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Gene Ellis

The Eurozone's Delayed Reckoning by Nouriel Roubini - Project Syndicate - 0 views

www.project-syndicate.org/...pe-s-crisis-by-nouriel-roubini

shared by Gene Ellis on 19 Dec 12 - No Cached
  • For starters, the European Central Bank’s “outright monetary transactions” program has been incredibly effective: interest-rate spreads for Spain and Italy have fallen by about 250 basis points, even before a single euro has been spent to purchase government bonds.
  • The introduction of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which provides another €500 billion ($650 billion) to be used to backstop banks and sovereigns, has also helped, as has European leaders’ recognition that a monetary union alone is unstable and incomplete, requiring deeper banking, fiscal, economic, and political integration.
  • But, perhaps most important, Germany’s attitude toward the eurozone in general, and Greece in particular, has changed. German officials now understand that, given extensive trade and financial links, a disorderly eurozone hurts not just the periphery but the core.
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  • GDP continues to shrink,
  • Moreover, balkanization of economic activity, banking systems, and public-debt markets continues, as foreign investors flee the eurozone periphery and seek safety in the core.
  • Likewise, competitiveness losses have been partly reversed as wages have lagged productivity growth, thus reducing unit labor costs, and some structural reforms are ongoing.
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 19 Dec 12
       
      This, indeed, is the crux of the matter.
  • either the eurozone moves toward fuller integration (capped by political union to provide democratic legitimacy to the loss of national sovereignty on banking, fiscal, and economic affairs), or it will undergo disunion, dis-integration, fragmentation, and eventual breakup.
  • but countries like Germany, which were over-saving and running external surpluses, have not been forced to adjust by increasing domestic demand, so their trade surpluses have remained large.
  • German leaders fear that the risk-sharing elements of deeper integration
  • imply a politically unacceptable transfer union whereby Germany and the core unilaterally and permanently subsidize the periphery.
  • Of course, Germany fails to recognize that successful monetary unions like the United States have a full banking union with significant risk-sharing elements, and a fiscal union whereby idiosyncratic shocks to specific states’ output are absorbed by the federal budget. The US is also a large transfer union, in which richer states permanently subsidize the poorer ones.
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 19 Dec 12
       
      These are key features, built into the over-representation of the poorer, smaller, more agricultural, states; as well as in the central institutions.
  • But the fundamental crisis of the eurozone has not been resolved, and another year of muddling through could revive these risks in a more virulent form in 2014 and beyond. Unfortunately, the eurozone crisis is likely to remain with us for years to come, sustaining the likelihood of coercive debt restructurings and eurozone exits.
  • Gene Ellis on 19 Dec 12
     
    Late 2012 reading
Gene Ellis

TARGET2 as a scapegoat for German errors | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...arget2-scapegoat-german-errors

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • This coincided with the bubble years in peripheral Eurozone countries (2003-07). The effect of this is that Germany accumulated large net claims on Eurozone countries, which at the end of 2011 amounted to €634 billion.
  • These current account surpluses did not lead to TARGET2 claims during the bubble years because the counterpart of these surpluses were increasing claims held by (mainly) German banks against the other Eurozone countries.
  • the German banking system was lending the money to other Eurozone countries to allow them to buy surplus German products – a highly risky affair.
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  • This created the illusion that no risk was involved; in fact the risks were increasing every year.
  • It should have been obvious that the debtor countries could get into payment difficulties as they were piling up debt made possible by the loans of German banks.
  • If there is a breakup of the Eurozone, Germany will face the risk that some debtor countries default on their debt. But again this risk is not affected by the size of the TARGET2 claims of Germany.
  • The risk that Germany faces as a result of its net exposure to other Eurozone countries is therefore entirely of the country’s own making.
  • Since 2009, when the TARGET2 balances started to take off, current account deficits of the peripheral countries as a whole declined from 9.1% of their GDP to 4.5%. These declines were mainly due to deep recessions in these countries.
  • Sinn (2012) argues that these deficits would have had to decline even faster had there been no financing through the TARGET2 mechanism. This is certainly true. But this is the same as saying that these countries should have pushed their economies into even deeper recessions.
  • The main reason why German TARGET2 claims have increased so much since 2010 is capital flows. The flows have taken two forms.
  • The first one came about when German banks unloaded their loans made to peripheral countries into the balance sheet of the Bundesbank.
  • The second one was the result of non-residents shifting their deposits from their local banks into the German banking system out of fear of a breakup of the Eurozone.
  • This led German banks to stop their credit lines to southern banks (and other northern EZ banks followed)
  • Thus in the scenario of a breakup, with or without TARGET2 claims, the risk of large losses for the German taxpayer is very similar.
  • the Bundesbank can eliminate the risk of such last minute accumulations of TARGET2 balances by converting euros into new German marks only for German residents.
Gene Ellis

