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allieggg

The U.S. Is Giving Up on Middle East Democracy-and That's a Mistake - The Atlantic - 0 views

www.theatlantic.com/...282890

middle east democracy institutions Bush Obama Congress

shared by allieggg on 29 Sep 14 - No Cached
  • democracy assistance to the region, which will drop from $459.2 million to $298.3 million
  • Today’s Middle East is a product, at least in part, of failed democratization, and one of the reasons it failed was the timid, half-hearted support of the Obama administration.
  • the significant impact Western leverage and “linkage” can have on democratic transitions.
  • ...8 more annotations...
  • “it was an externally driven shift in the cost of suppression, not changes in domestic conditions, that contributed most centrally to the demise of authoritarianism in the 1980s and 1990s.” They find that “states’ vulnerability to Western democratization pressure… was often decisive.”
  • it is also worth noting that President Bush acknowledged the existence of a “tyranny-terror” link—the notion that the root causes of extremism and terrorism can be found in the region’s enduring lack of democracy.
  • What is needed are more systematic reforms focused on fundamental institutions. These include things like constraining the military’s role in civilian domains of governance, deep reform in the security and justice sectors including law enforcement and policing, and comprehensive “renovation” of the civil service sector. These are large-scale, long-term, and expensive undertakings that far transcend the modest parameters of most U.S. democracy promotion programs.
  • We argue that the U.S. and its partners now need to consider a very different approach to Middle East democracy assistance.
  • Conventional democracy promotion activities tend to focus on the process and “retail” aspects of democratic politics—things like elections, political party training, get-out-the-vote (GOTV) campaigns, and civil society enhancement. While these are undoubtedly important, they are insufficient to deliver lasting reforms. Authoritarianism in the Arab world has proven time and time again—even in supposedly post-revolutionary settings such as Egypt today—that it can weather the annoyances of elections and civil society.
  • the administration’s approach to the region is characterized almost entirely by ad-hoc crisis management and traditional counterterrorism approaches. Its one larger-scale reform initiative—a half-hearted proposal for a
  • we make the case for a new Multilateral Endowment for Reform (MER) that would tie significant levels of financial assistance—in the billions of dollars—to reform commitments and benchmarked implementation performance by partner nations.
  • provide a real incentive for countries to embark down a path to deeper and more enduring political reforms while retaining the ability to pull back funding if they do not deliver.
  • allieggg on 29 Sep 14
     
    This article begins by illuminating the regional democracy assistance cuts that are dropping from $459.2 million to $298.3 million It explains that the Bush Administration began the quest for democracy in the Middle East, and the Obama administration has only continued in his footsteps. The author presents the viewpoint that the U.S. approach to Arab democratization has been in the form of "ad-hoc crisis management" rather than "large scale reform initiatives." Promoting democracy in the form of democratic politics are insufficient, elections and political parties have consistently proved to weather away and fester further civil strife. Consequently, the article proposes a new approach to the region conflict. This approach calls for "systematic reforms" focusing on basic institutions such as the civil service sector, justice and law enforcement, and the military's role in governance. The idea is that addressing these lacking departments in the arab world will eventually pave the way to a smoother democratic transition. 
diamond03

This film will battle a global epidemic prevalent in Egypt: sexual harassment | Egyptia... - 0 views

