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Gene Ellis

George Soros: how to save the EU from the euro crisis - the speech in full | Business |... - 0 views

www.guardian.co.uk/...ave-eu-from-euro-crisis-speech

shared by Gene Ellis on 09 Apr 13 - No Cached
  • The crisis has also transformed the European Union into something radically different from what was originally intended. The EU was meant to be a voluntary association of equal states but the crisis has turned it into a hierarchy with Germany and other creditors in charge and the heavily indebted countries relegated to second-class status. While in theory Germany cannot dictate policy, in practice no policy can be proposed without obtaining Germany's permission first.
  • Italy now has a majority opposed to the euro and the trend is likely to grow. There is now a real danger that the euro crisis may end up destroying the European Union.
  • The answer to the first question is extremely complicated because the euro crisis is extremely complex. It has both a political and a financial dimension. And the financial dimension can be divided into at least three components: a sovereign debt crisis and a banking crisis, as well as divergences in competitiveness
  • ...37 more annotations...
  • The crisis is almost entirely self-inflicted. It has the quality of a nightmare.
  • My interpretation of the euro crisis is very different from the views prevailing in Germany. I hope that by offering you a different perspective I may get you to reconsider your position before more damage is done. That is my goal in coming here.
  • I regarded the European Union as the embodiment of an open society – a voluntary association of equal states who surrendered part of their sovereignty for the common good.
  • The process of integration was spearheaded by a small group of far sighted statesmen who recognised that perfection was unattainable and practiced what Karl Popper called piecemeal social engineering. They set themselves limited objectives and firm timelines and then mobilised the political will for a small step forward, knowing full well that when they achieved it, its inadequacy would become apparent and require a further step.
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 09 Apr 13
       
      Excellent point!
  • Unfortunately, the Maastricht treaty was fundamentally flawed. The architects of the euro recognised that it was an incomplete construct: a currency union without a political union. The architects had reason to believe, however, that when the need arose, the political will to take the next step forward could be mobilized. After all, that was how the process of integration had worked until then.
  • For instance, the Maastricht Treaty took it for granted that only the public sector could produce chronic deficits because the private sector would always correct its own excesses. The financial crisis of 2007-8 proved that wrong.
  • When the Soviet empire started to disintegrate, Germany's leaders realized that reunification was possible only in the context of a more united Europe and they were prepared to make considerable sacrifices to achieve it. When it came to bargaining, they were willing to contribute a little more and take a little less than the others, thereby facilitating agreement.
  • The financial crisis also revealed a near fatal defect in the construction of the euro: by creating an independent central bank, member countries became indebted in a currency they did not control. This exposed them to the risk of default.
  • Developed countries have no reason to default; they can always print money. Their currency may depreciate in value, but the risk of default is practically nonexistent. By contrast, less developed countries that have to borrow in a foreign currency run the risk of default. To make matters worse, financial markets can actually drive such countries into default through bear raids. The risk of default relegated some member countries to the status of a third world country that became over-indebted in a foreign currency. 
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 09 Apr 13
       
      Again, another excellent point!
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 09 Apr 13
       
      Not quite... Maggie Thatcher, a Conservative; and Gordon Brown, of Labour, both recognized this possible loss of sovereignty (and economic policy weapons they might use to keep the UK afloat), and refused to join the euro.
  • The emphasis placed on sovereign credit revealed the hitherto ignored feature of the euro, namely that by creating an independent central bank the euro member countries signed away part of their sovereign status.
  • Only at the end of 2009, when the extent of the Greek deficit was revealed, did the financial markets realize that a member country could actually default. But then the markets raised the risk premiums on the weaker countries with a vengeance.
  • Then the IMF and the international banking authorities saved the international banking system by lending just enough money to the heavily indebted countries to enable them to avoid default but at the cost of pushing them into a lasting depression. Latin America suffered a lost decade.
  • In effect, however, the euro had turned their government bonds into bonds of third world countries that carry the risk of default.
  • In retrospect, that was the root cause of the euro crisis.
  • The burden of responsibility falls mainly on Germany. The Bundesbank helped design the blueprint for the euro whose defects put Germany into the driver's seat.
  • he fact that Greece blatantly broke the rules has helped to support this attitude. But other countries like Spain and Ireland had played by the rules;
  • the misfortunes of the heavily indebted countries are largely caused by the rules that govern the euro.
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 09 Apr 13
       
      Well, yes, but this is an extremely big point.  If, instead of convergence, we continue to see growth patterns growing apart, what then?
  • Germany did not seek the dominant position into which it has been thrust and it is unwilling to accept the obligations and liabilities that go with it.
  • Austerity doesn't work.
  • As soon as the pressure from the financial markets abated, Germany started to whittle down the promises it had made at the height of the crisis.
  • What happened in Cyprus undermined the business model of European banks, which relies heavily on deposits. Until now the authorities went out of their way to protect depositors
  • Banks will have to pay risk premiums that will fall more heavily on weaker banks and the banks of weaker countries. The insidious link between the cost of sovereign debt and bank debt will be reinforced.
  • In this context the German word "Schuld" plays a key role. As you know it means both debt and responsibility or guilt.
  • If countries that abide by the fiscal compact were allowed to convert their entire existing stock of government debt into eurobonds, the positive impact would be little short of the miraculous.
  • Only the divergences in competitiveness would remain unresolved.
  • Germany is opposed to eurobonds on the grounds that once they are introduced there can be no assurance that the so-called periphery countries would not break the rules once again. I believe these fears are misplaced.
  • Losing the privilege of issuing eurobonds and having to pay stiff risk premiums would be a powerful inducement to stay in compliance.
  • There are also widespread fears that eurobonds would ruin Germany's credit rating. eurobonds are often compared with the Marshall Plan.
  • It is up to Germany to decide whether it is willing to authorise eurobonds or not. But it has no right to prevent the heavily indebted countries from escaping their misery by banding together and issuing eurobonds. In other words, if Germany is opposed to eurobonds it should consider leaving the euro and letting the others introduce them.
  • Individual countries would still need to undertake structural reforms. Those that fail to do so would turn into permanent pockets of poverty and dependency similar to the ones that persist in many rich countries.
  • They would survive on limited support from European Structural Funds and remittances
  • Second, the European Union also needs a banking union and eventually a political union.
  • If Germany left, the euro would depreciate. The debtor countries would regain their competitiveness. Their debt would diminish in real terms and, if they issued eurobonds, the threat of default would disappear. 
Gene Ellis