The delicate balance of fixing the eurozone | Martin Wolf's Exchange - 0 views

blogs.ft.com/...balance-of-fixing-the-eurozone

shared by Gene Ellis on 17 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • The euro itself was a leading cause of this crisis by ushering in a remarkably swift convergence in interest rates, which had the effect of directing too much capital into countries that formerly had had to pay high interest rates. This undermined the competitiveness of these countries through inflation and gave rise to huge deficits in their current accounts.
  • The euro is not suffering from a mere confidence crisis that can be resolved by assuaging the markets; it is experiencing a profound balance‐of‐payment crisis that is being prolonged by the expansion of public financial aid.
  • Since autumn 2007, long before the official bail‐out initiatives began, some of the crisis‐hit countries have replaced dwindling private capital imports and capital flight with their money‐printing presses (Target credits).
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  • 5. Export surpluses create no real value if they translate into claims vis‐à‐vis countries which ultimately cannot pay their debts,
  • 6. The ECB Council overstepped its mandate when it transferred to Eurozone national central banks, primarily the Bundesbank, the task of financing the public and private deficits of other countries.
  • 7. Germany’s liability for the bail‐out initiatives does not total 211 billion euros, as often cited, but is actually now close to 600 billion euros if the far larger bailout initiatives of the ECB are included in this figure.
  • 8. The Target credits and the purchase of government bonds by the ECB system transfer the investment risk of private investors and banks to the taxpayers of economically sound countries, posing a threat to the euro because they offer debtor countries incentives to advocate inflationary policies at the ECB Council which would help them defer their obligation to repay their foreign debts.
  • 9. Eurobonds would undermine debt discipline, lead to much higher interest burdens for the German state, and anew induce capital flows in Europe that would exacerbate the external imbalances.
  • ) Target debts are to be settled on an annual basis with interest‐bearing, marketable assets as in the US.
  • g) Countries that are not competitive enough to repay their foreign debts should, in their own interest, leave the Monetary Union.”
  • I also appreciate the fact that the declaration envisages a credit boom in Germany that would ultimately rebalance the eurozone economy. Nevertheless, this rebalancing is likely to prove painfully slow and certainly requires a prolonged period of relatively high inflation in Germany, to offset relatively low inflation in the vulnerable countries. It is far from clear that German public opinion is prepared for such an outcome.
  • More important, I do not believe a currency union that takes for granted the possibility of sovereign defaults and even exit would prove workable. It is a recipe for extreme financial instability, with huge runs on credit to banks, private non-banks and governments built in.
  • mechanisms of financing and adjustment. Permanent transfers from some countries to others, merely to offset a lack of
  • competitiveness (rather than accelerate income convergence), are indeed undesirable. Nevertheless, financing needs to be sufficiently large and generous to give vulnerable countries some chance of managing the adjustment to shocks, without sovereign default, mass private bankruptcies and implosion of financial systems.
  • Gene Ellis on 17 Jul 12
     
    The second major article on Professor Hans-Werner Sinn's attack on the premises of the eurozone. TARGET 2 analysis, plus...
Gene Ellis

"Which Eurobonds?" by Jeffrey Frankel | Project Syndicate - 0 views

www.project-syndicate.org/...which-eurobonds-

jeffrey project syndicate

shared by Gene Ellis on 16 Jun 12 - No Cached
  • Any solution to the eurozone crisis must meet a short-run objective and a long-run goal. Unfortunately, the two tend to conflict.Illustration by Paul LachineCommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThe short-run objective is to return Greece, Portugal, and other troubled countries to a sustainable debt path (that is, a declining debt/GDP ratio). Austerity has raised debt/GDP ratios, but a debt write-down or bigger bailouts would undermine the long-term goal of minimizing the risk of similar debt crises in the future.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph
  • it is hard to commit today to practice fiscal rectitude tomorrow. Official debt caps, such as the Maastricht fiscal criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), failed because they were unenforceable.
  • The introduction of Eurobonds – joint, aggregate eurozone liabilities – could be part of the solution, if designed properly. There is certainly demand for them in China and other major emerging countries, which are desperate for an alternative to low-yielding US government securities.
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  • But Germany remains opposed on moral-hazard grounds: a joint guarantee of Eurozone members’ liabilities would strengthen individual national governments’ incentive to spend beyond their means.
  • The German Council of Economic Experts has proposed a European Redemption Fund (ERF). The plan would convert into de facto 25-year Eurobonds the existing sovereign debt of member countries in excess of 60% of GDP, the threshold specified by the Maastricht criteria and the SGP.
  • But this seems upside down.
  • it offers absolution precisely on the 60%-of-GDP margin where countries will have the most trouble resisting temptation.
  • the main explanation for the absence of US moral hazard is that the right precedent was set in 1841, when the federal government let eight states and the Territory of Florida default.
  • Ever since 1841, the market requires that US states running up questionable levels of debt pay an interest-rate premium to compensate for the default risk.
  • Had the ECB operated from the outset under a rule prohibiting it from accepting SGP-noncompliant countries’ debt as collateral, the entire eurozone sovereign-debt problem might have been avoided.
  • the expansion in the US took place at the federal level, where spending today amounts to 24% of GDP, compared to just 1.2% of GDP for the European Union budget.
  • The version of Eurobonds that might work as the missing long-term enforcement mechanism is almost the reverse of the Germans’ ERF proposal: the “blue bonds” proposed two years ago by Jacques Delpla and Jakob von Weizsäcker. Under this plan, only debt issued by national authorities below the 60%-of-GDP threshold could receive eurozone backing and seniority. When a country issued debt above the threshold, the resulting “red bonds” would lose this status.
  • The point is that the enforcement mechanism would be truly automatic: market interest rates would provide the discipline that bureaucrats in Brussels cannot.
  • Of course, the eurozone cannot establish a blue-bond regime without first solving the problems of debt overhang and troubled banks. Otherwise, the plan itself would be destabilizing, because almost all countries would immediately be in the red.
  • But one thing seems clear. German taxpayers, whose longstanding suspicion of profligate Mediterranean euro members has been vindicated, will not be happy when asked to pay still more for the cause of European integration. At a minimum, they will need some credible reason to believe that 20 years of false assurances have come to an end – that this is the last bailout.
Gene Ellis

