This article provides a brief background and history of the Libyan revolution. This background is helpful in understanding the current situation in Libya.
This essay, by Abdul Quader Shaikh, is published by the U.S. International Trade Administration and outlines a brief history of free trade agreements between the U.S. and the Middle East.
Another article addressing the recent destruction of Libyan oil fields, the Wall Street Journal points a more direct finger at the Islamic State. This article suggests that militant groups do not have the expertise to take advantage of the oil fields themselves,; therefore, they destroy the oil fields in an attempt to keep rival political factions from using the oil fields to their advantage.
BP has signed an $12 billion agreement to develop natural gas in Egypt. Production will start in 2017 and may result in 1.2 billion cubic feet a day of natural gas being put back into the countries natural gas grid.
Rex T. Tillerson, chief of Exxon Mobil predicts that due to slow global economic growth and higher than normal oil production, oil prices will remain low for the next two years.
The New York Times reports that eleven oilfields in Libya are not operational due "theft, looting, sabotage and destruction." The armed groups responsible remain unidentified. ISIS has allegedly beheaded Egyptian Christians in the area, but as of yet, are not taking responsibility for the oil field looting.
Iraq’s second city of Mosul looks like a model of success for its new rulers from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
But in the back alleys, litter fills the streets. The lights stay on, but only because locals rigged up generators themselves. And under the blare of café televisions, old men grumble about life under Isis’s self-proclaimed caliphate.
“We’ve endured international sanctions, poverty, injustice. But it was never worse than it is now.”
Sunni Muslims in both countries have long felt discriminated against by regimes dominated by rival sects
without an economy that gives people a chance to make a living, many say Isis has little more to offer
“Compared to past rulers, Isis is a lot easier to deal with. Just don’t piss them off and they leave you alone,” says Mohammed, a trader from Mosul. “If they could only maintain services — then people would support them until the last second.”
“They’re operating like something between a mafia, an insurgency and a terror group. Maybe they thought six months ago they were going to function as a state. But they don’t have the personnel or manpower.”
the FT found its attempt at state-building has so far failed to win over locals.
volunteers handing out sacks of wheat stamped with their black and white seal. They even announced plans to issue a currency,
In some cases they say Isis takes credit for systems in place before it seized power. In others, locals say it is stealing the resources of the region it seeks to rule
Travellers must stock up on Iraqi dinars to use in Iraq, US dollars for the road and Syrian pounds once they arrive.
“I’m against Isis with all my heart,” Mahmoud says. “But I can’t help but admire their cleverness.”
Isis struggles to balance its books,
services continue to function because of the money Baghdad still pays to former civil servants in Mosul. Isis taxes those employees at up to 50 per cent of their salaries.
It is as if Isis is financing itself partly through a pyramid scheme, and this has begun to falter.”
Though many now question Isis’s economic management, its military prowess and organisational skills are clear.
Isis allows easy movement through its territories to facilitate trade. Trucks passing through are taxed about 10 per cent of the value of their cargo.
“I may be a Salafi, but I’m not an idiot,” he jokes.
Mr Birol said instability in the Middle East, and especially in Iraq, had “major implications” for oil markets.
Iraq has the world’s third-largest reserves of conventional oil
the government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil, which are usually at loggerheads, this month agreeing a temporary deal for crude exports and revenue sharing
Iraq’s oil production has fallen only 10 per cent this year.
the rapid ascent of Isis has raised questions about the country’s security, adding to international companies’ concerns about regulatory, environmental and budget problems.
Poor roads and transport infrastructure were adding to security concerns and hence costs, he added.
Mr Birol said it was highly unlikely that US crude production could meet the expected increase in global demand, even if shale oil production continued to outpace forecasts as it has done in recent years.
The Islamic State has taken over several oil-producing areas in Iraq and Syria, raising fears that the group could leverage its hydrocarbon wealth to the point of economic self-sufficiency.
ISIS is indeed producing between 25,000 and 40,000 barrels of oil a day
its oil is of poor quality, and ISIS is likely having trouble transporting it.
ISIS is only capable of moving its oil by truck, suggesting that the group hasn't mastered the use of northern Iraq's oil pipeline system.
Some experts have estimated that ISIS brings in up to $3 million in revenue each day.
Ben Lando of Iraq Oil Report told the Post that ISIS's daily revenue might actually be as low as $250,000 a day.
Iraqi fields "are so small and the crude of such poor quality that international companies did not bid to develop them
ISIS, which nearly seized a refinery outside of Baghdad in June, is interrupting the one industry that makes Iraq viable not just as an economy, but as a political unit as well.
In 2012, the International Energy Agency predicted a nearly 500% increase in Iraqi oil revenue by 2020, and concluded that revenue would double during that period even in a worst-case scenario:
its ability to disrupt Iraq's leading industry denies the country of much of its economic potential while degrading vital infrastructure.
part of their dissatisfaction came from the distribution of oil revenues.
The mismanagement of oil revenues is also manifest in Iraq's poor infrastructure
Though currently the Iraqi government has reserves and surplus funds, mounting expenditures and falling oil prices has economists to project that Iraq will run a deficit next year.
it is running a self-sustaining economy, making it the world's richest terror group.