The delicate balance of fixing the eurozone | Martin Wolf's Exchange - 0 views

blogs.ft.com/...balance-of-fixing-the-eurozone

shared by Gene Ellis on 17 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • The euro itself was a leading cause of this crisis by ushering in a remarkably swift convergence in interest rates, which had the effect of directing too much capital into countries that formerly had had to pay high interest rates. This undermined the competitiveness of these countries through inflation and gave rise to huge deficits in their current accounts.
  • The euro is not suffering from a mere confidence crisis that can be resolved by assuaging the markets; it is experiencing a profound balance‐of‐payment crisis that is being prolonged by the expansion of public financial aid.
  • Since autumn 2007, long before the official bail‐out initiatives began, some of the crisis‐hit countries have replaced dwindling private capital imports and capital flight with their money‐printing presses (Target credits).
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  • 5. Export surpluses create no real value if they translate into claims vis‐à‐vis countries which ultimately cannot pay their debts,
  • 6. The ECB Council overstepped its mandate when it transferred to Eurozone national central banks, primarily the Bundesbank, the task of financing the public and private deficits of other countries.
  • 7. Germany’s liability for the bail‐out initiatives does not total 211 billion euros, as often cited, but is actually now close to 600 billion euros if the far larger bailout initiatives of the ECB are included in this figure.
  • 8. The Target credits and the purchase of government bonds by the ECB system transfer the investment risk of private investors and banks to the taxpayers of economically sound countries, posing a threat to the euro because they offer debtor countries incentives to advocate inflationary policies at the ECB Council which would help them defer their obligation to repay their foreign debts.
  • 9. Eurobonds would undermine debt discipline, lead to much higher interest burdens for the German state, and anew induce capital flows in Europe that would exacerbate the external imbalances.
  • ) Target debts are to be settled on an annual basis with interest‐bearing, marketable assets as in the US.
  • g) Countries that are not competitive enough to repay their foreign debts should, in their own interest, leave the Monetary Union.”
  • I also appreciate the fact that the declaration envisages a credit boom in Germany that would ultimately rebalance the eurozone economy. Nevertheless, this rebalancing is likely to prove painfully slow and certainly requires a prolonged period of relatively high inflation in Germany, to offset relatively low inflation in the vulnerable countries. It is far from clear that German public opinion is prepared for such an outcome.
  • More important, I do not believe a currency union that takes for granted the possibility of sovereign defaults and even exit would prove workable. It is a recipe for extreme financial instability, with huge runs on credit to banks, private non-banks and governments built in.
  • mechanisms of financing and adjustment. Permanent transfers from some countries to others, merely to offset a lack of
  • competitiveness (rather than accelerate income convergence), are indeed undesirable. Nevertheless, financing needs to be sufficiently large and generous to give vulnerable countries some chance of managing the adjustment to shocks, without sovereign default, mass private bankruptcies and implosion of financial systems.
  • Gene Ellis on 17 Jul 12
     
    The second major article on Professor Hans-Werner Sinn's attack on the premises of the eurozone. TARGET 2 analysis, plus...
Gene Ellis

TARGET2 as a scapegoat for German errors | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...arget2-scapegoat-german-errors

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • This coincided with the bubble years in peripheral Eurozone countries (2003-07). The effect of this is that Germany accumulated large net claims on Eurozone countries, which at the end of 2011 amounted to €634 billion.
  • These current account surpluses did not lead to TARGET2 claims during the bubble years because the counterpart of these surpluses were increasing claims held by (mainly) German banks against the other Eurozone countries.
  • the German banking system was lending the money to other Eurozone countries to allow them to buy surplus German products – a highly risky affair.
  • ...12 more annotations...
  • This created the illusion that no risk was involved; in fact the risks were increasing every year.
  • It should have been obvious that the debtor countries could get into payment difficulties as they were piling up debt made possible by the loans of German banks.
  • If there is a breakup of the Eurozone, Germany will face the risk that some debtor countries default on their debt. But again this risk is not affected by the size of the TARGET2 claims of Germany.
  • The risk that Germany faces as a result of its net exposure to other Eurozone countries is therefore entirely of the country’s own making.
  • Since 2009, when the TARGET2 balances started to take off, current account deficits of the peripheral countries as a whole declined from 9.1% of their GDP to 4.5%. These declines were mainly due to deep recessions in these countries.
  • Sinn (2012) argues that these deficits would have had to decline even faster had there been no financing through the TARGET2 mechanism. This is certainly true. But this is the same as saying that these countries should have pushed their economies into even deeper recessions.
  • The main reason why German TARGET2 claims have increased so much since 2010 is capital flows. The flows have taken two forms.
  • The first one came about when German banks unloaded their loans made to peripheral countries into the balance sheet of the Bundesbank.
  • The second one was the result of non-residents shifting their deposits from their local banks into the German banking system out of fear of a breakup of the Eurozone.
  • This led German banks to stop their credit lines to southern banks (and other northern EZ banks followed)
  • Thus in the scenario of a breakup, with or without TARGET2 claims, the risk of large losses for the German taxpayer is very similar.
  • the Bundesbank can eliminate the risk of such last minute accumulations of TARGET2 balances by converting euros into new German marks only for German residents.
Gene Ellis

