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Gene Ellis

European Banks Unprepared for Pandora's Box of Greek Exit (Bloomberg) - 0 views

www.italpreziosi.it/...as-box-of-greek-exit-bloomberg

shared by Gene Ellis on 09 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • Lenders in Germany, France and the U.K. had $1.19 trillion of claims on those four nations at the end of 2011, Bank for International Settlements data show.
  • Lenders in Germany and France saw an increase in deposits of 217.4 billion euros, or 6.3 percent, in the same period.
  • To prevent contagion, countries in the euro area would have to form a full-fledged political and fiscal union immediately and implement uniform guarantees on bank deposits throughout the region, Thomas Wacker and Juerg de Spindler, economists at Zurich-based UBS, said in a separate note. They said such a response can be ruled out.
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  • Bank of France Governor Christian Noyer told journalists in Paris last week that “whatever happens in Greece” won’t place any French financial institution in difficulty.
  • What’s changed is that banks in the so-called core EU countries of Germany, France and the U.K. used funds from the ECB in December and February to insulate their southern European units against losses should one or more country exit the euro. “If you’re a U.K. lender and you’ve lent 10 billion euros to your Spanish subsidiary and Spain exits, you’re suddenly only going to get paid back in 50 percent devalued pesetas and you’re on the hook for 5 billion euros,” said Philippe Bodereau, London-based head of European credit research at Pacific Investment Management Co., the world’s largest bond investor.
  • One way multinational banking groups are mitigating that risk is by replacing their own funding lines to subsidiaries in the region with ECB loans. Deutsche Bank, Europe’s biggest bank by assets, tapped “a small amount” of ECB cash to help fund corporate and retail business in continental Europe, where it has sizeable operations in Italy and Spain. BNP Paribas, Europe’s third-biggest bank, used the programs to help fund its Italian unit as it reduces intergroup backing.
  • European banks also have cut their sovereign-debt holdings and exposures to Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal.
  • ermany, France and the U.K. reduced exposure to Greece by more than half in the two years through the end of 2011 to $68.2 billion, BIS data show.
Gene Ellis

Many eurozone banks like Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas still in a weakened state - Page 2 - Economic Times - 0 views

articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/...2

shared by Gene Ellis on 09 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • While countries like Greece and Spain often face criticism for a lack of prudence that got them into trouble and caused the eurozone crisis, French and German banks were the enablers. During the boom years before 2008 they made huge loans to countries in Southern Europe, and today many banks remain vulnerable to the problems of those countries.
  • German banks are less exposed to Greece but are owed 134 billion euros by Italian borrowers and 146 billion euros by Spanish customers.
  • Private and public borrowers in Spain still owed 115 billion euros to French banks at the end of 2011, according to the Bank for International Settlements. Italian borrowers owed 332 billion euros to French banks, and Greek borrowers owed an additional 44 billion euros.
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  • At the end of this week, WestLB, once Germany's third-largest landesbank, will provide a rare example of an ailing bank that is being broken up. Under pressure from EU competition authorities, the bank's toxic assets have been moved into a so-called bad bank, another part of the business has been sold and the remainder will continue to operate under the brand name Portigon.
Gene Ellis