Thankfully, 6 of 8 Iraq’s major oil fields lie in the Shia South, which is unlikely to come under ISIS control.
It sells crude at a steep discount, at a rate of USD $30 per barrel
Turkey runs a huge trade surplus with Iraq, which is likely to slow down dramatically due to lower demand from Iraq.
Jordan and Lebanon, which have both absorbed a large number of refugees.
Iran’s position seems to be the trickiest of all in that its interests align with those of the US in its fight against ISIS
Falling oil prices have definitely curtailed Iran’s ability to intervene without serious consequences for its economy. Iran needs oil prices well above USD $100 for it to balance its budget,
Any cooperation between Iran and the US over ISIS could lead to a gradual withdrawal of sanctions, which would allow Iran to sell its oil on the open market and generate revenue. The flip side is that Iran’s oil would surely depress oil prices further.
Saudi's allegiances have become muddled.
it finds its interests are aligned with those of Iran, a traditional foe, both of which are against ISIS.
Russia needs oil prices near USD $100 to balance its budget and Iran needs high oil prices to support its nuclear program.
Regionally, ISIS will disrupt and degrade the economy of several states, and that in turn may lead to further political chaos -- which is precisely ISIS's goal.
That strategy allowed the United States to function as a “swing producer,” able to boost or trim production to stabilize global supplies and prices (just as Saudi Arabia does today).
NPR examines the history of the 1973 oil embargo and the differences in the global oil market forty years later. The article cites Gal Luft and Anne Korin, suggesting that the U.S. policy of reducing dependence on Middle East oil is "faulty."
Several articles to date have suggested that Saudi Arabia is leery about decreasing production because of the effects of the 1973 oil crisis. This article provides a brief history of the crisis and some of the consequences and results of the crisis.
The contest between the shalemen and the sheikhs has tipped the world from a shortage of oil to a surplus.
Big importing countries such as the euro area, India, Japan and Turkey are enjoying especially big windfalls. Since this money is likely to be spent rather than stashed in a sovereign-wealth fund, global GDP should rise.
There will, of course, be losers (see article). Oil-producing countries whose budgets depend on high prices are in particular trouble. The rouble tumbled this week as Russia’s prospects darkened further. Nigeria has been forced to raise interest rates and devalue the naira. Venezuela looks ever closer to defaulting on its debt
But Saudi Arabia, in particular, seems mindful of the experience of the 1970s, when a big leap in the price prompted huge investments in new fields, leading to a decade-long glut.
This article suggests that increased shale oil production is changing the economy of oil, but at the same time Saudi Arabia is reluctant to slow OPEC production.
The reasons for this change are twofold - weak demand in many countries due to insipid economic growth, coupled with surging US production.
Added to this is the fact that the oil cartel Opec is determined not to cut production as a way to prop up prices.
Russia loses about $2bn in revenues for every dollar fall in the oil price,
Russia has confirmed it will not cut production to shore up oil prices.
Venezuela is one of the world's largest oil exporters, but thanks to economic mismanagement it was already finding it difficult to pay its way even before the oil price started falling.
Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil exporter and Opec's most influential member, could support global oil prices by cutting back its own production, but there is little sign it wants to do this.
There could be two reasons - to try to instil some discipline among fellow Opec oil producers, and perhaps to put the US's burgeoning shale oil and gas industry under pressure.
Saudi Arabia needs oil prices to be around $85 in the longer term, it has deep pockets with a reserve fund of some $700bn - so can withstand lower prices for some time.
were to force some higher cost producers
In the 1980s the country did cut production significantly in a bid to boost prices, but it had little effect and it also badly affected the Saudi economy.
Saudi Arabia, Gulf producers such as the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait have also amassed considerable foreign currency reserves, which means that they could run deficits for several years if necessary.
Islamic State, capturing oil wells. It is estimated it is making about $3m a day through black market sales - and undercutting market prices by selling at a significant discount - around $30-60 a barrel.
"The growth of oil production in North America, particularly in the US, has been staggering," says Columbia University's Jason Bordoff.
It has been this growth in US energy production, where gas and oil is extracted from shale formations using hydraulic fracturing or fracking, that has been one of the main drivers of lower oil prices.
"Shale has essentially severed the linkage between geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East, and oil price and equities," says Seth Kleinman, head of energy strategy at Citi.
With Europe's flagging economies characterised by low inflation and weak growth, any benefits of lower prices would be welcomed by beleaguered governments.
A 10% fall in oil prices should lead to a 0.1% increase in economic output, say some. In general consumers benefit through lower energy prices, but eventually low oil prices do erode the conditions that brought them about.
Geof Riley explains the term "spare capacity" at a macro-economic level. This brief article explores the pros and cons of producing a product "below the maximum sustainable level of production," and helps to explain why the term is so prevalent in the petroleum market.
This U.S. government report examines OPEC's role in setting global oil prices. Specifically, the report documents the effect of OPEC's "spare capacity" on oil prices. The report suggests that OPEC uses its spare capacity to manage oil prices on the global market.