Europe Can't Handle the Euro - 0 views

www.nber.org/...wj020800.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 31 May 12 - No Cached
  • When leaders of the 11 nations that agreed to combine their currencies gathered in January 1999, they predicted great things: the single currency would shift global portfolios to euro assets, depressing the value of the dollar relative to the euro, and the new eurozone would be a strong player in the global economy, reflecting the size of an integrated European market. Instead the euro plummeted, Europes economy remains weak, and unemployment is more than twice the U.S. level.
  • The ECB will eventually be judged not by its words but by whether it achieves low inflation and does so without increasing cyclical unemployment. I am not optimistic about either part of this goal.
  • The ECB must make monetary policy for "Europe as a whole," which in practice means doing what is appropriate for Germany, France and Italy, the eurozones three largest countries. Last year demand conditions in those countries were relatively weak, while demand conditions in Spain and Ireland were very strong. That meant a monetary policy that was too expansionary for Spain and Ireland, causing a substantial acceleration of their inflation and threatening their competitiveness.
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  • Such disparities of demand conditions will undoubtedly persist in the future because European countries differ substantially in industrial composition and in a variety of economic policies.
  • the time will come when the ECB will set a policy that is too tight for the outliers, leading to substantially higher unemployment than if they were free to set their own monetary policies. Even without discretionary monetary policies, the interest rates in countries with weak demand would naturally decline, and the external values of their currencies would fall, both acting as offsetting stabilizers of the countries weak demand. But this will not be possible within the EMU, where a single interest rate and a single exchange rate prevail. Result: higher average cyclical unemployment.
  • In the U.S., a fall in regional demand leads to lower wages, which help to maintain employment; to movements of labor to regions where demand is stronger; and to a net fiscal transfer from Washington (because lower regional income means lower federal tax liability). None of this happens in Europe, where wages are inflexible, mobility is severely limited by language and custom, and there are no significant fiscal transfers.
  • Politicians can now blame the ECB for high unemployment and complain that it is a powerful force beyond national control. Instead of seeking to make labor markets more flexible, European governments are talking more about "social wages," about mandatory 35-hour workweeks, and about rolling back even the small reductions in social benefits Germany achieved under Helmut Kohls government. Worse yet, there are attempts to eliminate differences in labor practices and even differences in wages among the EMU countries.
  • Moreover, these policies reduce the international competitiveness of many European industries and encourage the adoption of protectionist policies to keep out non-European products.
  • Forcing a single monetary policy on all of Europe will cause the countries that suffer what they regard as unnecessarily high unemployment to resent the actions of others. Attempts to force a Europewide tax system, especially if taxes are used to redistribute incomes among European countries, will compound the potential for conflict.
  • EMU is meant to be a marriage made in heaven with no possibility of divorce.
Gene Ellis

PORTFOLIO.HU | Blanchard: Eurozone integration needs to go forward or go back, but it c... - 0 views

www.portfolio.hu/...t_it_cant_stay_here.24931.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 04 Oct 12 - No Cached
  • And, while lower investment since the beginning of the crisis has led to a smaller capital stock, again the effect appears quantitatively small. It is also difficult to see why the crisis would have led to a large decrease in total factor productivity. This being said, I would have expected a large output gap to lead to more downward pressure on inflation than we have seen. I see the fact that inflation is roughly stable is a puzzle. We are doing more research on this issue at the IMF.
  • O.B.:There is no question internal devaluations are tougher to achieve than when you can adjust the nominal exchange rate. That’s well understood. A number of European countries have a competitiveness problem, which shows up in a large current account deficit.
  • olve it. And there is no alternative for them than to become more competitive, to decrease the real exchange rate. Is it happening? I think it’s starting to happen, but it’s happening slowly, and it’s going to take a long time.
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  • They have to
  • Many countries have a tough adjustment to achieve. In doing so, they indeed have to be careful about their social implications. When adjustment requires a decrease in the real wage (or at least a decrease relative to productivity), it is essential that the decrease be fairly shared. You have to make sure that there is a safety net in place. If the pension system has to be made less generous, which is the case in a number of countries, you have to make sure the lowest pensions are protected.
  • It is clear that adjustment in the Euro zone requires a decrease in the relative price of periphery countries and an increase in the relative price of core countries. If the ECB wants to maintain two percent inflation for the Euro zone as a whole, this implies, arithmetically, that core countries have to have inflation higher than two percent, periphery countries have to have inflation lower than two percent, until the adjustment has taken place.
Gene Ellis

IMF's Blanchard: Global Economy Gripped By Meta-Uncertainty - WSJ.com - 0 views

stream.wsj.com/...SS-2-33475

shared by Gene Ellis on 17 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • In 2008-09, there was a collapse of global trade. We were all very surprised. Output was not doing well, but the collapse in global trade was enormous. We realized at the time that the elasticity of trade with respect to global output was not 1, as you might think, but more like 3 to 4. So this explained it. And then it recovered like crazy.
  • This is still true. If global output goes down by 1%, global trade goes down by 3% to 4%.
  • What Europe needs to do:
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  • These countries have to do what they need to do. There’s no question there has to be fiscal consolidation. We can discuss the pace, but it has to happen. The other is competitiveness, which I see as much tougher of the two.
  • It has to be through a combination of structural reforms, hoping they will work, and nominal wage adjustments, although one cannot be incredibly optimistic about the scope there. We know that that’s going to take a while.
  • Take the big two, Italy and Spain. You can always dream of more, but I think they’re serious about doing it, both on the fiscal front and the structural-reforms front. I think it may well be that even if they do everything they can, and do it right, it’s still not enough. They have to have help — I would say when needed rather than if needed.
  • The banks have to be recapped, and they have to be recapped not using sovereign money. I think that is really very, very high on the agenda. I don’t think they can make it without help to the banks.
  • If the banks were healthier, I think they would lend at lower rates
  • And the sovereigns have to be able to borrow at reasonable rates. As long as they behave and they do all the things they’re asked to do, they have to be able to borrow at lower rates than they currently do. Some way has to be found to do it.
  • It’s not that I don’t care about the way it’s done. But I care about the result. These countries, if they’re doing the right things, they have to be able to finance themselves.
  • Some people say a euro depreciation would help Europe a lot. I think there is an argument for it, even in a multilateral context. You have to depreciate vis-a-vis somebody, so somebody has to appreciate. My sense is we would like most of the depreciation to be vis-a-vis emerging-market countries. Even if there was a depreciation vis-a-vis the dollar, I still think it would be a good thing.
  • We’ve done simulations. Other people have done simulations as well. 10% real depreciation would lead to a 1.4% increase in growth for a year — which at this stage, given the numbers, would be nice. The footnote, and it’s a very big footnote, is that … how much you benefit depends on how big your exports are related to your GDP and where you export — whether you export in the euro zone or outside. Unfortunately the countries that benefit the most are the countries that really don’t need it — Germany, the Netherlands. The countries that benefit the least are Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain
  • There’s no question, the periphery countries have to improve their competitiveness. That’s not something even monetary policy at the level of the euro or fiscal policy can do. This they have to do through productivity improvements or nominal wage adjustments.
  • It is no secret that they have tended to respond to crises rather than be much more proactive.
  • And now there’s a sense in which they’re thinking about the full architecture.
  • At this stage I think there is a genuine commitment to thinking about the whole beast. That’s why these words — fiscal union, banking union — have come in.
  • Where I think there is still a problem is that all these things will take a lot of time. And some of these things may not happen because they’re unpopular. And meanwhile, there is a fire in the house. So they have to be willing to do more in the short term.
Gene Ellis

