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In the case of driving schools, the government offers only a limited number of exams each year, and these are doled out to the driving schools depending on their success rate the year before. That fact alone gives the old guard a virtual monopoly,

calling for an overhaul of the written test, which he says goes far beyond making sure that a person knows the rules of the road.

Some studies have concluded that the French are probably paying 20 percent more than they should for the services they get from regulated professions, which include notaries, lawyers, bailiffs, ambulance drivers, court clerks, driving instructors and more.

barriers to getting a license are so high that about one million French people, who should have licenses, have never been able to get them.

Mr. Kramarz said that it often costs 3,000 euros, or about $3,900, to get a license. But others said the average was closer to 1,500 to 2,000 euros.

Although students are required to take only 20 hours of driving lessons, most end up doing double that while they wait for a chance to take the test.

“We have been paying US$100,000 in annual taxes directly to the Kindia prefecture,” he told IRIN. “The distribution of the money rests with them according to the needs they have identified in Mambia.”

Seeing this for themselves, the CBK became concerned that the money was not being well spent, according to Cirra Dieng, communications officer at the CBK, and withdrew its payments in 2007 awaiting some explanation. They are still waiting.

The EITI has set up a monitoring committee made up of government representatives, mining companies and civil society to push mining companies to publish what they pay and the government to disclose what it receives at the state, prefecture and CRD level. So far it has done so for six mining companies, including the CBK.

We have long known that portfolio and short-term inflows fuel consumption booms and real-estate bubbles, with disastrous consequences when market sentiment inevitably sours and finance dries up. Governments that enjoyed the rollercoaster ride on the way up should not have been surprised by the plunge that inevitably follows.

It is true, but unhelpful, to say that governments have only themselves to blame for having recklessly rushed into this wild ride. It is now time to think about how the world can create a saner balance between finance and the real economy.

They must resist the temptation to binge on foreign finance when it is cheap and plentiful.

Death by Finance

Donor states started withholding aid, which makes up 40 percent of the country’s budget.

“For every one I have arrested,” she said of government crooks, “I have lost a whole village of votes.”

In February the health minister admitted that Malawi’s central medical stores held only 5 percent of the drugs they were supposed to stock.

Dr. Chiudzu blamed not corruption but an overcentralized state: The hospital is barred from buying supplies itself, yet the Health Ministry, which holds all the procurement power, is unable to meet needs.

Ms. Banda appeared to agree that poor governance was as lethal as corruption. “

This form of government support amounts to a large implicit subsidy for big banks.

What other part of the corporate world has the ability to drive the global economy into recession, as banks did in the fall of 2008?

By contrast, in the case of debt owed to foreigners, higher interest rates lead to a welfare loss for the country as a whole, because the government must transfer resources abroad, which usually requires a combination of exchange-rate depreciation and a reduction in domestic expenditure.

Second, if foreign debt is the real problem, the escalating debate about the Reinhart/Rogoff results is irrelevant for the euro crisis. Countries that have their own currency, like the United Kingdom – and especially the United States, which can borrow from foreigners in dollars – do not face a direct financing constraint.

But the eurozone’s peripheral countries simply did not have a choice: they had to reduce their deficits, because the foreign capital on which their economies were so dependent was no longer available.

These huge recessions do matter. For Latvia, the cumulative loss from 2008 to 2012 adds up to 77 per cent of the country’s pre-crisis annual output. On the same basis, the loss was 44 per cent for Lithuania and 43 per cent for Estonia.

In brief, Latvia, worst-hit of the Baltic countries, suffered one of the biggest depressions in history. It is recovering. But it has not yet fully recovered. Are its policies a model for others? In a word, no.

These states have four huge advantages

First, according to Eurostat, Latvian labour costs per hour, in 2012, were a quarter of those of the eurozone as whole, 30 per cent of those in Spain and half those of Portugal.

Second, these are very small and open economies

Its trade partners hardly notice Latvia’s adjustment. But they would notice a comparably large Italian one.

Third, foreign-owned banks play a central role in these economies. For the eurozone, this is the alternative to a banking union: let banks with fiscally strong host governments take over the weaker financial systems.

inally, the Baltic states have embraced their European destiny as an alternative to falling back into Russia’s orbit.

