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We provide direct evidence of market manipulation at the beginning of the financial crisis in November 2007. The type of manipulation, a "bear raid," would have been prevented by a regulation that was repealed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in July 2007. The regulation, the uptick rule, was designed to prevent manipulation and promote stability and was in force from 1938 as a key part of the government response to the 1928 market crash and its aftermath. On November 1, 2007, Citigroup experienced an unusual increase in trading volume and decrease in price. Our analysis of financial industry data shows that this decline coincided with an anomalous increase in borrowed shares, the selling of which would be a large fraction of the total trading volume. The selling of borrowed shares cannot be explained by news events as there is no corresponding increase in selling by share owners. A similar number of shares were returned on a single day six days later. The magnitude and coincidence of borrowing and returning of shares is evidence of a concerted effort to drive down Citigroup's stock price and achieve a profit, i.e., a bear raid. Interpretations and analyses of financial markets should consider the possibility that the intentional actions of individual actors or coordinated groups can impact market behavior. Markets are not sufficiently transparent to reveal even major market manipulation events. Our results point to the need for regulations that prevent intentional actions that cause markets to deviate from equilibrium and contribute to crashes. Enforcement actions cannot reverse severe damage to the economic system. The current "alternative" uptick rule which is only in effect for stocks dropping by over 10% in a single day is insufficient. Prevention may be achieved through improved availability of market data and the original uptick rule or other transaction limitations.

Hedge fund regulations, a tax on financial markets, a ban on naked short selling. The EU's bid to rein in the speculators has the financial industry up in arms. Lobbyists are already preparing to systematically attack the new proposals.

The most important thing to understand about the Republican jobs agenda is that it's not really a jobs agenda. That sounds simplistic and harsh, but I think it's true, at least if you buy into the mainstream economic consensus.

Much has been discussed on the root causes for the current financial crisis, including but not limited to lessons on monetary policy, financial sector regulations, accounting rules. This note aims to stimulate debate and discussions on some of the pro-cyclical features in the system, possible remedial measures, and how monetary and fiscal authorities can play their professional roles at times of severe market distress. It also touches upon China's financial sector reform and macroeconomic policy to counter slowdown in economic growth. The major points here were presented at the G20 Meeting of Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in San Paulo, Brazil on November 15, 2008.

The media has been so preoccupied with acute symptoms of the debt crisis - sliding home prices, foreclosure abuses, ongoing Euromarket bank/sovereign debt stress, ongoing battles over financial regulation implementation, unhappiness over the Fed's QE2 - that lingering problems are not getting the attention they deserve. High on the list is the how the weak job market is affecting new college and advanced degree program graduates. We have an unspoken social contract: young people who get an education, particularly a "good" education (which means more elite universities, more serious courses of study, graduate degrees) are supposed to be rewarded by higher lifetime earnings. And the prospect of higher lifetime earnings in turn makes it rational to borrow to invest in education. But this whole premise has started to go awry, and the huge uptick in unemployment has started to make matters worse.

Trading derivatives on regulated exchanges would be a major step forward, but it may no longer be enough. Economic bubbles are not recognized by those inside of them, the Congress of the united States being no exception. The $604.6 trillion derivatives bubble, which is equal to more than ten times world GDP, is a global issue. If existing OTC derivatives remain in place and there are no restrictions on what banks can trade derivatives, there is no actual or immediate reduction of systemic risk. Thus, the risks that led to the financial crisis in 2008 are likely to remain present in the global financial system for years to come. In fact, many banks have more CDS risk now than in 2008. Passing a bank-approved version of the financial reform bill, while it may be portrayed as a political victory or serve to calm financial markets temporarily, is unlikely to prevent another global financial crisis.

Angela Merkel told a meeting of international financial leaders that the G-20 must work together to reform the finance system. Merkel is pushing for tougher market regulations despite resistance from many countries.

Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City President Thomas Hoenig said U.S. regulators should avert another crisis by breaking up large financial institutions that pose a threat "to our capitalistic system." 

Businesses have had at least 25 to 30 years near complete certainty -- certainty that they will pay lower and lower taxes, that they' will face less and less regulation, that they can outsource to their hearts' content (which when it does produce savings, comes at a loss of control, increased business system rigidity, and loss of critical know how). They have also been certain that unions will be weak to powerless, that states and municipalities will give them huge subsidies to relocate, that boards of directors will put top executives on the up escalator for more and more compensation because director pay benefits from this cozy collusion, that the financial markets will always look to short term earnings no matter how dodgy the accounting, that the accounting firms will provide plenty of cover, that the SEC will never investigate anything more serious than insider trading (Enron being the exception that proved the rule). So this haranguing about certainty simply reveals how warped big commerce has become in the US. Top management of supposedly capitalist enterprises want a high degree of certainty in their own profits and pay. Rather than earn their returns the old fashioned way, by serving customers well, by innovating, by expanding into new markets, their 'certainty' amounts to being paid handsomely for doing things that carry no risk. But since risk and uncertainty are inherent to the human condition, what they instead have engaged in is a massive scheme of risk transfer, of increasing rewards to themselves to the long term detriment of their enterprises and ultimately society as a whole.

A vividly told history of how greed bred America's economic ills over the last forty years, and of the men most responsible for them. As Jeff Madrick makes clear in a narrative at once sweeping, fast-paced, and incisive, the single-minded pursuit of huge personal wealth has been on the rise in the United States since the 1970s, led by a few individuals who have argued that self-interest guides society more effectively than community concerns. These stewards of American capitalism have insisted on the central and essential place of accumulated wealth through the booms, busts, and recessions of the last half century, giving rise to our current woes. In telling the stories of these politicians, economists, and financiers who declared a moral battle for freedom but instead gave rise to an age of greed, Madrick traces the lineage of some of our nation's most pressing economic problems. He begins with Walter Wriston, head of what would become Citicorp, who led the battle against government regulation. He examines the ideas of economist Milton Friedman, who created the plan for an anti-Rooseveltian America; the politically expedient decisions of Richard Nixon that fueled inflation; the philosophy of Alan Greenspan, on whose libertarian ideology a house of cards was built on Wall Street. Intense economic inequity and instability is the story of our age, and Jeff Madrick tells it with style, clarity, and an unerring command of his subject.

In years past, when financial crises in Argentina and Russia left those countries unable to make good on their government debts, they simply defaulted. But this time around, swaps and other sorts of contracts have become so common and so intertwined in the financial markets that there are fears among regulators and financial players about how a Greek default would play out among derivatives holders. No one seems to be sure, in large part because the world of derivatives is so murky. But the possibility that some company out there may have insured billions of dollars of European debt has added a new tension to the sovereign default debate.

Former managing director of the IMF, Michel Camdessus admitted Thursday in Buenos Aires that during his time working for the organization, they 'made many mistakes with Argentina,' particularly highlighting the 90s. With regard to the topic, the former IMF managing director estimated that "80% of the global economic growth," over the course of the next forty years, "will come from the development of emerging countries, like Argentina," also considering that during this time the dollar will cease to dominate the monetary system and global finance. Camdessus acknowledged that "current neo-liberalism is extremely short regarding institutions and regulations".