"Which Eurobonds?" by Jeffrey Frankel | Project Syndicate - 0 views

www.project-syndicate.org/...which-eurobonds-

jeffrey project syndicate

shared by Gene Ellis on 16 Jun 12 - No Cached
  • Any solution to the eurozone crisis must meet a short-run objective and a long-run goal. Unfortunately, the two tend to conflict.Illustration by Paul LachineCommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThe short-run objective is to return Greece, Portugal, and other troubled countries to a sustainable debt path (that is, a declining debt/GDP ratio). Austerity has raised debt/GDP ratios, but a debt write-down or bigger bailouts would undermine the long-term goal of minimizing the risk of similar debt crises in the future.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph
  • it is hard to commit today to practice fiscal rectitude tomorrow. Official debt caps, such as the Maastricht fiscal criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), failed because they were unenforceable.
  • The introduction of Eurobonds – joint, aggregate eurozone liabilities – could be part of the solution, if designed properly. There is certainly demand for them in China and other major emerging countries, which are desperate for an alternative to low-yielding US government securities.
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  • But Germany remains opposed on moral-hazard grounds: a joint guarantee of Eurozone members’ liabilities would strengthen individual national governments’ incentive to spend beyond their means.
  • The German Council of Economic Experts has proposed a European Redemption Fund (ERF). The plan would convert into de facto 25-year Eurobonds the existing sovereign debt of member countries in excess of 60% of GDP, the threshold specified by the Maastricht criteria and the SGP.
  • But this seems upside down.
  • it offers absolution precisely on the 60%-of-GDP margin where countries will have the most trouble resisting temptation.
  • the main explanation for the absence of US moral hazard is that the right precedent was set in 1841, when the federal government let eight states and the Territory of Florida default.
  • Ever since 1841, the market requires that US states running up questionable levels of debt pay an interest-rate premium to compensate for the default risk.
  • Had the ECB operated from the outset under a rule prohibiting it from accepting SGP-noncompliant countries’ debt as collateral, the entire eurozone sovereign-debt problem might have been avoided.
  • the expansion in the US took place at the federal level, where spending today amounts to 24% of GDP, compared to just 1.2% of GDP for the European Union budget.
  • The version of Eurobonds that might work as the missing long-term enforcement mechanism is almost the reverse of the Germans’ ERF proposal: the “blue bonds” proposed two years ago by Jacques Delpla and Jakob von Weizsäcker. Under this plan, only debt issued by national authorities below the 60%-of-GDP threshold could receive eurozone backing and seniority. When a country issued debt above the threshold, the resulting “red bonds” would lose this status.
  • The point is that the enforcement mechanism would be truly automatic: market interest rates would provide the discipline that bureaucrats in Brussels cannot.
  • Of course, the eurozone cannot establish a blue-bond regime without first solving the problems of debt overhang and troubled banks. Otherwise, the plan itself would be destabilizing, because almost all countries would immediately be in the red.
  • But one thing seems clear. German taxpayers, whose longstanding suspicion of profligate Mediterranean euro members has been vindicated, will not be happy when asked to pay still more for the cause of European integration. At a minimum, they will need some credible reason to believe that 20 years of false assurances have come to an end – that this is the last bailout.
Gene Ellis

Are Germans really poorer than Spaniards, Italians and Greeks? | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...-spaniards-italians-and-greeks

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • From this survey it appeared that the median German household had the lowest wealth of all Eurozone countries
  • The median households in countries like Belgium, Spain and Italy appear to be three to four times wealthier than the median German household. Even the median Greek household is twice as wealthy as the German one.
  • mean net wealth of households
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  • A comparison of the median and mean wealth reveals something about the distribution of wealth in each country. If the largest difference is between the mean and the median, the greater is the inequality in the distribution of wealth.
  • In Germany the mean household wealth is almost four times larger than the median.
  • In most other countries this ratio is between 1.5 and 2.
  • We find that in Germany the median household in the top 20% of the income class has 74 times more wealth than the median household in the bottom 20% of the income class. Judged by this criterion Germany has the most unequal distribution of wealth in the Eurozone.
  • Wealth per capita is more than twice as high in northern European countries than in southern countries such as Greece and Portugal.
  • The facts are that Germany is significantly richer than southern Eurozone countries like Spain, Greece and Portugal. There does seem to be a problem of the distribution of wealth in Germany: First, wealth in Germany is highly concentrated in the upper part of the household-income distribution. Second, a large part of German wealth is not held by households and therefore must be held by the corporate sector or the government.
Gene Ellis

Sub-Saharan Africa's Subprime Borrowers by Joseph E. Stiglitz and Hamid Rashid - Projec... - 0 views

www.project-syndicate.org/...h-e--stiglitz-and-hamid-rashid

Africa subprime borrowers

shared by Gene Ellis on 10 Jan 14 - No Cached
  • Taking the lead in October 2007, when it issued a $750 million Eurobond with an 8.5% coupon rate, Ghana earned the distinction of being the first Sub-Saharan country – other than South Africa – to issue bonds in 30 years.
  • Nine other countries – Gabon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Zambia, and Tanzania – followed suit. By February 2013, these ten African economies had collectively raised $8.1 billion from their maiden sovereign-bond issues, with an average maturity of 11.2 years and an average coupon rate of 6.2%. These countries’ existing foreign debt, by contrast, carried an average interest rate of 1.6% with an average maturity of 28.7 years.
  • So why are an increasing number of developing countries resorting to sovereign-bond issues? And why have lenders suddenly found these countries desirable?
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • recent analyses, carried out in conjunction with the establishment of the new BRICS bank, have demonstrated the woeful inadequacy of official assistance and concessional lending for meeting Africa’s infrastructure needs, let alone for achieving the levels of sustained growth needed to reduce poverty significantly.
  • the conditionality and close monitoring typically associated with the multilateral institutions make them less attractive sources of financing. What politician wouldn’t prefer money that gives him more freedom to do what he likes? It will be years before any problems become manifest – and, then, some future politician will have to resolve them.
  • So, are shortsighted financial markets, working with shortsighted governments, laying the groundwork for the world’s next debt crisis?
  • he risks will undoubtedly grow if sub-national authorities and private-sector entities gain similar access to the international capital markets, which could result in excessive borrowing.
  • Nigerian commercial banks have already issued international bonds; in Zambia, the power utility, railway operator, and road builder are planning to issue as much as $4.5 billion in international bonds.
  • Signs of default stress are already showing. In March 2009 – less than two years after the issue – Congolese bonds were trading for 20 cents on the dollar, pushing the yield to a record high. In January 2011, Côte d’Ivoire became the first country to default on its sovereign debt since Jamaica in January 2010.
  • In June 2012, Gabon delayed the coupon payment on its $1 billion bond, pending the outcome of a legal dispute, and was on the verge of a default. Should oil and copper prices collapse, Angola, Gabon, Congo, and Zambia may encounter difficulties in servicing their sovereign bonds.
  • They need not only to invest the proceeds in the right type of high-return projects, but also to ensure that they do not have to borrow further to service their debt.
  • But borrowing money from international financial markets is a strategy with enormous downside risks, and only limited upside potential – except for the banks, which take their fees up front. Sub-Saharan Africa’s economies, one hopes, will not have to repeat the costly lessons that other developing countries have learned over the past three decades.
Gene Ellis