egyptianstreets.com/...ent-in-egypt-sexual-harassment

film egyptian harassment women

shared by diamond03 on 01 Oct 14 - No Cached
micklethwait liked it
  • Egypt:
  • sexual harassment
  • ‘Creepers on the Bridge’,
  • ...46 more annotations...
  • feeling of intimidation
  • Cairo
  • experience whe
  • n walking down Egyptian streets,
  • , The People’s Girls
  • issue of sexual harassment
  • perfect time to create a documentary that will analyze the causes, provide alternatives to traditional thought and document women fighting back in creative ways,” explained 22-year-old Colette Ghu
  • “Because we’re both frequently in the street alone, we both experience high levels of stares daily, as well as verbal harassment,
  • sexual harassment is still taboo in Cairo
  • to walk outside or take public transportation,
  • don’t want to deal with the intimidation and anxiety.
  • the United States, Latin America, Europe, South Asia- we’ve experienced various levels of sexual harassment.
  • three people with different views of sexual harassment and their daily lives surrounding the issue,
  • three Egyptians to reveal the extent of sexual harassment in Egypt and to get a better understanding of the issue,
  • Esraa is a 25-year-old Egyptian woman
  • challenges social norms by performing in storytelling theater pieces about sexual harassment
  • participating in anti-sexual harassment protests and events.”
  • 8 out of 10 women experience sexual harassment in public transportation,
  • deters us
  • members of society open up about their own experiences and perspectives.”
  • 99 percent of women in Egypt have faced sexual harassment.
  • 2011 revolution had a big impact on the issue of sexual harassment,
  • positive and negative ways
  • unfortunately become more widespread,
  • lack of police
  • gives harassers a sense of immunity
  • more commonplace and accepted.
  • President Sisi
  • police presence in the streets has increased, and more harassers have been brought to justice
  • Egyptian women have reached their boiling point in recent years, and inspired by the revolution, they have become a lot more outspoken
  • critics of Islam often end up blaming misogyny on religion.
  • sexual harassment is not specific to one religion.
  • here remains a common misbelief in the West that Egyptian, as well as all Arab women, are oppressed.
  • women in Egypt have been able to do basically anything a man can do
  • work and have a career
  • degrees in higher education,
  • high leadership roles
  • product of the news cycle following the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan
  • societal pressures for women to focus on getting married and starting a family.
  • very similar to the ones women in the West
  • no way means that all Egyptian men are harassers,
  • Arab or Muslim-specific issue.
  • a worldwide problem.”
  • two meanings that it has in Arabic
  • well-mannered, cultured, respectable girl,
  • “When people blame victims of sexual harassment, they often argue that if only the girl was a ‘people’s girl’ then she wouldn’t get harassed. The name is also an ode to all the girls and women of Egypt.”
  • diamond03 on 01 Oct 14
     
    Filmmakers are filming a film that talks about the sexual harassment issue that occurring in Egypt. Ninety-nine percent of women in Egypt have faced sexual harassment. It also shares the common misbeliefs that people believe due to American news. 
allieggg

Islamists Aren't the Obstacle | Foreign Affairs - 0 views

www.foreignaffairs.com/...islamists-arent-the-obstacle

middle east democracy Islamists institutions egypt politics tunisia

shared by allieggg on 28 Sep 14 - No Cached
micklethwait liked it
  • A minority of the population -- 26 percent of Tunisians and 28 percent of Egyptians -- believes that Islam should play a large role in government.
  • Islamist parties received considerable support in both countries' recent elections -- not only because there is a broad ideological affinity for Islamism among the population but also because of Islamist parties' effective campaigning.
  • Both secularists and Islamists associate democracy with economic prosperity
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • When asked about the most important feature of a democracy, 69 percent of Egyptians and 32 percent of Tunisians put providing people with basic necessities or narrowing the gap between rich and poor at the top of their lists.
  • On a related note, Islamist parties have shown a remarkable ability to maintain their base.
  • Tunisia has fared better than Egypt so far in the post-Arab Spring transition, with less violence, fewer demonstrations, and greater political stability. This is in part because challenges are easier to confront in a country of only 11 million, 98 percent of whom are Sunni Muslim, compared to the more diverse and populous Egypt. But Tunisia's success is primarily a result of its stronger institutions, which provide a conduit for political debate.
  • Egypt's institutions are weak and have been routinely undermined by entrenched interests. The countries' different geopolitical situations play a role here. Tunisia's minimal strategic importance means that foreign countries have less reason to intervene. But Egypt's proximity to Israel and the Palestinian territories, its 1979 peace treaty with Israel, and its role as an intermediary between Israel and Hamas make its political developments important to Israel and the United States. Consequently, Egypt is vulnerable to foreign interference, particularly to attempts to prop up its military. Furthermore, beyond serving as a pillar to Egypt's authoritarian regimes, the Egyptian military has significant business interests and accounts for ten to 30 percent of Egypt's gross domestic product.
  • Egyptians, in fact, are no more religious than Tunisians.
  • Many onlookers claim that Egypt's more tumultuous post-revolution trajectory is because of the country's legacy of religiosity and Islamism.
  • Egypt's judicial branch, which is also more powerful than Tunisia's, has at times undermined democratic processes.
  • Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court ruled that the Islamist-dominated parliament and the Constituent Assembly it elected were unconstitutional, because Islamist parties contested seats intended for independent candidates. The move polarized the country and pushed the executive branch to take extreme measures.
  • Egyptian democracy is undermined by the inability of institutions to address citizens' demands and the impulse of powerful actors to interfere, not by the divide between Islamists and secularists. Institutions in Egypt fail to provide a meaningful forum for debate. As a result, violent street protesters and extremist sheiks are gaining power.
  • U.S. policy must support institutions rather than actors, and processes rather than outcomes, in order to help Egypt and Tunisia achieve their democratic potential.
  • allieggg on 28 Sep 14
     
