taxes and rigid labor costs reduce the potential benefits, he says.

Any euro-zone economy would benefit from a drop in the euro to the extent that it can redirect more resources to external markets. But the willingness and ability of businesses to do that differs across the region. Nadio Delai, chairman of Italian research and consultancy firm Ermeneia, say a host of smaller, less prestigious Italian shoe and textile companies have started to export to emerging markets, riding the coattails of more famous names.

These thoughts are spurred by the rather weak communique, which followed the meeting earlier last week of eurogroup finance ministers in Brussels,

There is, as yet, no mechanism in place to ensure bond market support to Spain and Italy and nobody, except the ECB, has the funds to keep their governments funded, should they be forced from the market. The ECB has suspended its bond-buying programme so the high-wire act continues, without a safety net.

As far as I am aware, this is the first time in the history of central banking that a sovereign state has been compelled, to the point of national insolvency, and by its own central bank (by our Government's choice, the ECB), to make whole those who foolishly purchased bonds issued by private banks, which had gone bust and been closed down.

It’s hard to see how providing politicians in troubled countries with unlimited credit will increase the likelihood of real reform of any kind.

But instead of funneling that money back into the Spanish and Greek economies as loans to cash-starved businesses and individuals, these banks have become the primary buyers of their governments’ bonds.