Op-Ed Columnist - The Euro Trap - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...30krugman.html

krugman euro trap nytimes

shared by Gene Ellis on 24 Apr 13 - Cached
  • The fact is that three years ago none of the countries now in or near crisis seemed to be in deep fiscal trouble.
  • And all of the countries were attracting large inflows of foreign capital, largely because markets believed that membership in the euro zone made Greek, Portuguese and Spanish bonds safe investments.
  • Then came the global financial crisis. Those inflows of capital dried up; revenues plunged and deficits soared; and membership in the euro, which had encouraged markets to love the crisis countries not wisely but too well, turned into a trap.
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  • During the years of easy money, wages and prices in the crisis countries rose much faster than in the rest of Europe. Now that the money is no longer rolling in, those countries need to get costs back in line.
  • Now that Greece and Germany share the same currency, however, the only way to reduce Greek relative costs is through some combination of German inflation and Greek deflation. And since Germany won’t accept inflation, deflation it is.
  • The problem is that deflation — falling wages and prices — is always and everywhere a deeply painful process. It invariably involves a prolonged slump with high unemployment. And it also aggravates debt problems, both public and private, because incomes fall while the debt burden doesn’t.
  • Earlier this week, when it downgraded Greek debt, Standard & Poor’s suggested that the euro value of Greek G.D.P. may not return to its 2008 level until 2017, meaning that Greece has no hope of growing out of its troubles.
  • Until recently, most analysts, myself included, considered a euro breakup basically impossible, since any government that even hinted that it was considering leaving the euro would be inviting a catastrophic run on its banks. But if the crisis countries are forced into default, they’ll probably face severe bank runs anyway, forcing them into emergency measures like temporary restrictions on bank withdrawals. This would open the door to euro exit.
Gene Ellis

Op-Ed Contributor - The Greek crisis shows why Germany should leave the European Moneta... - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...29Starbatty.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 09 Jul 12 - Cached
  • THE European Monetary Union, the basis of the euro, began with a grand illusion. On one side were countries — Austria, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands — whose currencies had persistently appreciated, both within Europe and worldwide; the countries on the other side — Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain — had persistently depreciating currencies.
  • Rather than pulling the lagging countries forward, the low interest rates of the European Central Bank have lured governments and households, especially in the southern part of the euro zone, into frivolous budgetary policies and excessive consumption.
  • the solution is clear: the only way to avoid further harm to the global economy is for Germany to lead its fellow stable states out of the euro and into a new and stronger currency bloc.
  • ...8 more annotations...
  • Unlike their northern neighbors, the countries in the zone’s southern half have difficulty placing bonds — issued to finance their national deficits — with international capital investors. Nor are these countries competitive in the global economy, as shown by their high trade deficits.
  • If Greece were outside the euro zone, for example, it could devalue its currency
  • Instead, the fiscal strictures of the euro zone are forcing the country to curtail public expenditures, raise taxes and cut government employees’ salaries, actions that may push Greece into a deep depression and further undermine its already weak international credit standing.
  • In short, th
  • e euro is headed toward collapse.
  • hat opportunity and pull out of the euro, it wouldn’t be alone. The same calculus would probably lure Austria, Finland and the Netherlands — and perhaps France — to leave behind the high-debt states and join Germany in a new, stable bloc, perhaps even with a new common currency.
  • If Germany were to take t
  • A strong-currency bloc could fulfill the euro’s original purpose. Without having to worry about laggard states, the bloc would be able to follow a reliable and consistent monetary policy that would force the member governments to gradually reduce their national debt. The entire European economy would prosper. And the United States would gain an ally in any future reorganization of the world currency system and the global economy.
Gene Ellis

