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Contents contributed and discussions participated by Gene Ellis

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Gene Ellis

Op-Ed Contributor - The Greek crisis shows why Germany should leave the European Moneta... - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...29Starbatty.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 09 Jul 12 - Cached
  • THE European Monetary Union, the basis of the euro, began with a grand illusion. On one side were countries — Austria, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands — whose currencies had persistently appreciated, both within Europe and worldwide; the countries on the other side — Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain — had persistently depreciating currencies.
  • Rather than pulling the lagging countries forward, the low interest rates of the European Central Bank have lured governments and households, especially in the southern part of the euro zone, into frivolous budgetary policies and excessive consumption.
  • the solution is clear: the only way to avoid further harm to the global economy is for Germany to lead its fellow stable states out of the euro and into a new and stronger currency bloc.
  • ...8 more annotations...
  • Unlike their northern neighbors, the countries in the zone’s southern half have difficulty placing bonds — issued to finance their national deficits — with international capital investors. Nor are these countries competitive in the global economy, as shown by their high trade deficits.
  • If Greece were outside the euro zone, for example, it could devalue its currency
  • Instead, the fiscal strictures of the euro zone are forcing the country to curtail public expenditures, raise taxes and cut government employees’ salaries, actions that may push Greece into a deep depression and further undermine its already weak international credit standing.
  • In short, th
  • e euro is headed toward collapse.
  • hat opportunity and pull out of the euro, it wouldn’t be alone. The same calculus would probably lure Austria, Finland and the Netherlands — and perhaps France — to leave behind the high-debt states and join Germany in a new, stable bloc, perhaps even with a new common currency.
  • If Germany were to take t
  • A strong-currency bloc could fulfill the euro’s original purpose. Without having to worry about laggard states, the bloc would be able to follow a reliable and consistent monetary policy that would force the member governments to gradually reduce their national debt. The entire European economy would prosper. And the United States would gain an ally in any future reorganization of the world currency system and the global economy.
Gene Ellis

Understanding the European Crisis Now - Graphic - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...nding-the-european-crisis.html

understanding european crisis graphic nytimes

shared by Gene Ellis on 18 Jun 12 - No Cached
  • Gene Ellis on 18 Jun 12
     
    Well, not an understanding, but a graphic overview... useful.
Gene Ellis

Worried Banks Pose Obstacle to Forming Financial Union - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...-push-for-financial-union.html

banks pose obstacle union nytimes nytimes com com

shared by Gene Ellis on 18 Jun 12 - No Cached
  • French loans to Spanish banks plunged 34 percent in the fourth quarter of 2011 compared with the previous quarter, according to the latest data from the Bank for International Settlements.
  • For Italian banks, French bankers cut their exposure by 16 percent. German banks have also been increasingly wary of their Italian and Spanish peers, reducing lending to them by about 19 percent last year
  • In the last six months, as fears about Spain and Greece have intensified, Spanish and Italian banks have been by far the biggest users of the European Central Bank’s program of cut-rate, three-year loans to banks that cannot find money elsewhere.
  • ...4 more annotations...
  • But instead of funneling that money back into the Spanish and Greek economies as loans to cash-starved businesses and individuals, these banks have become the primary buyers of their governments’ bonds.
  • Most delicate will be whether the Spanish banks receiving the largest cash injections, like the nationalized mortgage giant Bankia, will be forced to impose losses on holders of their subordinated bonds. Those are the investors whose bonds are not backed by collateral and are thus considered more risky.
  • In Spain, though, the problem is that 62 percent of the holders of Bankia’s subordinated debt are Spanish individual investors, not overseas hedge funds and investment banks. It is not likely that Madrid will be willing to hit those citizens with a 65 percent loss — the loans are currently priced at about 35 cents on the dollar — at a time of 25 percent unemployment in the country.
  • “There are compelling reasons for the euro zone to insist on losses for subordinated and even senior bondholders, the least of which is a reduction in moral hazard,” said Adam Lerrick, an expert on banking and sovereign debt at the American Enterprise Institute. “Losses for bondholders is now euro zone policy, so Europe’s credibility is also at stake.”
  • Gene Ellis on 18 Jun 12
     