    The Council on Foreign Relations published an article about democratization in the middle east and the major obstacles that are present in the process. While most assume Islamists and Islamic embedded institutions are the root of the delayed democratic transition, the problems are much bigger than that. While Islamist regimes do indeed stunt the growth of democratic progress in terms of creating a stable government, Arab countries struggle with economic and social factors as well. The Arab Spring Revolutions have caused economic and social degradation across the region, resulting in a road block of political leadership. Without a reliable and capable government structure, the states are unable to progress economically. However, in order to have a stable government, social and economic institutions must be in place to create this capitalist economy that they strive for. Because most wealth resides in oil, the revenue that the states bring in isn't distributed properly throughout society and is concentrated within few business elites. The article stresses that instead of foreign aid going into the hands of an unstable leader or regime, it should be invested in institutions in order to spur economic growth and eliminate corruption. Rather than focusing on the Islamist-secularist divide, the world should be working towards the strengthening of institutions to create a stable foundation for governance. 
wmulnea

Attacks Cripple 11 Oil Fields, Libya Says - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...oduction-at-11-oil-fields.html

shared by wmulnea on 09 Mar 15 - No Cached
  • wmulnea on 09 Mar 15
     
    The New York Times reports that eleven oilfields in Libya are not operational due "theft, looting, sabotage and destruction." The armed groups responsible remain unidentified. ISIS has allegedly beheaded Egyptian Christians in the area, but as of yet, are not taking responsibility for the oil field looting.
lking5

isis-air-strikes-undermine-anti-assad-rebels-syria - 0 views

www.theguardian.com/...ermine-anti-assad-rebels-syria

shared by lking5 on 11 Nov 14 - No Cached
  • mpatel5 on 11 Nov 14
     
    US-led attacks on the jihadis of the Islamic State (Isis) are the product of a "confused" policy that is turning a "blind eye" to the crimes of President Bashar al-Assad, the leader of Syria's main western-backed opposition group said on Monday.
wmulnea

How the 1973 Oil Embargo Saved the Planet | Foreign Affairs - 0 views

www.foreignaffairs.com/...3-oil-embargo-saved-the-planet

shared by wmulnea on 23 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • That strategy allowed the United States to function as a “swing producer,” able to boost or trim production to stabilize global supplies and prices (just as Saudi Arabia does today).
  • there was no spare capacity left in East Texas.
nicolet1189

Al-Qaida and ISIS Use Twitter Differently. Here's How and Why. - NationalJournal.com - 1 views

www.nationaljournal.com/...ly-here-s-how-and-why-20141009

Al-Qaida ISIS social media Twitter facebook communication

shared by nicolet1189 on 27 Oct 14 - No Cached
  • Al-Qaida has an Internet presence nearly two decades old
  • their separate techniques not only reveal key divisions between the two terrorist groups, but also illustrate the depths of extremism that ISIS will plumb—and that al-Qaida won't.
  • Social media's public and instantaneous nature is ideal for reaching ISIS's target audience—young, disillusioned Westerners who are ripe for radicalization—and it gives them a sense of community.
  • ...12 more annotations...
    • nicolet1189
      nicolet1189 on 27 Oct 14
       
      Wait, seriously? 
  • while ISIS focuses on fighting a nearby enemy to defend the Islamic State, al-Qaida focuses on fighting an external enemy, i.e. the United States.,
  • e group still relies heavily on "older" platforms, like websites and forums, according to Weimann.
  • ecause al-Qaida is more focused on fighting Western influence, it is much more concerned with currying favor with the wider Muslim community.
  • al-Qaida's online magazine, Inspire,
  • ISIS, all attention is good attention
  • ISIS's propaganda documentary Flames of War is produced in a Hollywood-esque fashion, complete with pyrotechnics and voice
  • appeal to a younger audience
  • ISIS glorifies violence
  • al-Qaida leader Anwar al-Awlaki, which numbered over a thousand at one point before Google took them down. Al-Awlaki preaching directly into the camera for close to an hour is in stark contrast to ISIS's sophisticated and sensational production.
  • Weimann predicts al-Qaida will outlast ISIS. I
  • l-Qaida's network is much wider and more deeply rooted than that of ISIS.
  • nicolet1189 on 27 Oct 14
     