Four rescue measures for stagnant eurozone - FT.com - 0 views

www.ft.com/...81-11e4-a882-00144feabdc0.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 18 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • Four rescue measures for stagnant eurozone
  • To avoid the cyclical stagnation in the eurozone turning into secular stagnation, four policies are required.
  • Both the AQR and the stress test relied heavily on national regulators and supervisors – the very entities on whose watch the excesses that led to the financial crisis were allowed to fester and compound.
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  • They were in charge of the regulatory leniency that permitted the banks in their jurisdictions to engage in lender forbearance (extend and pretend/delay and pray) and to overstate the fair value of their assets.
  • The EBA has a long record of stress tests that grotesquely underestimate the capital holes in EU banks.
  • he first is a proper AQR and stress test followed by a speedy recapitalisation of the capital-deficient banks and a wave of consolidation in the eurozone banking sector to bring higher profitability
  • The second measure is a temporary fiscal stimulus (say 1 per cent of eurozone GDP per year for two years, concentrated in the countries with the largest output gaps, that is, in the periphery), which is permanently funded and monetised by the ECB.
  • this will be a reminder that the most important asset of central banks – the present value of future seigniorage profits – is off-balance sheet.
  • Finally, to achieve debt sustainability for the eurozone sovereigns, radical supply side reforms are required that boost the growth rate of potential output to at least 1.5 per cent in Italy, Portugal and other sclerotic countries.
Gene Ellis

The euro is in greater peril today than at the height of the crisis - FT.com - 0 views

www.ft.com/...28-11e4-91b1-00144feabdc0.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 18 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • The euro is in greater peril today than at the height of the crisis
  • Two years ago forecasters were hoping for strong economic recovery. Now we know it did not happen, nor is it about to happen.
  • Today the eurozone has no mechanism to defend itself against a drawn-out depression. And, unlike two years ago, policy makers have no appetite to create such a mechanism.
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  • Both Ms Le Pen and Mr Grillo want their countries to leave the eurozone.
  • Unlike two years ago, we now have a clearer idea about the long-term policy response. Austerity is here to stay. Fiscal policy will continue to contract as member states fulfil their obligations under new European fiscal rules.
  • And what about structural reforms? We should not overestimate their effect. Germany’s much-praised welfare and labour reforms made it more competitive against other eurozone countries. But they did not increase domestic demand. Applied to the eurozone as a whole, their effect would be even smaller as not everybody can become simultaneously more competitive against one another.
  • hese serial disappointments do not tell us conclusively that the eurozone will fail. But they tell us that secular stagnation is very probable. For me, that constitutes the true metric of failure.
Gene Ellis

The Broken Model Of The Eurozone | Seeking Alpha - 0 views

seekingalpha.com/...e-broken-model-of-the-eurozone

shared by Gene Ellis on 05 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • The Broken Model Of The Eurozone
  • The North is competitive. The South is 20% overvalued.And I realized that's all you need to know about the eurozone and about why it will fail. Or has already failed, to put it more accurately. There's no other information required. Other than a bit of context, perhaps, to clarify.Before the euro and the eurozone, countries like Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal, would perform 20% or more lower economically than Germany or Holland would. And that was kind of alright, because periodically, their governments and central banks would revalue (devaluate) their currencies down against;
  • Of course, Germany hated this to an extent, since it made it harder for its industries to compete against Greek and Italian companies. Which may, by the way, well be a mostly hidden reason for them to push the eurozone on the Mediterranean.
Gene Ellis

