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We provide direct evidence of market manipulation at the beginning of the financial crisis in November 2007. The type of manipulation, a "bear raid," would have been prevented by a regulation that was repealed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in July 2007. The regulation, the uptick rule, was designed to prevent manipulation and promote stability and was in force from 1938 as a key part of the government response to the 1928 market crash and its aftermath. On November 1, 2007, Citigroup experienced an unusual increase in trading volume and decrease in price. Our analysis of financial industry data shows that this decline coincided with an anomalous increase in borrowed shares, the selling of which would be a large fraction of the total trading volume. The selling of borrowed shares cannot be explained by news events as there is no corresponding increase in selling by share owners. A similar number of shares were returned on a single day six days later. The magnitude and coincidence of borrowing and returning of shares is evidence of a concerted effort to drive down Citigroup's stock price and achieve a profit, i.e., a bear raid. Interpretations and analyses of financial markets should consider the possibility that the intentional actions of individual actors or coordinated groups can impact market behavior. Markets are not sufficiently transparent to reveal even major market manipulation events. Our results point to the need for regulations that prevent intentional actions that cause markets to deviate from equilibrium and contribute to crashes. Enforcement actions cannot reverse severe damage to the economic system. The current "alternative" uptick rule which is only in effect for stocks dropping by over 10% in a single day is insufficient. Prevention may be achieved through improved availability of market data and the original uptick rule or other transaction limitations.

At almost 20 percent, Spain suffers the second-highest unemployment rate in the European Union. But the rate for those just entering the job market is twice as high. This month, Madrid wants to push through far-reaching labor market reforms. But opposition promises to be fierce.

Concerns €110bn bailout will not be enough. NYSE 200 points lower; FTSE 100 down 2.5%. Spain's stock market falls 5%; Germany 2%.

Since 91% of stocks are owned by the Plutocracy, the much-ballyhooed rise in the stock market as proof the recession is over is perception management/ propaganda.

Spreading problems in Europe's sovereign debt markets pose potential challenges for China, which has been stepping up its investments in European government bonds and relies on Europe as its biggest export market.

The EU faced the biggest test in its history last night as it launched a last-ditch effort to save the euro, amid acute fears that markets could unleash a fresh attack on the currency on Monday.

The fear that began in Athens, raced through Europe, and finally shook the stock market in the United States is now affecting the broader global economy, from the ability of Asian corporations to raise money to the outlook for money-market funds where American savers park their cash.

Markets fear deal will not cover Greece's borrowing needs. German minister: Greece could need more money. Cost of insuring Greek, Spanish and Portuguese debt rises.

As China gains dominance on the world stage, more and more multinational corporations will need to rethink their assumptions about competing under its state-capitalism model-one in which the government is the principal economic driver. So says Ian Bremmer, president of the political-risk consulting firm Eurasia Group and author of the upcoming book The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations? In this video interview, Bremmer discusses the fundamental distinctions between state capitalism and free-market economies, as well as the strategic implications this has for Western companies and governments alike.

European financial markets were expected to suffer another week of turmoil after the Spanish government was forced over the weekend to rescue a regional mortgage lender and European leaders revealed deep divisions over how to tackle mounting deficits in the eurozone.

By John B. Taylor This review is from a syndication service of The Washington Post. In "Reckless Endangerment," Gretchen Morgenson and Joshua Rosner argue that cozy connections between government and the financial industry were the primary cause of the financial crisis. While many economists-including this reviewer-have argued that government actions caused the crisis, Morgenson and Rosner use their investigative skills to dig down and explain why those actions were taken. The book focuses on two government agencies, Fannie Mae and the Federal Reserve. The mutual support system is better explained and documented in the case of Fannie, the government-sponsored enterprise that supported the home mortgage market by buying mortgages and packaging them into marketable securities, which it then guaranteed and sold to investors.

The Dow Jones average suffered its latest calamitous decline on Thursday, plunging 419 points and erasing much of the progress that had been made after the last series of wild swings two weeks ago. There were many factors at work in Thursday's carnage, which came after markets in Asia and Europe experienced similar turmoil, but the overriding one seems to be this: Just about everyone now believes the U.S. economy is getting worse -- and no one thinks our leaders in Washington are about to do anything meaningful about it. So we thought it might be a good time to take a step back and consider the fundamental absurdity of the paralysis in Washington, where spending cuts and deficit reduction -- and not job creation -- have come to define and dominate the discussion. And who better to illustrate this than ... Robert Reich, playing the roles of both Professor Donald Right and Dr. Hugo Wrong in a one-man show that everyone on Capitol Hill really ought to check out:

Businesses have had at least 25 to 30 years near complete certainty -- certainty that they will pay lower and lower taxes, that they' will face less and less regulation, that they can outsource to their hearts' content (which when it does produce savings, comes at a loss of control, increased business system rigidity, and loss of critical know how). They have also been certain that unions will be weak to powerless, that states and municipalities will give them huge subsidies to relocate, that boards of directors will put top executives on the up escalator for more and more compensation because director pay benefits from this cozy collusion, that the financial markets will always look to short term earnings no matter how dodgy the accounting, that the accounting firms will provide plenty of cover, that the SEC will never investigate anything more serious than insider trading (Enron being the exception that proved the rule). So this haranguing about certainty simply reveals how warped big commerce has become in the US. Top management of supposedly capitalist enterprises want a high degree of certainty in their own profits and pay. Rather than earn their returns the old fashioned way, by serving customers well, by innovating, by expanding into new markets, their 'certainty' amounts to being paid handsomely for doing things that carry no risk. But since risk and uncertainty are inherent to the human condition, what they instead have engaged in is a massive scheme of risk transfer, of increasing rewards to themselves to the long term detriment of their enterprises and ultimately society as a whole.

The crash has laid bare many unpleasant truths about the United States. One of the most alarming, says a former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, is that the finance industry has effectively captured our government-a state of affairs that more typically describes emerging markets, and is at the center of many emerging-market crises. If the IMF's staff could speak freely about the U.S., it would tell us what it tells all countries in this situation: recovery will fail unless we break the financial oligarchy that is blocking essential reform. And if we are to prevent a true depression, we're running out of time.

Judging from the skittishness of both markets and "consensus expectations," the United States' economic prospects are confusing. One day, the country is on the brink of a double-dip recession; the next, it is on the verge of a turbo-charged recovery, powered by resilient consumers and US multinationals starting to deploy, at long last, their massive cash reserves. In the process, markets take investors on a wild rollercoaster ride, with the European crisis (riddled with even more confusion and volatility) serving to aggravate their queasiness. This situation is both understandable and increasingly unsettling for America's well-being and that of the global economy. It reflects the impact of fundamental (and historic) economic and financial re-alignments, insufficient policy responses, and system-wide rigidities that frustrate structural change. As a result, there are now legitimate questions about the underlying functioning of the US economy and, therefore, its evolution in the months and years ahead.

After a nearly $1 trillion rescue package meant to end Europe's debt crisis once and for all, financial markets took a second look Friday and began to worry about how the plan would actually work and the implications of the drastic austerity measures for the fragile European economies.

Europe has put up 750 billion euros in an effort to stop speculation against the European common currency. Still, it remains to be seen if financial markets will learn their lesson. After all, speculators aren't even being punished for the damage they have caused. But they should be.

Angela Merkel told a meeting of international financial leaders that the G-20 must work together to reform the finance system. Merkel is pushing for tougher market regulations despite resistance from many countries.