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"The Greek bailout was not a program for Greece, but for the euro zone itself,"

"In May 2010, we knew that Greece needed a bailout but not that it would require debt restructuring," IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde said in a June interview. "We had no clue that the overall economic situation was going to deteriorate as quickly as it did."

Ms. Lagarde was French finance minister at the time and keen to avoid losses by her country's banks, which had lent heavily to Greece.

"An upfront debt restructuring would have been better for Greece although this was not acceptable to the euro partners," it said.

Much of the debt was held by already fragile French and German banks, so European nations wouldn't consider it. And the U.S. feared its own trillion-dollar exposure to European banks.

Several IMF directors had warned of just that outcome three years earlier. The program "may be seen not as a rescue of Greece, which will have to undergo a wrenching adjustment, but as a bailout of Greece's private debtholders, mainly European financial institutions," Brazil's executive director, Paulo Nogueira Batista, said at the May 2010 meeting.

But those initial demonstrations, often lacking identifiable leaders and programs, soon gave way to old habits.

Egypt retains the strongest sense of nation-statehood in the region; nonetheless, it has become a shattered and divided society, and it will take many years to recover.

Other states are even less fortunate. Muammar el-Qaddafi’s evil buffoonery in Libya has given way to Bedouin tribalism that will be hard to meld into a functioning nation-state, if Libya ever was such an entity.

And Syria, a fragile amalgam of Sunni, Alawite, Kurdish, Christian, and other sects, is unlikely ever to be reconstructed as the state it once was.

To be sure, one can reasonably argue that austerity in the eurozone has been excessive, and that fiscal deficits should have been much larger to sustain demand. But only governments with access to market finance can use expansionary fiscal policy to boost demand.

Had Greece not received financial support in 2010, it would have had to cut its fiscal deficit from more than 10% of GDP to zero immediately. By financing continued deficits until 2013, the troika actually enabled Greece to delay austerity.

Of course, Greece is not the first country to request emergency financing to delay budget cuts, and then complain that the cuts are excessive once the worst is over. This typically happens when the government runs a primary surplus. When the government can finance its current spending through taxes – and might even be able to increase expenditure, if it does not have to pay interest – the temptation to renege on debt intensifies.

The practical problem for Greece now is not the sustainability of a debt that matures in 20-30 years and carries very low interest rates; the real issue is the few payments to the IMF and the ECB that fall due this year – payments that the new government has promised to make.

Central banks that buy sovereign debt issued by fiscal authorities offset market-imposed discipline on borrowing costs, effectively subsidizing public-sector profligacy.

Zombie-like companies were kept on artificial life-support in the false hope that time alone would revive them. It was not until late in the decade, when the banking sector was reorganized and corporate restructuring was encouraged,

Like Japan, America’s post-bubble healing has been limited – even in the face of the Fed’s outsize liquidity injections. Household debt stood at 112% of income in the third quarter of 2012 – down from record highs in 2006, but still nearly 40 percentage points above the 75% norm of the last three decades of the twentieth century. Similarly, the personal-saving rate, at just 3.5% in the four months ending in November 2012, was less than half the 7.9% average of 1970-99.

Crisis-torn peripheral European economies still suffer from unsustainable debt loads and serious productivity and competitiveness problems. And a fragmented European banking system remains one of the weakest links in the regional daisy chain.

That leaves a huge sum of excess liquidity sloshing around in global asset markets. Where it goes, the next crisis is inevitably doomed to follow.

While a slide in imports accounts for some of the correction, Greece boosted its exports outside the EU by about 30 percent in the fourth quarter of 2012 from the previous year, while Italy’s rose 13 percent in January from a year ago, he said.

The metamorphosis is known as internal devaluation

Prevented by membership of the euro from driving down currencies, governments and companies are squeezing labor costs to spur productivity.

On average, the periphery is about halfway to eliminating large structural current-account deficits, which allow for declines related to recession-driven weaker import demand, estimates Goldman Sachs (GS).

The OECD today published an index showing that relative labor costs in Spain and Portugal have now dropped below Germany’s for the first time since 2005.

“It’s potentially good for the economy but only if it results in faster investment,”

“If not then there’s a downward spiral risk.”

Big retailers and fashion companies have repeatedly tried and failed to develop alternatives, experimenting in India, Africa and Latin America, only to run into infrastructure bottlenecks and shortages of skilled managers or workers.