The dispute unfolded in the heated politics surrounding the presidential election, with Mexican growers charging that the Commerce Department was courting voters in the important swing state of Florida. Instead, the timing of the negotiations ensured that the government could win those votes and bring the controversy to a conclusion satisfactory to the Mexicans after the election was over.

The Mexicans enlisted roughly 370 American businesses, including Wal-Mart Stores and meat and vegetable producers, to argue their cause.

Unfortunately, often supervisors in charge of the failing entity in the years of the debt run up were the ones charged with uncovering the problems.

Spain was the leader in the introduction of a dynamic provision – a provisioning tool that forces banks to increase provisions without reference to any specific loan. The intention of this tool was twofold: to mitigate the bad times, and to cool the booms in the good times (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). Dynamic provisions were endorsed as part of the Basel III standards in December 2010, in part on the strength of Spain’s experience. And indeed the existing evidence (Jiménez et al. 2012) shows that the tool worked as intended, dampening the credit boom and softening somewhat the credit crunch. However, it is clear by now that their level was not nearly enough, as their size – 3% of GDP at their highest point (2004) – was simply not of a magnitude commensurate with the credit losses.

Without the provisions, the reality of the cajas' accounts would have become much faster a concern, and would have imposed itself on the regulator

Had the Banco de España ordered an audit of the system after uncovering numerous irregularities in CCM, it would have not been able to deal with the capital shortfalls uncovered as there was no appropriate resolution regime in Spain at the time

governance played a critical role in the development of the Spanish crisis. In the Spanish case, the supervisor, confronted with powerful and well connected ex-politicians decided to look the other way in the face of obvious building trouble.

More systematic evidence of the role played by these governance issues is provided in a 2009 paper (Cuñat and Garicano 2009b) where we showed that cajas with chief executives who had no previous banking experience (!), no graduate education, and were politically connected did substantially worse in the run up to the crisis (granting more real estate developer loan, up to half of the entire loan book in some instances) and during the crisis (with higher NPLs).

Such disparities of demand conditions will undoubtedly persist in the future because European countries differ substantially in industrial composition and in a variety of economic policies.

EMU is meant to be a marriage made in heaven with no possibility of divorce.

In the German Council of Economic Experts, we proposed a consolidation pact, under which each country would be required to specify a fully verifiable path that it will follow as it puts its financial house in order. It wouldn't just be a solution for Greece; it would be for everyone.

And you seriously believe that would help? Following that approach, the Greeks would save themselves to death, just as the Germans did in the early 1930s under then-Reich Chancellor Heinrich Brüning. What you expect the Greeks to do is Brüning squared. The real problem is that Greece shouldn't have been accepted into the monetary union in the first place.

its 1.3 million short-time workers do not find regular employment again,

The European Central Bank would never, ever contemplate using inflation to eliminate debt.

European Central Bank President Mario Draghi acknowledged as he cut interest rates last week that the north-south disconnect was making it more difficult to run a single monetary policy.

If a southern country were to default or leave the euro, they contend, Germany would be left with an astronomical bill, far beyond its theoretical limit of 211 billion euros liability for euro zone bailout funds.

"The problem is that at the time of a sovereign debt crisis, large portions of a national balance sheet may suddenly flee to the ECB's books, possibly overwhelming the capacity of a bailout fund to absorb the entire hit," he wrote in 2010,

national regulators in some EU countries are moving quietly to try to reduce their home banks' exposure to such an eventuality. The ECB itself last week set a limit on the amount of state-backed bank bonds that banks could use as collateral in its lending operations.

In one high-profile case, Germany's financial regulator Bafin ordered HypoVereinsbank (HVB), the German subsidiary of UniCredit, to curb transfers to its parent bank in Italy last year, people familiar with the case said.

In any case, common supervision without joint deposit insurance may be insufficient to reverse capital flight.

The Maastricht Treaty took it for granted that only the public sector can produce chronic deficits. It assumed that financial markets would always correct their own excesses

For instance, they treated the euro crisis as if it were a purely fiscal, i.e., budgetary, problem. But only Greece qualified as a genuine fiscal crisis. The rest of Europe suffered largely from banking problems and a divergence in competitiveness, which gave rise to balance of payments problems.

So the private sector as a whole is bent on reducing debt.

Businesses will use depreciation charges and sell off inventories to do so. Households are trying once more to save. Less investment and more saving spell declining incomes.

now that they know how dangerous their leverage of yesteryear was.