PrudentBear - 0 views

prudentbear.com/...featuredcommentaryview

GEP com nytimes nytimes com global europe GDP crisis syndicate euro

shared by Gene Ellis on 09 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • German exporters were major beneficiaries of this growth. German banks and financial institutions helped finance the growth.
  • Exports have provided the majority of Germany’s growth in recent years. Germany is heavily reliant on a narrowly based industrial sector, focused on investment goods—automobiles, industrial machinery, chemicals, electronics and medical devices. These sectors make up a quarter of its GDP and the bulk of exports.
  • Germany’s service sector is weak with lower productivity than comparable countries. While it argues that Greece should deregulate professions, many professions in Germany remain highly regulated. Trades and professions are regulated by complex technical rules and standards rooted in the medieval guild systems. Foreign entrants frequently find these rules difficult and expensive to navigate.
  • ...18 more annotations...
  • Despite the international standing of Deutsche Bank, Germany’s banking system is fragile. Several German banks required government support during the financial crisis. Highly fragmented (in part due to heavy government involvement) and with low profitability, German banks, especially the German Länder (state) owned Landsbanks, face problems. They have large exposures to European sovereign debt, real estate and structured securities.
  • Prior to 2005, the Landesbanken were able to borrow cheaply, relying on the guarantee of the state governments. The EU ruled these guarantees amounted to subsidies. Before the abolition of the guarantees, the Landesbanks issued large amounts of state-guaranteed loans which mature by December 2015.
  • While it insists on other countries reducing public debt, German debt levels are high—around 81% of GDP. The Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, has stated that public debt levels will remain above 60% (the level stipulated by European treaties) for many years.
  • Germany’s greatest vulnerability is its financial exposures from the current crisis. German exposure to Europe, especially the troubled peripheral economies, is large.
  • German banks had exposures of around US$500 billion to the debt issues of peripheral nations. While the levels have been reduced, it remains substantial, especially when direct exposures to banks in these countries and indirect exposures via the global financial system are considered. The reduction in risk held by private banks has been offset by the increase in exposure of the German state, which assumed some of this exposure.
  • For example, the exposure of the ECB to Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy is euro 918 billion as of April 2012. This exposure is also rising rapidly, especially driven by capital flight out of these countries.
  • Germany is now caught in a trap. Irrespective of the resolution of the debt crisis, Germany will suffer significant losses on its exposure – it will be the biggest loser.
  • Once the artificial boom ends, voters will discover they were betrayed by Germany’s pro-European political elite. There will be an electoral revolt and, as in the rest of Europe, a strong challenge from radical political forces with unpredictable consequences.
  • In late May 2012, French President Francois Hollande provided a curious argument in support of eurozone bonds: “Is it acceptable that some sovereigns can borrow at 6% and others at zero in the same monetary union?”
  • Political will for integration
  • In the peripheral economies, continued withdrawal of deposits from national banks (a rational choice given currency and confiscation risk) may necessitate either a Europe wide deposit guarantee system or further funding of banks.
  • A credible deposit insurance scheme would have to cover household deposits (say up to euro 100,000), which is around 72% of all deposits, in the peripheral countries. This would entail an insurance scheme for around euro 1.3 trillion of deposits.
  • Given that the Spanish Economy Ministry reports that euro 184 billion in loans to developers are “problematic,” the additional recapitalization needs of Spain’s banks may be as high as euro 200-300 billion in additional funds (20-30% of GDP)
  • A Greek default would result in losses to Germany of up to around euro 90 billion. Germany’s potential losses increase rapidly as more countries default or leave the eurozone.
  • Austerity or default will force many European economies into recession for a prolonged period. German exports will be affected given Europe is around 60% of its market, including around 40% within the eurozone. In case of a break-up of the euro, estimates of German growth range from -1% to below -10%. It is worth remembering that the German economy fell in size by around 5% in 2008, the worst result since the Second World War, mainly on the back of declining exports.
  • For example, Greece owes about euro 400 billion to private bondholders but increasingly to public bodies, such as the IMF and ECB, mainly due to the bailouts. If Greece walks away as some political parties have threatened, then the fallout for the lenders, such as Germany, are potentially calamitous.
  • But the largest single direct German exposure is the Bundesbank’s over euro 700 billion current exposure under the TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System) to other central banks in the Eurozone.
  • by Satyajit Das
Gene Ellis

Weaning Europe From Russian Gas - NYTimes.com - 1 views

www.nytimes.com/...g-europe-from-russian-gas.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 25 Apr 14 - No Cached
  • Weaning Europe From Russian Gas
  • European Union leaders at a summit meeting last week made a commitment to cut their dependence on Russian gas.
  • Russia gets about 14 percent of its entire export earnings from the gas it sells to other European countries.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • Some countries in Central Europe — such as Austria and the Czech Republic — and the Balkans would run out of gas they import through Ukraine.
  • that Russia cuts supplies of gas through Ukraine but continues pumping it through its other two pipelines to the West — one through the Baltic and the other through Poland.
  • In such a scenario,
  • The European Union also responded to the 2009 shutdown by building “interconnectors” between different countries. As a result, it is easier to shunt gas and electricity from countries that have excess energy to those that face a shortage — though these connections are still patchy and need to be built up.
  • n the short run, European Union countries can use more coal and less gas in their electricity generation.
  • The European Union can also increase imports of liquefied natural gas, mainly from Qatar. But there are problems. First, most of the Union’s L.N.G. terminals are in Western Europe, whereas it is the eastern part of the Union that is most vulnerable to a cutoff of Russian gas. So more terminals need to be built, which takes time. What’s more, L.N.G. is expensive — partly because Japan is buying lots of it after closing its nuclear plants in the wake of the Fukushima disaster.
  • Longer term, European Union nations should embrace shale gas. It is cheap and local. Britain and Poland have the most potential.
  • Meanwhile, countries such as Germany should abandon their knee-jerk aversion to nuclear energy.
  • The problem is not the carbon goal, said Raoul Ruparel of Open Europe, a research institute. Rather it is the renewable target, which results in uneconomic wind and solar power being built across the Union.
Gene Ellis

French Tax Proposal Tackles Data Harvest by Google and Facebook - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...n-web-giants-data-harvest.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 26 Feb 13 - No Cached
  • Internet companies like Amazon.com, Facebook and Google stay largely out of reach of tax collectors in large European countries like Britain, France and Germany by routing their sales through smaller countries, like Ireland and Luxembourg, where corporate tax rates are lower. The companies insist that such practices are permitted under European Union law and international taxation treaties.
  • France and other countries have begun talks to change those conventions, so Internet companies could be taxed in the country where a sale takes place, rather than in the location where the transaction is recorded. But that could take many years, with no guarantee of any change.
  • A recent study by Ovum, a research firm in London, showed that 81 percent of Internet users in France would use a “do not track” feature on Web sites if it were readily available. That was the highest percentage in any of the 11 countries surveyed.
Gene Ellis

Europe's Irrelevant Austerity Debate by Daniel Gros - Project Syndicate - 0 views

www.project-syndicate.org/...ogoff-in-europe-by-daniel-gros

shared by Gene Ellis on 08 May 13 - No Cached
  • But the debate about austerity and the cost of high public-debt levels misses a key point: Public debt owed to foreigners is different from debt owed to residents.
  • If foreign debt matters more than public debt, the key variable requiring adjustment is the external deficit, not the fiscal deficit. A country that has a balanced current account does not need any additional foreign capital. That is why risk premiums are continuing to fall in the eurozone, despite high political uncertainty in Italy and continuing large fiscal deficits elsewhere. The peripheral countries’ external deficits are falling rapidly, thus diminishing the need for foreign financing.
  • And the evidence confirms that the euro crisis is not really about sovereign debt, but about foreign debt.
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  • Second, if foreign debt is the real problem, the escalating debate about the Reinhart/Rogoff results is irrelevant for the euro crisis. Countries that have their own currency, like the United Kingdom – and especially the United States, which can borrow from foreigners in dollars – do not face a direct financing constraint.
  • But austerity can never be self-defeating for the external adjustment. On the contrary, the larger the fall in domestic demand in response to a cut in government expenditure, the more imports will fall and the stronger the improvement in the current account – and thus ultimately the reduction in the risk premium – will be.
  • By contrast, in the case of debt owed to foreigners, higher interest rates lead to a welfare loss for the country as a whole, because the government must transfer resources abroad, which usually requires a combination of exchange-rate depreciation and a reduction in domestic expenditure.
  • But the eurozone’s peripheral countries simply did not have a choice: they had to reduce their deficits, because the foreign capital on which their economies were so dependent was no longer available.
Gene Ellis