They saved the eurozone; they just forgot to save the people - Vox - 0 views

www.vox.com/...just-forgot-to-save-the-people

shared by Gene Ellis on 05 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • They saved the eurozone; they just forgot to save the people
  • The only problem is vast swathes of the continent remain an economic disaster area. They saved the eurozone, but not the economies that it comprises or the people who live there.
  • So what happened? Well, recall the problem. A bunch of countries that had previously been considered substantially less creditworthy than Germany joined the euro, and immediately saw a huge reduction in their borrowing costs. That led to irresponsible budgeting in Italy, a lot of private borrowing in Spain and Ireland, and a bit of both in Greece. Then after the global financial crisis hit, all these countries wound up in recession.
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  • In stepped Mario Draghi, chief of the European Central Bank, with a speech and a plan. The plan was called Outright Monetary Transactions and the speech said Draghi would do "whatever it takes" to prevent a eurozone government from being forced into default or out of the eurozone
Gene Ellis

Cyprus adds to Europe's confusion - FT.com - 0 views

www.ft.com/...4a-11e2-a4fa-00144feabdc0.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Mar 13 - No Cached
  • First, the eurozone does indeed have the capacity to do the right thing in the end, though not before first exhausting all the alternatives.
  • It protects the small deposits and imposes a rational resolution process.
  • Second, a euro is indeed not a euro everywhere.
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  • A consensus on the principle that creditors, not taxpayers, should pay if a bank becomes insolvent does not yet exist across the eurozone. Does anybody imagine the German government would not rescue Deutsche Bank if it were in trouble? Of course it would.
  • Yet, as Guntram Wolff of Bruegel notes, a currency union with internal exchange controls is a contradiction in terms. Only the willingness of the European Central Bank to finance Cypriot banks without limit could end these controls in the near future. Will it be willing to act soon?
  • The outcome in Cyprus underlines the fact that the value of a euro of bank liabilities depends on the solvency of the bank itself and the solvency of the government standing behind the bank. If both bank and state are insolvent, lenders are likely not only to lose a big proportion of their money outright, but to find that the rest is frozen behind controls,
  • The ideal conclusion from the Cypriot imbroglio would be that all eurozone banks should have more capital.
  • A final lesson of this crisis is that what I have called the “bad marriage” that binds the eurozone members together has become worse.
  • Thus the eurozone limps on through crisis after crisis. Can – or will – this continue indefinitely? I do not know.
Gene Ellis

Crippled eurozone to face fresh debt crisis this year, warns ex-ECB strongman Axel Webe... - 0 views

www.telegraph.co.uk/...-ECB-strongman-Axel-Weber.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 24 Jan 14 - No Cached
  • Crippled eurozone to face fresh debt crisis this year, warns ex-ECB strongman Axel Weber
  • Harvard professor Kenneth Rogoff said the launch of the euro had been a "giant historic mistake, done to soon" that now requires a degree of fiscal union and a common bank resolution fund to make it work, but EMU leaders are still refusing to take these steps.
  • "People are no longer talking about the euro falling apart but youth unemployment is really horrific. They can't leave this twisting in wind for another five years," he said.
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  • Mr Rogoff said Europe is squandering the "scarce resource" of its youth, badly needed to fortify an ageing society as the demographic crunch sets in.
  • "If these latent technologies are not realised, Europe will wake up like Rip Van Winkel from a long Japan-like slumber to find itself a much smaller part of the world economy, and a lot less important."
  • Pierre Nanterme, chairman and chief executive officer of Accenture, said Europe is losing the great battle for competitiveness, and risks a perma-slump where debt burdens of 100pc of GDP prevent governments breaking free by investing in skills and technology.
  • Mr Weber, who resigned from the Bundesbank and the ECB in a dispute over euro debt crisis strategy, said new "bail-in" rules for bond-holders of eurozone banks will cause investors to act pre-emptively, aiming to avoid large losses before the ECB issues its test verdicts. "We may see that speculators do not wait until November, but bet on winners and losers before that," he said.
  • Sir Martin said the eurozone is pursuing a reverse "Phillips Curve" - the trade off between jobs and inflation - as if it were testing "what level of unemployment it is prepared to tolerate for zero inflation".
  • Mr Rogoff said debt write-downs across the EMU periphery "will eventually happen" but the longer leaders let the crisis fester with half-measures, the worse damage this will do to European society in the end.
  • He said Europe is falling further behind as the US basks in cheap energy and pours funds into cutting-edge technology. "A lot is at stake. If in 12 to 24 months no radical steps are taken to break the curse, we might have not just five, ten, but twenty years of a low-growth sluggish situation in Europe," he said.
  • "People are no longer talking about the euro falling apart but youth unemployment is really horrific. They can't leave this twisting in wind for another five years," he said
Gene Ellis

