The Economic Limits of Cryptocurrencies and Blockchains - 0 views
-
John Kiff on 18 Jan 25The Quarterly Journal of Economics (QJE) published a paper by Eric Budish that shows that Nakamoto's novel form of trust is deeply economically limited. A zero-profit condition on the quantity of honest blockchain "trust support" (work, stake, etc.) and an incentive-compatibility condition on the system's security against majority attack together imply an equilibrium constraint which says that the "flow" cost of blockchain trust has to be large at all times relative to the benefits of attacking the system. This is extremely expensive relative to traditional forms of trust and scales linearly with the value of attack. The paper's analysis is consistent with the continued use of cryptocurrencies and blockchains for black market purposes, and more generally in use cases where users are willing to pay the high implicit costs of anonymous, decentralized trust. See also: https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/slow-blockchain-mathematical-certainty-patrick-mcconnell/