Banks' Fire Drill for Greece Election - NYTimes.com - 0 views

dealbook.nytimes.com/...fire-drill-for-greece-election

banks fire drill greece election nytimes nytimes com com

shared by Gene Ellis on 16 Jun 12 - No Cached
  • In New York and London, banks have set up dedicated crisis teams, and rehearsed elaborate responses.
  • Citigroup has $84 billion in loans, bonds and other types of exposure to troubled European countries, plus France. The bank’s filings indicate that all but $8 billion of that exposure is offset with collateral it has collected and hedges on the portfolio.
  • Some banks are testing their systems to deal with the possibility of new currencies and preparing guidance for clients on how to operate in such an environment.
  • ...6 more annotations...
  • Banks like Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley are also looking into the severe legal challenges that would arise if a country exited the euro. Contracts that govern loans, bonds and derivatives in Europe rarely take into account such a situation.
  • Consider an Italian corporation that owed a foreign bank 5 million euros, with a loan agreement struck under Italian law. If Italy left the euro, the bank might have less chance of getting euros back after the exit. In that case, the financial firm might be exposed to a new, less valuable currency.
  • Recognizing that threat, some banks are trying to move contracts into new jurisdictions like the United States or Britain. By transferring such loan agreements to English law, the banks may increase the chances of getting repaid in euros after an exit, according to legal experts.
  • The banks are also trying to protect their balance sheets if they do get stuck with large amounts of assets denominated in a new, weaker currency.
  • By doing so, they can better match their assets (the loans) within a specific country with their liabilities (the deposits). Then if a country left the euro zone, the value of the loan might fall in euros, but the banks wouldn’t owe as much to depositors in euros.
  • Mr. Lim notes, however, that some large banks, including Deutsche Bank, still have a lot more loans than deposits in countries like Italy and Spain.
Gene Ellis

An interview with Athanasios Orphanides: What happened in Cyprus | The Economist - 0 views

www.economist.com/...nterview-athanasios-orphanides

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • Cyprus had developed its financial center over three decades ago by having double taxation treaties with a number of countries, the Soviet Union for example. That means if profits are booked and earned and taxed in Cyprus, they are not taxed again in the other country. Russian deposits are there because Cyprus has a low corporate tax rate, much like Malta and Luxembourg, which annoys some people in Europe.
  • In addition, Cyprus has a legal system based on English law and follows English accounting rules
  • This government took a country with excellent fiscal finances, a surplus in fiscal accounts, and a banking system that was in excellent health. They started overspending, not only for unproductive government expenditures but also they raised implicit liabilities by raising pension promises, and so forth.
  • ...11 more annotations...
  • The size of the banking sector and exposure to Greece were known risks but at that time there was no banking problem in Cyprus
  • The containers were part of a shipment going from Iran to Syria that was intercepted in Cypriot waters after a tip from the U.S. The president took the decision to keep the ammunition. [NOTE: An independent prosecutor found that Christofias has ignored repeated warnings and pleas to destroy or safeguard the ammunition, apparently in hopes of one day returning it to Syria or Iran.]
  • Instead, they started lobbying the Russian government to give them a loan that would help them finance the country for a couple more years, and Russia came through, unfortunately,
  • I say unfortunately because as a result the government could keep operating and accumulating deficits without taking corrective action.
  • The next important date was the October 26-27, 2011 meeting of the EU council in Brussels where European leaders decided to wipe out what ended up being about 80% of the value of Greek debt that the private sector held. Every bank operating in Greece, regardless of where it was headquartered, had a lot of Greek debt.
  • For Cyprus, the writedown of Greek debt was between 4.5 and 5 billion euro, a substantial chunk of capital.
  • The second element of the decision taken by heads of states was to instruct the EBA to do a so- called capital exercise that marked to market sovereign debt and effectively raised abruptly capital requirements. The exercise required banks to have a core tier-1 ratio of 9%, and on top of that a buffer to make up for differences in market and book value of government debt. That famous capital exercise created the capital crunch in the euro area which is the cause of the recession we've had in the euro area for the last 2 years.
  • The Basle II framework that governments adopted internationally, and that the EU supervisory framework during this period also incorporated, specifies that holdings of government debt in a states' own currency are a zero-risk-weight asset, that is they are assigned a weight of zero in calculating capital requirements.
  • the governments should have agreed to make the EFSF/ESM available for direct recapitalization of banks instead of asking each government to be responsible for the capitalization.
  • Following a downgrading in late June 2012, all three major rating agencies rated the sovereign paper Cyprus below investment grade. According to ECB rules, that made the government debt not eligible as collateral for borrowing from the eurosystem, unless the ECB suspended the rules, as it had done for the cases of Greece, Portugal and Ireland. In the case of Cyprus, the ECB decided not to suspend the eligibility rule.
  • The governments have created risk in what before last week were considered perfectly safe deposits. This is going to have a chilling effect on deposits in any bank in a country perceived to be weak. This will mean the cost of funding will increase in the periphery of Europe and as a result, the cost of financing for businesses and households will increase. That will add to the divergences we already have and make the recession in the periphery of Europe deeper than it already is. This is really a disaster for European economic management as a whole. 
Gene Ellis

Syriza and the French indemnity of 1871-73 | Michael Pettis' CHINA FINANCIAL MARKETS - 0 views

blog.mpettis.com/...he-french-indemnity-of-1871-73

shared by Gene Ellis on 06 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • Fundamental to the argument that Spain (or Greece, or anyone else) has a moral obligation to repay in full its debt to Germany are two assumptions. The first assumption is that “Spain” borrowed the money from “Germany”, and that there is a collective obligation on the part of Spain to repay the German collective. The second assumption is that Spain had a choice in what it could do with the German money that poured into the country, and so it must be held responsible for its having mis-used hard-earned german funds.
  • There was plenty of irresponsible behavior in every country, and it is absurd to think that if German and Spanish banks were pouring nearly unlimited amounts of money into countries at extremely low or even negative real interest rates, especially once these initial inflows had set off stock market and real estate booms, that there was any chance that these countries would not respond in the way every country in history, including Germany in the 1870s and in the 1920s, had responded under similar conditions.
  • The winners have been banks, owners of assets, and business owners, mainly in Germany, whose profits were much higher during the last decade than they could possibly have been otherwise
  • ...3 more annotations...
  •  Second, it is the responsibility of the leading centrist parties to recognize the options explicitly. If they do not, extremist parties either of the right or the left will take control of the debate, and convert what is a conflict between different economic sectors into a nationalist conflict or a class conflict. If the former win, it will spell the end of the grand European experiment.
  • First, as long as Spain suffers from its current debt burden, it does not matter how intelligently and forcefully it implements economic reforms. It will not be able to grow out of its debt burden and must choose between two paths
  • Most currency and sovereign debt crises in modern history ultimately represent a conflict over how the costs are to be assigned among two different groups
  • Gene Ellis on 06 Feb 15
     