Optimism about an end to the euro crisis is wrong - FT.com - 0 views

www.ft.com/...9a-11e3-86ef-00144feab7de.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • Adjustment is the key to ending the eurozone crisis. The optimists are saying that this process of regaining competitiveness is now taking place.
  • This judgment is profoundly wrong.
  • In other words, the eurozone is adjusting at the expense of the rest of the world.
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  • But while the eurozone is a fixed-currency regime internally, it is nothing of the sort externally. The currency does exactly what textbooks say it should: it keeps on rising, thus offsetting the improvements in the current account. Last week the euro rose to more than $1.38 against the dollar.
  • The main problem with the rise in the euro’s external value is that it makes the internal adjustment harder. The crisis countries need to lower their export prices but the higher value of the euro raises the prices of exports to outside the eurozone.
  • It essentially says internal adjustment is not really happening.
  • Second, the prices of Spanish tradeable goods would have to fall against those of non-Spanish tradeable goods elsewhere in the eurozone.
  • Put bluntly: the scale of necessary adjustment is absolutely enormous. The IMF does not believe that this is going to happen.
  • In a monetary union adjustment is hard without any transfers and without a fiscal union.
Gene Ellis

Eurozone crisis: can the centre hold? | Nouriel Roubini | Business | theguardian.com - 0 views

www.theguardian.com/...eurozone-crisis-euro-european

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • Several developments helped to restore calm. The European Central Bank (ECB) president, Mario Draghi, vowed to do "whatever it takes" to save the euro, and quickly institutionalised that pledge by establishing the ECB's "outright monetary transactions" programme to buy distressed eurozone members' sovereign bonds.
  • And, even if such adjustment is not occurring as fast as Germany and other core eurozone countries would like, they remain willing to provide financing, and governments committed to adjustment are still in power.
  • For starters, potential growth is still too low in most of the periphery, given ageing populations and low productivity growth, while actual growth – even once the periphery exits the recession, in 2014 – will remain below 1% for the next few years, implying that unemployment rates will remain very high.
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  • levels of private and public debt, domestic and foreign, are still too high, and continue to rise as a share of GDP, owing to slow or negative output growth. This means that the issue of medium-term sustainability remains unresolved.
  • At the same time, the loss of competitiveness has been only partly reversed, with most of the improvement in external balances being cyclical rather than structural.
  • The euro is still too strong, severely limiting the improvement in competitiveness that is needed to boost net exports in the face of weak domestic demand.
  • a continuing credit crunch, as undercapitalised banks deleverage by selling assets and shrinking their loan portfolios.
  • The larger problem, of course, is that progress toward banking, fiscal, economic and political union, all of which are essential to the eurozone's long-term viability, has been too slow.
  • all imply that banks will have to focus on raising capital at the expense of providing the financing needed for economic growth.
  • Moreover the ECB, in contrast to the Bank of England, is unwilling to be creative in pursuing policies that would ameliorate the credit crunch.
  • Meanwhile, austerity fatigue is rising in the eurozone periphery.
  • And bailout fatigue is emerging in the eurozone's core.
  • But the eurozone's political strains may soon reach a breaking point,
Gene Ellis

Do not kid yourself that the eurozone is recovering - FT.com - 0 views

www.ft.com/...aa-11e3-bbeb-00144feab7de.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • Comparing the first half of 2007 and the first half of 2013, real GDP contracted by an accumulated 1.3 per cent in the eurozone, 5.3 per cent in Spain and 8.4 per cent in Italy.
  • In the same period investment was down by an accumulated 19 per cent in the eurozone – and 38 per cent in Spain and 27 per cent in Italy. Between the first quarter of 2007 and the first quarter of 2013, employment fell 17 per cent in Spain and 2 per cent in Italy.
  • Italy is stuck with a combination of an unsustainable high level of public debt and no productivity growth. It has essentially two options to adjust – become like Germany, or leave the eurozone. The country is unable to do the first, and unwilling to do the latter
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  • Italy faces no immediate threat for as long interest rates remain low. The country will be able to muddle through for a while until some political or economic shock will force a decision one way or the other.
  • Meanwhile, the single largest constraint on the resumption of eurozone growth is not fiscal policy – which is broadly neutral at present across the single currency area – but the continued failure to clean up the banks. The growth rate of loans to the non-financial sector turned negative in 2009, showed some intermittent improvements, only to then deteriorate again last year.
  • The monetary and banking data are telling us that the economy will teeter on the brink of zero or low growth for the foreseeable future because the financial sector is not supplying the economy with sufficient funds to expand.
  • Banking union could help, but only if it were to break the relationship between banks and sovereigns and clean up the balance sheets.
Gene Ellis

