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But with major U.S. players like Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman almost certainly out of reach for national security reasons,

“I have no illusions about how difficult it is to sell non-American products on the American market,” Mr. Enders said. “We should not even dream about trying to sell a product to a U.S. defense customer if it is not really superior to what our American peers are offering.” Analysts tended to agree.

A consensus on the principle that creditors, not taxpayers, should pay if a bank becomes insolvent does not yet exist across the eurozone. Does anybody imagine the German government would not rescue Deutsche Bank if it were in trouble? Of course it would.

Yet, as Guntram Wolff of Bruegel notes, a currency union with internal exchange controls is a contradiction in terms. Only the willingness of the European Central Bank to finance Cypriot banks without limit could end these controls in the near future. Will it be willing to act soon?

The outcome in Cyprus underlines the fact that the value of a euro of bank liabilities depends on the solvency of the bank itself and the solvency of the government standing behind the bank. If both bank and state are insolvent, lenders are likely not only to lose a big proportion of their money outright, but to find that the rest is frozen behind controls,

The ideal conclusion from the Cypriot imbroglio would be that all eurozone banks should have more capital.

A final lesson of this crisis is that what I have called the “bad marriage” that binds the eurozone members together has become worse.

Thus the eurozone limps on through crisis after crisis. Can – or will – this continue indefinitely? I do not know.

"Supertankers" are the largest tankers, including very large crude carriers (VLCC) and ULCCs with capacities over 250,000 DWT. These ships can transport 2,000,000 barrels (320,000 m3) of oil/318 000 metric tons.[46] By way of comparison, the United Kingdom consumed about 1.6 million barrels (250,000 m3) of oil per day in 2009.[47] ULCCs, commissioned in the 1970s, were the largest vessels ever built, but the longest ones have already been scrapped; only a few ULCCs remain in service, none of which are more than 400m long.[48] Because of their great size, supertankers often can not enter port fully loaded.[28] These ships can take on their cargo at off-shore platforms and single-point moorings.[28] On the other end of the journey, they often pump their cargo off to smaller tankers at designated lightering points off-coast.[28] A supertanker's routes are generally long, requiring it to stay at sea for extended periods, up to and beyond seventy days at a time.[28]

As demand grew moderately in the United States and Western Europe, expanding economies such as China fueled exponential growth in demand.[60]

The average one-year time charter rate for a 5-year-old tanker of 280,000 metric tons of deadweight varied from $56,500 per day in December 2005 to $53,000 per day in September 2007 with a high of $64,500 per day in September 2006.[59]

But austerity can never be self-defeating for the external adjustment. On the contrary, the larger the fall in domestic demand in response to a cut in government expenditure, the more imports will fall and the stronger the improvement in the current account – and thus ultimately the reduction in the risk premium – will be.

In the Baltic nations, for example, farmers are furious that a system of cash payments to support agriculture is skewed in favor of farmers from richer countries like France and the Netherlands. Latvian farmers say they get less than 40 percent of the European Union’s average payment level for each acre of land. Dairy farmers say they fare even worse, getting just 20 percent of what their Dutch counterparts receive.

Portugal and Italy, on the other hand, specialised much more heavily in consumer-goods producing sectors and felt the brunt of Chinese competition. No Eurozone member was sufficiently well diversified to shrug off this kind of shock, something that should have made the euro’s architects think twice.

Specifically, they should have thought again, Kenen argued, about the coordination of national fiscal policies, the need for a common Eurozone budget, and mechanisms for transferring fiscal resources from booming to depressed regions.

For starters, fracking has caused gas prices to drop dramatically.

Since 1990, the EU has heavily subsidized solar and wind energy at a cost of more than $20 billion annually. Yet its per capita CO2 emissions have fallen by less than half of the reduction achieved in the US – even in percentage terms, the US is now doing better.

Along with the closure of German nuclear power stations, this has led, ironically, to a resurgence of coal.

Critics mocked it as “the Common Agricultural Policy in the sky,” a reference to Europe’s program of subsidies for farmers, which eats up nearly 40 percent of the union’s total budget.

All long-term budget decisions require unanimous approval by the member states, a rule first established when the grouping, then known as the European Economic Community, had just six members, not 27. The power of veto makes any major change to spending all but impossible and entrenches the status quo, no matter how unworkable or unpopular.

“It is extremely difficult to change anything,” Mr. Sapir said. “Everyone is always fighting at the margins over narrow national interests. They try to make sure they get money for their own countries and that cuts go to other countries.”

Europe, of course, has no significant centralized tax authority, so this key automatic stabilizer is essentially absent.

Many Germans today rightly feel that any system of fiscal transfers will morph into a permanent feeding tube, much the way that northern Italy has been propping up southern Italy for the last century. Indeed, more than 20 years on, Western Germans still see no end in sight for the bills from German unification.

A logical corollary of the criteria set forth by Kenen and Obstfeld, and even of Mundell’s labor-mobility criterion, is that currency unions cannot survive without political legitimacy,

European policymakers today often complain that, were it not for the US financial crisis, the eurozone would be doing just fine. Perhaps they are right. But any financial system must be able to withstand shocks, including big ones.

It is deeply troubling that it took Europe’s leaders so long to see something so obvious

What is now proposed is recapitalization of the European Investment Bank, part of a growth package of some $150 billion. But politicians are good at repackaging, and, by some accounts, the new money is a small fraction of that amount, and even that will not get into the system immediately. In short: the remedies – far too little and too late – are based on a misdiagnosis of the problem and flawed economics.

The euro was flawed from the outset, but it was clear that the consequences would become apparent only in a crisis.

Workers may leave Ireland or Greece not because their productivity there is lower, but because, by leaving, they can escape the debt burden incurred by their parents.

Germany worries that, without strict supervision of banks and budgets, it will be left holding the bag for its more profligate neighbors. But that misses the key point: Spain, Ireland, and many other distressed countries ran budget surpluses before the crisis. The down

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