India was not organized for large-scale, timely production,

Africa did not have enough workers with the right skills for high-volume labeling and shipping,

and Latin America did not have enough workers interested in operating sewing machines.

In Guatemala, the quality was excellent, he said, but, “They can’t handle big orders and they’re slow on delivery.”

What may save Bangladesh from a sharp, immediate drop in export orders is simply that most Southeast Asian factories are already fully booked with orders from multinationals fleeing China’s ever-rising costs.

Dozens of impoverished countries make T-shirts and other very basic clothing. But only a few countries — really just China, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Indonesia and to some extent Cambodia and Pakistan — have developed highly complex systems for producing and shipping tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands of identical, high-quality shirts, blouses or trousers to a global retailer within several weeks of receiving an order.

He said that he and a couple of other suppliers of elite retail chains always worried about Bangladesh’s reliance on high-rise factories,

GDP continues to shrink,

Moreover, balkanization of economic activity, banking systems, and public-debt markets continues, as foreign investors flee the eurozone periphery and seek safety in the core.

Likewise, competitiveness losses have been partly reversed as wages have lagged productivity growth, thus reducing unit labor costs, and some structural reforms are ongoing.

For example, in November 2011, interest rates on Italian sovereign bonds were around 8% all along the curve, even as the government faced refinancing needs totaling nearly 30% of GDP over the following year. Because debt monetization was not an option, austerity had to ensue at that point, regardless of what Merkel – or anyone else – had to say.

Southern countries, still largely in denial, should accept the need for deeper, competiveness-enhancing reforms. Germany and its allies, for their part, should accept that running high external surpluses is damaging the eurozone and themselves, and that it is time for them to put part of their huge excess savings to work to support growth.

By contrast, in the case of debt owed to foreigners, higher interest rates lead to a welfare loss for the country as a whole, because the government must transfer resources abroad, which usually requires a combination of exchange-rate depreciation and a reduction in domestic expenditure.

Second, if foreign debt is the real problem, the escalating debate about the Reinhart/Rogoff results is irrelevant for the euro crisis. Countries that have their own currency, like the United Kingdom – and especially the United States, which can borrow from foreigners in dollars – do not face a direct financing constraint.

But the eurozone’s peripheral countries simply did not have a choice: they had to reduce their deficits, because the foreign capital on which their economies were so dependent was no longer available.

he devoted much of a postsummit news conference to boasting about his steadfast defense of British interests, particularly a multibillion-dollar rebate that Britain receives each year on its payments.

The rethink, which would have scrapped spending on agricultural subsidies, ran into heavy opposition and stalled

After months of arguments, two broad alliances have emerged. The first comprises countries like Britain, Germany and Sweden that are big net contributors and want to keep a tighter rein on spending. The second, known as the “Friends of Cohesion,” after a class of development grants aimed at less wealthy areas, includes Poland, Spain, Portugal and others that want to make sure the union’s largess does not dry up.

The European Commission, however, has been far less forthcoming. It told Mr. Ehrenhauser that it could not give a breakdown of spending in recent years on wine because that would require “lengthy research” and “it cannot consider doing this at the present time because of other priorities.”

I suspect that, in order to limit country specific shocks, euro members may have to actively use macro prudential tools such as rules on the amount of liquidity that banks should hold, or upper limit to loans to value ratios, much more so that they have in the past.

If the U.S. and a number of other advanced countries are going to decrease their current account deficits, then some countries will have to decrease their current account surpluses. And for this to happen, there has to be, among other changes, an adjustment of the exchange rates. Put more bluntly, most emerging markets have to accept an appreciation.

Unfortunately, often supervisors in charge of the failing entity in the years of the debt run up were the ones charged with uncovering the problems.

Spain was the leader in the introduction of a dynamic provision – a provisioning tool that forces banks to increase provisions without reference to any specific loan. The intention of this tool was twofold: to mitigate the bad times, and to cool the booms in the good times (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). Dynamic provisions were endorsed as part of the Basel III standards in December 2010, in part on the strength of Spain’s experience. And indeed the existing evidence (Jiménez et al. 2012) shows that the tool worked as intended, dampening the credit boom and softening somewhat the credit crunch. However, it is clear by now that their level was not nearly enough, as their size – 3% of GDP at their highest point (2004) – was simply not of a magnitude commensurate with the credit losses.