PrudentBear - 0 views

prudentbear.com/...featuredcommentaryview

GEP com nytimes nytimes com global europe GDP crisis syndicate euro

shared by Gene Ellis on 09 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • German exporters were major beneficiaries of this growth. German banks and financial institutions helped finance the growth.
  • Exports have provided the majority of Germany’s growth in recent years. Germany is heavily reliant on a narrowly based industrial sector, focused on investment goods—automobiles, industrial machinery, chemicals, electronics and medical devices. These sectors make up a quarter of its GDP and the bulk of exports.
  • Germany’s service sector is weak with lower productivity than comparable countries. While it argues that Greece should deregulate professions, many professions in Germany remain highly regulated. Trades and professions are regulated by complex technical rules and standards rooted in the medieval guild systems. Foreign entrants frequently find these rules difficult and expensive to navigate.
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  • Despite the international standing of Deutsche Bank, Germany’s banking system is fragile. Several German banks required government support during the financial crisis. Highly fragmented (in part due to heavy government involvement) and with low profitability, German banks, especially the German Länder (state) owned Landsbanks, face problems. They have large exposures to European sovereign debt, real estate and structured securities.
  • Prior to 2005, the Landesbanken were able to borrow cheaply, relying on the guarantee of the state governments. The EU ruled these guarantees amounted to subsidies. Before the abolition of the guarantees, the Landesbanks issued large amounts of state-guaranteed loans which mature by December 2015.
  • While it insists on other countries reducing public debt, German debt levels are high—around 81% of GDP. The Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, has stated that public debt levels will remain above 60% (the level stipulated by European treaties) for many years.
  • Germany’s greatest vulnerability is its financial exposures from the current crisis. German exposure to Europe, especially the troubled peripheral economies, is large.
  • German banks had exposures of around US$500 billion to the debt issues of peripheral nations. While the levels have been reduced, it remains substantial, especially when direct exposures to banks in these countries and indirect exposures via the global financial system are considered. The reduction in risk held by private banks has been offset by the increase in exposure of the German state, which assumed some of this exposure.
  • For example, the exposure of the ECB to Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy is euro 918 billion as of April 2012. This exposure is also rising rapidly, especially driven by capital flight out of these countries.
  • Germany is now caught in a trap. Irrespective of the resolution of the debt crisis, Germany will suffer significant losses on its exposure – it will be the biggest loser.
  • Once the artificial boom ends, voters will discover they were betrayed by Germany’s pro-European political elite. There will be an electoral revolt and, as in the rest of Europe, a strong challenge from radical political forces with unpredictable consequences.
  • In late May 2012, French President Francois Hollande provided a curious argument in support of eurozone bonds: “Is it acceptable that some sovereigns can borrow at 6% and others at zero in the same monetary union?”
  • Political will for integration
  • In the peripheral economies, continued withdrawal of deposits from national banks (a rational choice given currency and confiscation risk) may necessitate either a Europe wide deposit guarantee system or further funding of banks.
  • A credible deposit insurance scheme would have to cover household deposits (say up to euro 100,000), which is around 72% of all deposits, in the peripheral countries. This would entail an insurance scheme for around euro 1.3 trillion of deposits.
  • Given that the Spanish Economy Ministry reports that euro 184 billion in loans to developers are “problematic,” the additional recapitalization needs of Spain’s banks may be as high as euro 200-300 billion in additional funds (20-30% of GDP)
  • A Greek default would result in losses to Germany of up to around euro 90 billion. Germany’s potential losses increase rapidly as more countries default or leave the eurozone.
  • Austerity or default will force many European economies into recession for a prolonged period. German exports will be affected given Europe is around 60% of its market, including around 40% within the eurozone. In case of a break-up of the euro, estimates of German growth range from -1% to below -10%. It is worth remembering that the German economy fell in size by around 5% in 2008, the worst result since the Second World War, mainly on the back of declining exports.
  • For example, Greece owes about euro 400 billion to private bondholders but increasingly to public bodies, such as the IMF and ECB, mainly due to the bailouts. If Greece walks away as some political parties have threatened, then the fallout for the lenders, such as Germany, are potentially calamitous.
  • But the largest single direct German exposure is the Bundesbank’s over euro 700 billion current exposure under the TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System) to other central banks in the Eurozone.
  • by Satyajit Das
Gene Ellis

Euro crisis deepens as time starts to run out for Spain's banks and regions | Business | The Guardian - 0 views

www.guardian.co.uk/...spain-crisis-eurozone-valencia

shared by Gene Ellis on 21 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • But the shortcomings of the agreement have once again undermined renewed confidence in the eurozone and sent the bond yields of several countries higher, including Spain and Italy.
  • The Spanish government said a predicted rise in GDP next year of 0.4% had proved optimistic, and the economy would suffer another year of recession.
  • Regional governments deliver the key parts of the welfare state, including health, education and social services.
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  • Eastern Valencia said it was asking for central government help as it could not refinance loans that must be paid off this year.
  • Valencia, which has long been run by Rajoy's PP, is emblematic of Spain's current crisis. A property crash has hit both regional government income and the region's banks, with its three main banks having to be rescued. Local politicians, meanwhile, have a growing reputation for corruption and frivolous spending.
  • Valencia mopped up a quarter of the €17bn (£13.2bn) of extra money made available by central government in April to pay a backlog of regional government bills.
  • Last year the regions not only failed to meet government-set deficit reduction targets, but actually increased their joint deficit.
  • Analysts believe most regions will miss this year's 1.5 percent deficit target. The government last week asked at least eight of them to revise their 2012 budgets, threatening to take over the finances of some of them.
  • it was startling to see international investors fearful of getting their money back from members of the single currency.
  • He said the eurozone's total public sector debt will reach 90% at the end of the year compared to 106% in the US and 235% in Japan.
Gene Ellis