Italy Falls Back Into Recession, Raising Concern for Eurozone Economy - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...cern-for-eurozone-economy.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 05 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • Italy Falls Back Into Recession, Raising Concern for Eurozone Economy
  • Some economists argue that the region is already well into a so-called lost decade.
  • Analysts surmised that the strained relations with Russia as well as turmoil in the Middle East had undercut demand for Italian exports, in particular fashion and other luxury goods.
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  • “I definitely expect that things will get worse,” he said.
  • The European Union exported agricultural goods worth 11.8 billion euros, or $15.8 billion, to Russia last year, and sales have been rising at a rate of almost 15 percent a year.
  • The economic data and news that Russia was massing troops and military equipment on the Ukrainian border caused stock prices to fall across Europe on Wednesday.
  • Separately, the German Federal Statistical Office reported on Wednesday that new industrial orders in Germany fell 3.2 percent in June compared with May. Analysts had expected orders to increase.
  • For Italy, the deteriorating economy puts greater pressure on Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who less than a week ago promised not to impose any more government budget cuts and to invest in improving the country’s roads and other infrastructure. Such promises will be difficult to keep if slower growth, which usually translates into higher unemployment and lower corporate profits, limits tax receipts.A slower economy also endangers Italy’s ability to comply with eurozone rules on budget deficits.
  • Italy’s 2.1 trillion euro government debt equals 136 percent of its annual gross domestic product, the second-highest debt ratio in the eurozone, after Greece.
  • They said Italy’s problems stemmed more from its failure make changes needed to improve the performance of its economy.
  • The slow pace of structural reforms is worrisome,” said Paolo Manasse, a professor of macroeconomics at Bologna University. He said there was no sign of progress on necessary steps like selling off state-owned assets or overhauling the labor market or public pension system.
Gene Ellis

Kenen on the euro | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/kenen-euro

shared by Gene Ellis on 26 Jan 13 - No Cached
  • Early work on optimum currency areas by Robert Mundell had emphasised the symmetry or asymmetry of disturbances hitting different regional economies as a key criterion on which to gauge their suitability for sharing a common currency.
  • Peter took this insight further by arguing that disturbances were often sector specific and that the diversification of regional economies was therefore a key consideration in gauging their suitability for monetary union (the better diversified an economy was, the less likely it was to be badly destabilised by a sector-specific shock). (Kenen 1969).
  • We now know that Kenen flagged a problem for which the Eurozone could have been better prepared. With an outsized capital-goods producing sector, Germany benefitted from a strong positive shock as a result of China’s emergence onto the global stage, given the Chinese economy’s voracious appetite for capital goods.
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  • Portugal and Italy, on the other hand, specialised much more heavily in consumer-goods producing sectors and felt the brunt of Chinese competition. No Eurozone member was sufficiently well diversified to shrug off this kind of shock, something that should have made the euro’s architects think twice.
  • Specifically, they should have thought again, Kenen argued, about the coordination of national fiscal policies, the need for a common Eurozone budget, and mechanisms for transferring fiscal resources from booming to depressed regions.
  • More than any other economist, Peter understood that monetary union was a legal as well as an economic construct. His careful parsing of the Maastricht Treaty explained to the economics profession exactly what the treaty did and did not allow (Kenen 1992).
  • Peter even anticipated the debate over TARGET2 imbalances, observing in 1999 that it was possible to “easily conceive of conditions…in which one [national central bank] would be reluctant to build up claims indefinitely on some other national central bank.” (Kenen 1999).
  • Finally, Peter observed that the possibility of a member state exiting from the Eurozone could not be ruled out but warned that European officials should be cautious in bandying about the idea (Kenen 1999). “The costs of defecting,” he wrote back in 1999, “could be very high.”
  • Gene Ellis on 26 Jan 13
     
    Good Eichengreen, Wyplosz EUVox article on Peter Kenen and insights on why the Euro might have difficuties.
Gene Ellis

PrudentBear - 0 views

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GEP com nytimes nytimes com global europe GDP crisis syndicate euro