Without the provisions, the reality of the cajas' accounts would have become much faster a concern, and would have imposed itself on the regulator

Had the Banco de España ordered an audit of the system after uncovering numerous irregularities in CCM, it would have not been able to deal with the capital shortfalls uncovered as there was no appropriate resolution regime in Spain at the time

governance played a critical role in the development of the Spanish crisis. In the Spanish case, the supervisor, confronted with powerful and well connected ex-politicians decided to look the other way in the face of obvious building trouble.

More systematic evidence of the role played by these governance issues is provided in a 2009 paper (Cuñat and Garicano 2009b) where we showed that cajas with chief executives who had no previous banking experience (!), no graduate education, and were politically connected did substantially worse in the run up to the crisis (granting more real estate developer loan, up to half of the entire loan book in some instances) and during the crisis (with higher NPLs).

While German interest rates remained little changed, rates in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Italy tumbled, fueling consumption and swelling their imports of German cars and other products.

Now, budget stringency is being accompanied by labor-market reforms across Southern Europe.

At best, these adjustments yield benefits only after several years,

"The ECB was created with the mission to avoid the inflation of the 1970s and 1980s, when there was global inflation. Now we have global deflationary pressure, we need a different point of view," he says.

They say it's arithmetically impossible for every economy in the world to build growth on the German model of export success; and if every country in the euro zone is to do it, they need to find others willing to run big deficits in the rest of the world.

In the German Council of Economic Experts, we proposed a consolidation pact, under which each country would be required to specify a fully verifiable path that it will follow as it puts its financial house in order. It wouldn't just be a solution for Greece; it would be for everyone.

And you seriously believe that would help? Following that approach, the Greeks would save themselves to death, just as the Germans did in the early 1930s under then-Reich Chancellor Heinrich Brüning. What you expect the Greeks to do is Brüning squared. The real problem is that Greece shouldn't have been accepted into the monetary union in the first place.

its 1.3 million short-time workers do not find regular employment again,

The European Central Bank would never, ever contemplate using inflation to eliminate debt.

Unlike their northern neighbors, the countries in the zone’s southern half have difficulty placing bonds — issued to finance their national deficits — with international capital investors. Nor are these countries competitive in the global economy, as shown by their high trade deficits.

If Greece were outside the euro zone, for example, it could devalue its currency

Instead, the fiscal strictures of the euro zone are forcing the country to curtail public expenditures, raise taxes and cut government employees’ salaries, actions that may push Greece into a deep depression and further undermine its already weak international credit standing.

In short, th

e euro is headed toward collapse.

hat opportunity and pull out of the euro, it wouldn’t be alone. The same calculus would probably lure Austria, Finland and the Netherlands — and perhaps France — to leave behind the high-debt states and join Germany in a new, stable bloc, perhaps even with a new common currency.

If Germany were to take t

A strong-currency bloc could fulfill the euro’s original purpose. Without having to worry about laggard states, the bloc would be able to follow a reliable and consistent monetary policy that would force the member governments to gradually reduce their national debt. The entire European economy would prosper. And the United States would gain an ally in any future reorganization of the world currency system and the global economy.

The banking union that is required is the one Germany will not accept: central regulation and supervision, a common restructuring fund and common deposit insurance. It would take years to create.

With interest rates on 10-year government bonds over 6 per cent, neither Italy nor Spain can sustain their membership in the eurozone. This is what Mario Monti and Mariano Rajoy should have made clear to Angela Merkel at the summit.

The message I took away from the summit is that the eurozone will not resolve the crisis. In that sense, it was indeed a “historic” meeting.

European Central Bank President Mario Draghi acknowledged as he cut interest rates last week that the north-south disconnect was making it more difficult to run a single monetary policy.

If a southern country were to default or leave the euro, they contend, Germany would be left with an astronomical bill, far beyond its theoretical limit of 211 billion euros liability for euro zone bailout funds.

"The problem is that at the time of a sovereign debt crisis, large portions of a national balance sheet may suddenly flee to the ECB's books, possibly overwhelming the capacity of a bailout fund to absorb the entire hit," he wrote in 2010,

national regulators in some EU countries are moving quietly to try to reduce their home banks' exposure to such an eventuality. The ECB itself last week set a limit on the amount of state-backed bank bonds that banks could use as collateral in its lending operations.

In one high-profile case, Germany's financial regulator Bafin ordered HypoVereinsbank (HVB), the German subsidiary of UniCredit, to curb transfers to its parent bank in Italy last year, people familiar with the case said.

In any case, common supervision without joint deposit insurance may be insufficient to reverse capital flight.