Economia-finanzas-banca-política

challenges from an enhanced regulatory regime that has evolved in the wake of the crisis.

The ultimate focus of examination and supervision is the safety and soundness of the bank, as well as compliance with laws and an assessment of the bank's ability to withstand risks and shocks.

how the Federal Reserve's monetary policy aims to increase the availability of credit to foster economic growth, and how we are tailoring our examination and supervision of community banks to ensure that we are not inadvertently constraining lending. 

examination and supervision of community banks is a timely and important topic. Why do I say that? Because, as I will discuss shortly, lending by community banks plays an important role in the ongoing economic recovery, especially by providing credit to small businesses. And it is absolutely critical that examination and supervision do not produce outcomes that are barriers to small business expansion.

potential effects of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank Act).

Supervision and Examination of Large and Community Banks

good examiners will help them to be proactive and identify problems early, and because a strong and durable banking system is in everyone's best interest.

They are relatively diversified, but also tend to be more highly leveraged than smaller institutions, and often rely on more volatile wholesale funding. These organizations often are tightly interconnected, raising the prospect that the failure of one institution could rapidly destabilize the wider financial system, giving rise to the "too-big-to-fail" problem.7  

the examination and supervision of the lender should not hinder the ability of creditworthy businesses to access credit.

I am encouraged that community banks are faring better in the current environment.

While profitability remains below long-run historical norms, returns on equity and assets have reached their highest post-crisis levels.3

we must continue to think about how we can improve the examination and supervision of community banks. One issue that we constantly must evaluate is the appropriate balance in the allocation of responsibilities between banks and examiners.4

community bankers typically welcome effective and appropriate examination and supervision.

there are key differences between these two sets of institutions, and these differences have implications for our supervisory framework.

over at least the past decade indicates a trend toward greater concentration. Ninety-nine percent of banks in the United States are community banks, with most of these holding less than $1 billion in total assets. The remaining 1 percent of banks together hold more than 80 percent of the assets in the banking system, with much of this concentrated at a handful of the very largest banks. The four largest commercial banks, each of which has more than $1 trillion in consolidated assets, collectively hold just under half of all U.S. banking assets.6   

The largest commercial banks are characterized not only by their size, but also by their scope of operations and complexity.

we must always think about whether the allocation of responsibilities should be different depending on whether the supervision is of a community bank rather than a large bank,

The characteristics of the largest commercial banks stand in contrast with those of community banks.

community banks are not immune from taking on excessive risk. But there are reasons why risks at community banks are likely to be less dangerous to the financial system. First, community banks generally are less complex and more easily understood. Second, community banks tend to be more traditional in approach.

our supervision of these firms has become arguably much more intensive, which I believe is perfectly appropriate given the effect that problems at the largest firms had on the financial system and the broader economy. 

All of these characteristics have implications for how large and complex banks should be supervised, as compared with community banks. Notably, our supervision of large banks reflects the scope and complexity of their activities as well as their interactions with other firms and possible effects on financial markets, and incorporates systemic risk considerations that could arise from the failure of these banks.

In recognition of their systemic importance, the largest firms also are required to plan for their own orderly resolution in the event that they should fail. 

Because of their complexity and risk characteristics, these firms require intensive and continuous on-site supervision;

examiners also understand local market conditions to be able to put the bank's management and credit decisions in the proper context.

What does this have to do with community banks?

The community banking model is very different from that of the largest banks. Community banks are local by their very nature. They have deep roots in their communities.

This trait is particularly important when it comes to small business lending, where a local community bank may understand things about a prospective customer that cannot be captured in a more quantitative credit-scoring model that might be used by a larger institution.

these characteristics call for a very different model of examination and supervision than what is required for the largest banks.

Third, community banks are less interconnected, so when a community bank fails, the effects are less widespread. 

Strong lines of communication between examiners and community banks are vitally important.

Examiners need to listen carefully to management to understand their perspective where views may differ

We encourage our examiners to be responsive to questions from bankers and help banks understand new regulatory requirements, and they take this responsibility seriously.

the risk-management system of a healthy bank can be pictured as a series of concentric circles. The inner circles consist of the systems and functions that keep the bank healthy and allow it to meet the credit needs of its community while remaining financially sound and compliant with its legal and regulatory obligations. Moving outward, additional circles include processes and checks such as internal audit, executive management committees, risk-management and internal controls, and appropriate governance by the board of directors. The outermost circle is effective supervision. The critical element of this model is that problem identification is first and foremost the responsibility of the bank, while banking supervisors kick the tires of the bank's risk-management and internal control systems. The examiners are, in this sense, a last line of defense and do not substitute for a bank's own processes for risk identification and mitigation. They are not a guarantee of the bank's ultimate success or failure. 

this model of concentric circles generally holds true for banks of all sizes, the complexity of the largest institutions requires far more complex inner circles.

the outer circle that is necessary at a systemically important bank should be far more layered than what is needed at a small community bank. 

think about the effects these policies are likely to have on community banks and the areas they serve.

Federal Reserve are working to ensure that our supervisory program is properly tailored to the wide array of institutions

considering the effect that these policies might have on smaller institutions

we consider not only whether specific policies are appropriate for community banks, but also whether these policies could have the effect of reducing the availability of credit to sound borrowers.

Community Bank Supervision at the Federal Reserve

I hope my remarks will at least continue our conversation about how best to structure a regulatory and supervisory framework for the banking system that effectively supports the real economy and encourages sound and sustained lending to creditworthy borrowers. In order to sustain the economic recovery, we need strong, well-run community banks that operate in a framework of smart and effective supervision

three-pronged reform agenda

capital plan

capital holes

it would be somewhere between €100bn ($137bn) and €200bn.

the plan needs to change

forced to meet the planned 9 per cent core tier one capital ratio in such a short time

determined not to raise fresh money – either from shareholders, because equity prices are so disastrously low, or from the state, because of an understandable fear of being stigmatised as a bailed-out bank that is weaker than its rivals

they would shrink their balance sheets, reducing the risk-weighted assets (or lending commitments) that form the denominator of their capital ratios, rather than boosting the capital that forms the numerator.

shrinkage of available bank credit across Europe

protesting about the lack of funding.

politicians and small business

the banks are bluffing

There is a strong reason to call their bluff

second prong

that will not be enough

normalise banks’ access to liquid funds in the bond markets.

Dexia,

often not insufficient capital that kills a bank (Dexia’s ratios were top-notch) but a lack of liquidity

short-term funding and long-term lending commitments proved fatal.

International regulators

come up with a new measure

the net stable funding ratio

will limit profitability and the banks have protested. But it should happen.

there needs to be a quick fix, too

there has been no issuance of bank bonds

Only with a temporary guarantee from a European Union vehicle can bond markets be reopened.

policymakers need to tackle the root cause of the problems in the periphery – namely, their budgetary mismanagement.

Silvio Berlusconi

must be ousted by the Italian people

entirely within the gift of those preparing for the weekend summit.

first two reforms

brave political calls, laying policymakers open to accusations of handing money to bankers again

the lesser of two evils

accompanied by an enforceable regime of business lending commitments

normal rules of capitalism have already been suspended. We should stop pretending otherwise and make the necessary intervention quickly and decisively