shared by Gene Ellis on 09 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • German exporters were major beneficiaries of this growth. German banks and financial institutions helped finance the growth.
  • Exports have provided the majority of Germany’s growth in recent years. Germany is heavily reliant on a narrowly based industrial sector, focused on investment goods—automobiles, industrial machinery, chemicals, electronics and medical devices. These sectors make up a quarter of its GDP and the bulk of exports.
  • Germany’s service sector is weak with lower productivity than comparable countries. While it argues that Greece should deregulate professions, many professions in Germany remain highly regulated. Trades and professions are regulated by complex technical rules and standards rooted in the medieval guild systems. Foreign entrants frequently find these rules difficult and expensive to navigate.
  • ...18 more annotations...
  • Despite the international standing of Deutsche Bank, Germany’s banking system is fragile. Several German banks required government support during the financial crisis. Highly fragmented (in part due to heavy government involvement) and with low profitability, German banks, especially the German Länder (state) owned Landsbanks, face problems. They have large exposures to European sovereign debt, real estate and structured securities.
  • Prior to 2005, the Landesbanken were able to borrow cheaply, relying on the guarantee of the state governments. The EU ruled these guarantees amounted to subsidies. Before the abolition of the guarantees, the Landesbanks issued large amounts of state-guaranteed loans which mature by December 2015.
  • While it insists on other countries reducing public debt, German debt levels are high—around 81% of GDP. The Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, has stated that public debt levels will remain above 60% (the level stipulated by European treaties) for many years.
  • Germany’s greatest vulnerability is its financial exposures from the current crisis. German exposure to Europe, especially the troubled peripheral economies, is large.
  • German banks had exposures of around US$500 billion to the debt issues of peripheral nations. While the levels have been reduced, it remains substantial, especially when direct exposures to banks in these countries and indirect exposures via the global financial system are considered. The reduction in risk held by private banks has been offset by the increase in exposure of the German state, which assumed some of this exposure.
  • For example, the exposure of the ECB to Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy is euro 918 billion as of April 2012. This exposure is also rising rapidly, especially driven by capital flight out of these countries.
  • Germany is now caught in a trap. Irrespective of the resolution of the debt crisis, Germany will suffer significant losses on its exposure – it will be the biggest loser.
  • But the largest single direct German exposure is the Bundesbank’s over euro 700 billion current exposure under the TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System) to other central banks in the Eurozone.
  • In late May 2012, French President Francois Hollande provided a curious argument in support of eurozone bonds: “Is it acceptable that some sovereigns can borrow at 6% and others at zero in the same monetary union?”
  • Political will for integration
  • In the peripheral economies, continued withdrawal of deposits from national banks (a rational choice given currency and confiscation risk) may necessitate either a Europe wide deposit guarantee system or further funding of banks.
  • A credible deposit insurance scheme would have to cover household deposits (say up to euro 100,000), which is around 72% of all deposits, in the peripheral countries. This would entail an insurance scheme for around euro 1.3 trillion of deposits.
  • Given that the Spanish Economy Ministry reports that euro 184 billion in loans to developers are “problematic,” the additional recapitalization needs of Spain’s banks may be as high as euro 200-300 billion in additional funds (20-30% of GDP)
  • A Greek default would result in losses to Germany of up to around euro 90 billion. Germany’s potential losses increase rapidly as more countries default or leave the eurozone.
  • Austerity or default will force many European economies into recession for a prolonged period. German exports will be affected given Europe is around 60% of its market, including around 40% within the eurozone. In case of a break-up of the euro, estimates of German growth range from -1% to below -10%. It is worth remembering that the German economy fell in size by around 5% in 2008, the worst result since the Second World War, mainly on the back of declining exports.
  • For example, Greece owes about euro 400 billion to private bondholders but increasingly to public bodies, such as the IMF and ECB, mainly due to the bailouts. If Greece walks away as some political parties have threatened, then the fallout for the lenders, such as Germany, are potentially calamitous.
  • Once the artificial boom ends, voters will discover they were betrayed by Germany’s pro-European political elite. There will be an electoral revolt and, as in the rest of Europe, a strong challenge from radical political forces with unpredictable consequences.
  • by Satyajit Das
Gene Ellis

Colm McCarthy: The eurozone is still at risk and we need to get our house in order - An... - 0 views

www.independent.ie/...ur-house-in-order-3168399.html

syndicate

shared by Gene Ellis on 15 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • Friday's two-notch downgrade of Italy by ratings agency Moody's explicitly mentions default risk and eurozone fracturing.
  • History teaches that muddle rather than conspiracy lies behind even the greatest turning points and the doubters are being too quick on the draw.
  • accompanied by some rowing back from the apparently significant decisions taken at the summit on June 28 and 29.
  • ...6 more annotations...
  • These thoughts are spurred by the rather weak communique, which followed the meeting earlier last week of eurogroup finance ministers in Brussels,
  • There is, as yet, no mechanism in place to ensure bond market support to Spain and Italy and nobody, except the ECB, has the funds to keep their governments funded, should they be forced from the market. The ECB has suspended its bond-buying programme so the high-wire act continues, without a safety net.
  • The eurozone could face a major crisis at short notice if either country experiences serious trouble selling government paper, which both must do in large volume and on a continuing basis.
  • The avoidance of default on the core sovereign debt, the debt undertaken without duress by the Irish State, is a legitimate objective of national policy.
  • It had become clear, early in 2010, that the blanket bank guarantee would bankrupt the Irish State, and the Government finally began to acknowledge that haircuts for senior, but unsecured, bank bondholders had become unavoidable.
  • As far as I am aware, this is the first time in the history of central banking that a sovereign state has been compelled, to the point of national insolvency, and by its own central bank (by our Government's choice, the ECB), to make whole those who foolishly purchased bonds issued by private banks, which had gone bust and been closed down.
Gene Ellis