    Highly recommended!
Gene Ellis

Learning about global value chains by looking beyond official trade data: Part 1 | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...ond-official-trade-data-part-1

shared by Gene Ellis on 25 Apr 14 - No Cached
  • Gross trade accounting: A transparent method to discover global value chain-related information behind official trade data: Part 1
  • With the rapid increase in intermediate trade flows, trade economists and policymakers have reached a near consensus that official trade statistics based on gross terms are deficient, often hiding the extent of global value chains. There is also widespread recognition among the official international statistics agencies that fragmentation of global production requires a new approach to measure trade, in particular the need to measure trade in value-added. This led the WTO and the OECD to launch a joint “Measuring Trade in Value-Added” initiative on 15 March 2012, which is designed to mainstream the production of trade in value-added statistics and make them a permanent part of the statistical landscape.
  • All the estimation methods used in recent efforts to measure trade in value-added are rooted in Leontief (1936). His work demonstrated that the amount and type of intermediate inputs needed in the production of one unit of output can be estimated based on the input-output structures across countries and industries.
  • ...6 more annotations...
  • If one is only interested in estimating the domestic value-added embedded in a country’s or sector’s gross exports, applying Leontief’s insight is sufficient. However, for many economic and policy applications, one also needs to quantify other components in gross exports and their structures. In such circumstances Leontief’s original insight is not sufficient, as it does not provide a way to decompose intermediate trade flows across countries into various value-added terms according to their final absorption,
  • Our gross trade accounting framework in fact allows one to further decompose each of the four major parts of gross exports above into finer components with economic interpretations
  • By the gross statistics, presented in column 1 of Table 1, the trade is highly imbalanced – Chinese exports to the US ($176.9 billion in 2011) are five times that of US exports to China ($35.1 billion in 2011). If we separate exports of final goods and of intermediate goods (reported in columns 2a and 2b of Table 1), we see that most of the Chinese exports consist of final goods, whereas most of the US exports consist of intermediate goods.
  • In other words, the US exports rely overwhelmingly on its own value-added (only 2.1% from China and 5.8% from other countries in 2011), whereas the Chinese exports use more foreign value-added, especially value-added from third countries (with 3.2% from the US and 23.1% from Japan, Korea, and all other countries).
  • As a consequence of these differences in the structure of value-added composition, the China–US trade balance in this sector looks much smaller when computed in terms of domestic value-added than in terms of gross exports.
  • By identifying which parts of the official data are double counted and the sources of the double counting, our gross trade accounting method provides a transparent way to bridge official trade statistics (in gross terms) and national accounts (in value-added terms) consistent with the System of National Accounts standard.
Gene Ellis

Is Europe's gas supply threatened by the Ukraine crisis? | World news | The Guardian - 0 views

www.theguardian.com/...raine-crisis-russsia-pipelines

shared by Gene Ellis on 04 Mar 14 - No Cached
  • Is Europe's gas supply threatened by the Ukraine crisis?
  • more than a quarter of the EU's total gas needs were met by Russian gas, and some 80% of it came via Ukrainian pipelines. Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy and Poland soon reported gas pressure in their own pipelines was down by as much as 30%.
  • While it was eventually resolved through a complex deal that saw Ukraine buying gas from Russia (at full price) and Turkmenistan (at cut price) via a Swiss-registered Gazprom subsidiary
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • But three years later, the same row erupted again: Gazprom demanded a price hike to $400-plus from $250, Kiev flatly refused, and on New Year's day 2009, Gazprom began pumping only enough gas to meet the needs of its customers beyond Ukraine.
  • Again, the consequences were marked. Inevitably, Russia accused Ukraine of siphoning off supplies meant for European customers to meet its own needs, and cut supplies completely
  • several countries – particularly in south-eastern Europe, almost completely dependent on supplies from Ukraine – simply ran out of gas.
  • Bulgaria shut down production in its main industrial plants; Slovakia declared a state of emergency
  • Many industry experts, though, point out that the world has changed since 2009, and that there are any number of reasons why Moscow's natural gas supplies may not prove quite the potent economic and diplomatic weapon they once were.
  • higher than normal temperatures are forecast to continue for several weeks yet, significantly reducing demand for gas and leaving prices at their lowest for two years
  • since the first "gas war" of 2006, many European countries have made huge efforts to increase their gas storage capacity and stocks are high. Some countries, such as Bulgaria, Slovakia and Moldova, which lack large storage capacity and depend heavily on gas supplies via Ukraine, would certainly suffer from any disruption in supplies
  • New Gazprom pipelines via Belarus and the Baltic Sea to Germany (Nord Stream) have cut the proportion of Gazprom's Europe-bound exports that transit via Ukraine to around half the total, meaning only about 15% of Europe's gas now relies on Ukraine's pipelines. Gazprom is also planning a Black Sea pipeline (South Stream), expected in 2015, meaning its exports to Europe will bypass Ukraine completely. Ukraine itself has cut its domestic gas consumption by nearly 40% over the past few years, halving its imports from Russia in the process.
  • Europe is increasingly installing specialist terminals that will allow gas to be imported from countries such as Qatar in the form of liquefied natural gas – while Norway's Statoil sold more gas to European countries in 2012 than Gazprom did. "Since the Russian supply cuts of 2006 and 2009, the tables have totally turned," Anders åslund, an energy advisor to both the Russian and Ukrainian governments, told the Washington Post.
  • Europe accounts for around a third of Gazprom's total gas sales, and around half of Russia's total budget revenue comes from oil and gas. Moscow needs that source of revenue, and whatever Vladimir Putin's geo-political ambitions, most energy analysts seem to agree he will think twice about jeopardising it.
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