    Good article on bank behavior
Gene Ellis

Greece as Victim - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...krugman-greece-as-victim.html

greece victim nytimes nytimes com com

shared by Gene Ellis on 18 Jun 12 - No Cached
  • Gene Ellis on 18 Jun 12
     
    Good Krugman piece...
Gene Ellis

Greek Credit-Default Swaps Are Activated - NYTimes.com - 0 views

dealbook.nytimes.com/...it-default-swaps-are-activated

greek

shared by Gene Ellis on 17 Jun 12 - No Cached
  • The decision by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association ends months of speculation that a Greek default might not set off the swaps, a result that could have undermined their role as insurance against debt defaults.
  • Still, doubts about the instruments’ effectiveness may linger. European officials initially shaped the Greek debt restructuring to avoid activating them. The concern is that future restructurings could be arranged to stop swaps from paying out.
  • Since then, banks and regulators have taken steps to strengthen the market, mostly by making sure that investors can pay out the money they owe on swaps.
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  • The Greek government chose to apply so-called collective action clauses, which it had earlier inserted into its bonds registered under Greek law. The deal maximized total debt relief for the country,
  • but it also forced losses on bondholders — a credit event, and therefore a trigger, for the swaps.
  • the restructuring activated the swaps only after the country made a legal move on Friday.
  • Nearly $70 billion of swaps are currently outstanding on Greek debt. But after both sides settle their accounts, the amount that will need to be paid out should be no more than $3.2 billion.
  • Some investors entered swaps on Greece as a way of effectively insuring themselves against losses on their Greek bonds, while others used them as a way to bet on a default happening.
  • Before investors doubted Greece’s solvency, the swaps offered insurance at what turned out to be an extremely cheap price. At the start of 2008, an investor buying protection on Greek debt had to pay only $22,000 annually to insure against default on $10 million of Greek bonds over five years, according to Markit, a data provider. Now, the protection would cost about $7.6 million.
  • Investors will most likely continue to want default swaps to protect against losses on Greece’s new bonds. These bonds, to be issued Monday, are expected to have yields of well over 15 percent, according to advance pricing. This suggests investors have strong doubts about Greece’s creditworthiness even after its restructuring. Fitch Ratings said on Friday that it would probably give Greece’s new bonds a low, junk-bond rating.
  • Gene Ellis on 17 Jun 12
     
    Global
Gene Ellis

Op-ed: The End of the Euro: A Survivor's Guide - 0 views

www.iie.com/...oped.cfm

EUROCRISIS

shared by Gene Ellis on 16 Jun 12 - No Cached
  • Ms. Lagarde's empathy is wearing thin and this is unfortunate—particularly as the Greek failure mostly demonstrates how wrong a single currency is for Europe.
  • The Greek backlash reflects the enormous pain and difficulty that comes with trying to arrange "internal devaluations" (a euphemism for big wage and spending cuts) in order to restore competitiveness and repay an excessive debt level.
  • During the next stage of the crisis, Europe's electorate will be rudely awakened to the large financial risks which have been foisted upon them in failed attempts to keep the single currency alive. When Greece quits the euro, its government will default on approximately 121 billion euros of debt to official creditors and about 27 billion euros owed to the IMF.
  • ...7 more annotations...
  • More importantly and less known to German taxpayers, Greece will also default on 155 billion euros directly owed to the euro system (comprised of the ECB and the 17 national central banks in the euro area). This includes 110 billion euros provided automatically to Greece through the Target2 payments system—which handles settlements between central banks for countries using the euro. As depositors and lenders flee Greek banks, someone needs to finance that capital flight, otherwise Greek banks would fail. This role is taken on by other euro area central banks, which have quietly lent large funds, with the balances reported in the Target2 account. The vast bulk of this lending is, in practice, done by the Bundesbank since capital flight mostly goes to Germany, although all members of the euro system share the losses if there are defaults.
  • But between Target2 and direct bond purchases alone, the euro system claims on troubled periphery countries are now approximately 1.1 trillion euros (this is our estimate based on available official data). This amounts to over 200 percent of the (broadly defined) capital of the euro system.
  • No responsible bank would claim these sums are minor risks to its capital or to taxpayers. These claims also amount to 43 percent of German Gross Domestic Product,
  • Jacek Rostowski, the Polish Finance Minister, recently warned that the calamity of a Greek default is likely to result in a flight from banks and sovereign debt across the periphery, and that—to avoid a greater calamity—all remaining member nations need to be provided with unlimited funding for at least 18 months. Mr. Rostowski expresses concern, however, that the ECB is not prepared to provide such a firewall, and no other entity has the capacity, legitimacy, or will to do so.
  • The most likely scenario is that the ECB will reluctantly and haltingly provide funds to other nations—an on-again, off-again pattern of support—and that simply won't be enough to stabilize the situation.
  • he automatic mechanics of Europe's payment system will mean the capital flight from Spain and Italy to German banks is transformed into larger and larger de facto loans by the Bundesbank to Banca d'Italia and Banco de Espana—essentially to the Italian and Spanish states. German taxpayers will begin to see through this scheme and become afraid of further losses.
  • there will be recognition that the ECB has lost control of monetary policy, is being forced to create credits to finance capital flight and prop up troubled sovereigns—and that those credits may not get repaid in full. The world will no longer think of the euro as a safe currency; rather investors will shun bonds from the whole region, and even Germany may have trouble issuing debt at reasonable interest rates.
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