The Greek package: Eurozone rescue or seeds of an unravelled monetary union? | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...eeds-unravelled-monetary-union

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • The plan will not work.
  • The IMF has the option of suspending its disbursements and forcing a default, as it did with Argentina.
  • Once the markets realise this, they will further raise the interest that they request to roll over the maturing debt or simply refuse to refinance the debt.
  • ...7 more annotations...
  • At least, this will clarify the situation: the plan is about bailing out a Eurozone government, in direct violation of Art. 125 of the European Treaty, the so-called no-bail-out clause.
  • The next headache should be contagion.
  • What has been offered to Greece cannot be refused to other Eurozone governments
  • So, one more time, a (dwindling) group of deficit-stricken countries will have to provide money to increasingly large debtors. In fact, this process means that ultimately there is no national debt anymore, at least for the next few years.
  • An alternative to spreading mutual underwriting is debt monetisation.
  • The ECB does not buy assets outright, so the loss would be borne by the banks that used the Greek bonds as collateral for repo operations with the ECB. But banks are the ECB’s counterparties; if they default, the loss is the ECB’s.
  • Was there no other way? It would have been very easy to let Greece go straight to the IMF months ago and reschedule its debt with IMF’s assistance. This would have been a partial default, and the haircut could have been quite small. Most banks that are exposed to the Greek debt should have been able to withstand such losses. With a grace period of, say, three years, Greece would have had the breathing space that the latest plan tries so hard to organise
Gene Ellis

Big trouble from little Cyprus - FT.com - 0 views

www.ft.com/...e5-11e2-ae9e-00144feabdc0.html

little cyprus trouble

shared by Gene Ellis on 20 Mar 13 - No Cached
  • The banks stand on the edge of collapse. But it is the European Central Bank that has pulled the plug by threatening not to accept Cypriot government debt as collateral against liquidity support.
  • A restructuring of public debt is still likely. As Hamlet advises: If it be not now, yet it will come.
  • Is there no alternative to the bail-ins? Yes: direct bank recapitalisation by the eurozone, for which the sum required is a small matter. If the banking union had been up and running, that would have happened. It is not, presumably because core countries do not want to bail out mismanaged banking systems,
  • ...6 more annotations...
  • A big question is why ordinary Cypriot taxpayers should rescue banks at all?
  • The first concern is the deal itself. The decision to impose losses on insured deposits is indeed a big error. (Yes, it is a default, not a tax.)
  • Banks have so little loss-absorbing capacity that they stand permanently on the edge of disaster.
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 20 Mar 13
       
      Very good point.  
  • The eurozone must either make the industry far more robust, by hugely increasing equity capital, or consolidate fiscal capacity and tighten regulation, to ensure adequate eurozone-wide oversight and fiscal support.
  • Banking is dangerous everywhere. But it still threatens the eurozone’s survival. This has to change – and very soon.
Gene Ellis

Eurozone: Looking for growth | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...eurozone-looking-growth

looking growth vox

shared by Gene Ellis on 25 Mar 13 - No Cached
  • Empirical evidence suggests deleveraging episodes accompanied by a housing crisis will take on average five and a half years across high-income OECD countries (or seven years when accompanied by a banking crisis (Aspachs-Bracon et al. 2011, IMF 2012).
  • Little resolution of banking-sector difficulties in the Eurozone suggests that deleveraging and credit will probably remain slow and impaired for much longer than previously thought. Recoveries that happen without credit are, on average, a third longer than recovery episodes with credit (Darvas 2013).
  • Damages to trend growth are notoriously difficult to assess,
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • In addition, observed GDP growth tends to be revised until several years after the first estimate
  • Our work is based on a simple Solow growth-accounting methodology.
  • A common feature of all economies is a collapse in productivity, which is typical of a big recession. In addition, Spain and Italy also underwent a very sharp labour contraction.
  • The additional effect of ageing.
  • A downside risk is that investment growth does not recover fully (for example, because banks fail to provide the necessary funding). In this case, we assume investment growth is only half what it was before the onset of economic turmoil.
  • We also estimate productivity through a convergence equation, which would slightly lift productivity in peripheral countries in the future.
  • This exercise suggests that in the absence of policy reforms, trend growth will have been damaged significantly, by at least one percentage point, post-crisis, compared with pre-crisis levels,
  • In the event that investment fails to recover quickly
  •  or unemployment levels take longer to fall than in previous recovery episodes, then trend growth would be significantly lower for longer. Trend growth might well remain negative in Spain and Italy, and may fail to increase for Germany or France.
  • this exercise shows the damage will indeed be long lasting, permanently impairing growth in a context of an ageing population that needs higher growth capacity than ever before.
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