Op-ed: The End of the Euro: A Survivor's Guide - 0 views

www.iie.com/...oped.cfm

EUROCRISIS

shared by Gene Ellis on 16 Jun 12 - No Cached
  • Ms. Lagarde's empathy is wearing thin and this is unfortunate—particularly as the Greek failure mostly demonstrates how wrong a single currency is for Europe.
  • The Greek backlash reflects the enormous pain and difficulty that comes with trying to arrange "internal devaluations" (a euphemism for big wage and spending cuts) in order to restore competitiveness and repay an excessive debt level.
  • During the next stage of the crisis, Europe's electorate will be rudely awakened to the large financial risks which have been foisted upon them in failed attempts to keep the single currency alive. When Greece quits the euro, its government will default on approximately 121 billion euros of debt to official creditors and about 27 billion euros owed to the IMF.
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  • More importantly and less known to German taxpayers, Greece will also default on 155 billion euros directly owed to the euro system (comprised of the ECB and the 17 national central banks in the euro area). This includes 110 billion euros provided automatically to Greece through the Target2 payments system—which handles settlements between central banks for countries using the euro. As depositors and lenders flee Greek banks, someone needs to finance that capital flight, otherwise Greek banks would fail. This role is taken on by other euro area central banks, which have quietly lent large funds, with the balances reported in the Target2 account. The vast bulk of this lending is, in practice, done by the Bundesbank since capital flight mostly goes to Germany, although all members of the euro system share the losses if there are defaults.
  • But between Target2 and direct bond purchases alone, the euro system claims on troubled periphery countries are now approximately 1.1 trillion euros (this is our estimate based on available official data). This amounts to over 200 percent of the (broadly defined) capital of the euro system.
  • No responsible bank would claim these sums are minor risks to its capital or to taxpayers. These claims also amount to 43 percent of German Gross Domestic Product,
  • Jacek Rostowski, the Polish Finance Minister, recently warned that the calamity of a Greek default is likely to result in a flight from banks and sovereign debt across the periphery, and that—to avoid a greater calamity—all remaining member nations need to be provided with unlimited funding for at least 18 months. Mr. Rostowski expresses concern, however, that the ECB is not prepared to provide such a firewall, and no other entity has the capacity, legitimacy, or will to do so.
  • The most likely scenario is that the ECB will reluctantly and haltingly provide funds to other nations—an on-again, off-again pattern of support—and that simply won't be enough to stabilize the situation.
  • he automatic mechanics of Europe's payment system will mean the capital flight from Spain and Italy to German banks is transformed into larger and larger de facto loans by the Bundesbank to Banca d'Italia and Banco de Espana—essentially to the Italian and Spanish states. German taxpayers will begin to see through this scheme and become afraid of further losses.
  • there will be recognition that the ECB has lost control of monetary policy, is being forced to create credits to finance capital flight and prop up troubled sovereigns—and that those credits may not get repaid in full. The world will no longer think of the euro as a safe currency; rather investors will shun bonds from the whole region, and even Germany may have trouble issuing debt at reasonable interest rates.
Gene Ellis

The euro crisis: Debtors' prison | The Economist - 0 views

www.economist.com/...n-more-government-debt-debtors

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • But the reforms often fail to work. The Spanish law is intended to promote restructuring of viable firms but in practice most insolvencies end in liquidation after lengthy court proceedings.
  • High household debt helps explain why the Netherlands, along with Italy and Spain, remained in recession in the second quarter of 2013 even as the euro area in general embarked on recovery. Dutch GDP this year will be 2% lower than in 2011 and more than 3% below its previous peak, in 2008.
  • it illustrates the malign effect of high debt when house prices fall
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  • One aim of the exercise is to identify the bad debts that are fouling up euro-zone banks and preventing the flow of new credit. This is important because parts of the single-currency area are crippled not just by public borrowing but by private debt, most of which is sitting on banking books.
  • High private debt is more detrimental to growth than high public debt, according to recent research by the IMF.
  • The malign effect of high private debt becomes apparent in the busts that follow credit-driven booms. Households that have borrowed too much in relation to their income trim their spending, the main component of GDP. Overleveraged firms avoid investing and concentrate on shrinking their balance-sheets by paying off loans. As bad debts erode their capital, banks become more reluctant to lend. These adverse trends reinforce each other, increasing the overall drag on growth.
  • Other balance-sheet indicators also suggest that Italian business is in a bad way. For example, 30% of corporate debt is owed by firms whose pre-tax earnings are less than the interest payments they have to make. That share of frail companies is even higher in Spain and Portugal (40% and nearly 50% respectively).
  • Little progress has been made to lighten the private-debt burden since the crisis began. Though it eased in Spain from 227% of GDP in 2009 to 215% in 2012, it rose over the same period in Cyprus, Ireland and Portugal. In Britain, by contrast, private debt fell from 207% of GDP in 2009 to 190% in 2012 thanks to improvements by both households and firms.
  • There is an inherent contradiction between the need for debtor countries in the euro zone to regain competitiveness through lower prices and at the same time to ease excessive debt with a dose of inflation.
  • Firms that have overborrowed are reluctant to embark on new ventures, and banks are in any case reluctant to lend because their balance-sheets are peppered with bad debts. This unhappy state of affairs prevails throughout southern Europe though its precise causes vary.
Gene Ellis

Europe has to do whatever it takes - FT.com - 0 views

www.ft.com/...49-11e4-8472-00144feabdc0.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 05 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • Europe has to do whatever it takes By Martin Wolf
  • Astonishingly, yields on Italian and Spanish 10-year debt have fallen from 6.3 per cent and 7.0 per cent, respectively, at the beginning of August 2012, to a mere 2.3 and 2.1 per cent early this month. That is below the yield on UK gilts.
  • Fiscal policy also continues to tighten, even though interest rates are at the zero bound: the OECD has forecast that the cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit of the eurozone would shrink from a mere 1.4 per cent in 2013 to an even more austere 0.9 per cent in 2014.
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  • Huge divergences in competitiveness remain
  • This is forcing vulnerable countries into deflation, which raises the real level of their debt.
  • Furthermore, it is clear that the ECB would be taking on credit risk. It would be charged with monetary financing of governments. I believe it should go ahead. But the row between northern and southern Europe would surely be deafening.
  • It also hopes that, through this and other programmes it has announced, it will be able to expand its balance sheet
  • back to where it was two years ago.
  • Moreover, the range of measures taken reinforce the ECB’s forward guidance. It has locked itself into ultra-accommodative monetary policies for years, as it should.
  • this year Germany’s current account surplus might be as big as 8 per cent of gross domestic product.
  • What else is left? One possibility, suggested in Mr Draghi’s speech, is active use of fiscal policy.
Gene Ellis

Syriza and the French indemnity of 1871-73 | Michael Pettis' CHINA FINANCIAL MARKETS - 0 views

blog.mpettis.com/...he-french-indemnity-of-1871-73

shared by Gene Ellis on 06 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • Fundamental to the argument that Spain (or Greece, or anyone else) has a moral obligation to repay in full its debt to Germany are two assumptions. The first assumption is that “Spain” borrowed the money from “Germany”, and that there is a collective obligation on the part of Spain to repay the German collective. The second assumption is that Spain had a choice in what it could do with the German money that poured into the country, and so it must be held responsible for its having mis-used hard-earned german funds.
  • There was plenty of irresponsible behavior in every country, and it is absurd to think that if German and Spanish banks were pouring nearly unlimited amounts of money into countries at extremely low or even negative real interest rates, especially once these initial inflows had set off stock market and real estate booms, that there was any chance that these countries would not respond in the way every country in history, including Germany in the 1870s and in the 1920s, had responded under similar conditions.
  • The winners have been banks, owners of assets, and business owners, mainly in Germany, whose profits were much higher during the last decade than they could possibly have been otherwise
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  •  Second, it is the responsibility of the leading centrist parties to recognize the options explicitly. If they do not, extremist parties either of the right or the left will take control of the debate, and convert what is a conflict between different economic sectors into a nationalist conflict or a class conflict. If the former win, it will spell the end of the grand European experiment.
  • First, as long as Spain suffers from its current debt burden, it does not matter how intelligently and forcefully it implements economic reforms. It will not be able to grow out of its debt burden and must choose between two paths
  • Most currency and sovereign debt crises in modern history ultimately represent a conflict over how the costs are to be assigned among two different groups
  • Gene Ellis on 06 Feb 15
     
    Highly recommended!
Gene Ellis

Suspension Bridges - Inca - Andes - New York Times - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...08bridg.html

General inca suspension bridges

shared by Gene Ellis on 19 Feb 15 - Cached
  • “Mexicans discovered vulcanization 3,500 years before Goodyear,” said Dorothy Hosler, an M.I.T. professor of archaeology and ancient technology. “The Spanish had never seen anything that bounced like the rubber balls of Mexico.”
  • Dr. Ochsendorf, a specialist in early architecture and engineering, said the colonial government tried many times to erect European arch bridges across the canyons, and each attempt ended in fiasco until iron and steel were applied to bridge building.
  • The Inca suspension bridges achieved clear spans of at least 150 feet, probably much greater. This was a longer span than any European masonry bridges at the time. The longest Roman bridge in Spain had a maximum span between supports of 95 feet. And none of these European bridges had to stretch across deep canyons.
  • ...2 more annotations...
  • Similar bridges existed in other mountainous regions of the world, most notably in the Himalayas and in ancient China, where iron chain suspension bridges existed in the third century B.C.”
  • The last existing Inca suspension bridge, at Huinchiri, near Cuzco, is virtually rebuilt each year. People from the villages on either side hold a three-day festival and gather stiff grasses for producing more than 50,000 feet of cord. Finally, the cord is braided into 150-foot replacement cables.
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