    This article contrasts communication techniques of Al-Qaida and ISIS. It outlines how ISIS communication strategy uses more dominant forms of social media such as facebook, youtube, and twitter while Al-Qaida still uses web pages, forums, and their own magazine they publish to speak to their audience.
wmulnea

Libya's civil war: That it should come to this | The Economist - 3 views

www.economist.com/...factional-chaos-it-should-come

shared by wmulnea on 11 Apr 15 - No Cached
  • It is split between a government in Beida, in the east of the country, which is aligned with the military; and another in Tripoli, in the west, which is dominated by Islamists and militias from western coastal cities
  • Benghazi is again a battlefield.
  • The black plumes of burning oil terminals stretch out over the Mediterranean.
  • ...69 more annotations...
  • Libya looked like the latest fragile blossoming of the Arab spring
  • Army commanders, mostly of Arab Bedouin origin, refused orders to shoot the protesters
  • the revolutionaries cobbled together a National Transitional Council (NTC) claiming to represent all of Libya
  • Volunteers from students to bank managers took up arms, joining popular militias and only sometimes obeying the orders of defecting army commanders trying to take control
  • In August Western bombing of government bases surrounding Tripoli cleared an avenue for the revolutionaries to take the capital.
  • Recognised abroad, popular at home and enjoying the benefits of healthy oil revenues—97% of the government’s income—the NTC was well placed to lay the foundations for a new Libya
  • he judges, academics and lawyers who filled its ranks worried about their own legitimacy and feared confrontation with the militias which, in toppling Qaddafi, had taken his arsenals for their own.
  • militia leaders were already ensconced in the capital’s prime properties
  • The NTC presided over Libya’s first democratic elections in July 2012, and the smooth subsequent handover of power to the General National Congress (GNC) revived popular support for the revolution.
  • Islamist parties won only 19 of 80 seats assigned to parties in the new legislature, and the process left the militias on the outside
  • The Homeland party, founded by Abdel Hakim Belhad
  • tried to advertise its moderation by putting an unveiled woman at the head of its party list in Benghazi
  • The incumbent prime minister, Abdurrahim al-Keib, a university professor who had spent decades in exile, fretted and dithered
  • He bowed to militia demands for their leaders to be appointed to senior ministries, and failed to revive public-works programmes
  • which might have given militiamen jobs
  • Many received handouts without being required to hand in weapons or disband, an incentive which served to swell their ranks
  • the number of revolutionaries registered with the Warriors Affairs Commission set up by the NTC was about 60,000; a year later there were over 200,000. Of some 500 registered militias, almost half came from one city, Misrata.
  • In May 2013 the militias forced parliament to pass a law barring from office anyone who had held a senior position in Qaddafi’s regime after laying siege to government ministries.
  • In the spring of 2014, Khalifa Haftar, a retired general who had earlier returned from two decades of exile in America, forcibly tried to dissolve the GNC and re-establish himself as the armed forces’ commander-in-chief in an operation he called Dignity
  • The elections which followed were a far cry from the happy experience of 2012. In some parts of the country it was too dangerous to go out and vote
  • Such retrenchment has been particularly noticeable among women. In 2011 they created a flurry of new civil associations; now many are back indoors.
  • Turnout in the June 2014 elections was 18%, down from 60% in 2012, and the Islamists fared even worse than before
  • Dismissing the results, an alliance of Islamist, Misratan and Berber militias called Libya Dawn launched a six-week assault on Tripoli. The newly elected parliament decamped to Tobruk, some 1,300km east
  • Grasping for a figleaf of legitimacy, Libya Dawn reconstituted the pre-election GNC and appointed a new government
  • So today Libya is split between two parliaments—both boycotted by their own oppositions and inquorate—two governments, and two central-bank governors.
  • The army—which has two chiefs of staff—is largely split along ethnic lines, with Arab soldiers in Arab tribes rallying around Dignity and the far fewer Misratan and Berber ones around Libya Dawn.
  • Libya Dawn controls the bulk of the territory and probably has more fighters at its disposal.
  • General Haftar’s Dignity, which has based its government in Beida, has air power and, probably, better weaponry
  • the Dignity movement proclaims itself America’s natural ally in the war on terror and the scourge of jihadist Islam
  • Libya Dawn’s commanders present themselves as standard-bearers of the revolution against Qaddafi now continuing the struggle against his former officers
  • Ministers in the east vow to liberate Tripoli from its “occupation” by Islamists, all of whom they denounce as terrorists
  • threatens to take the war to Egypt if Mr Sisi continues to arm the east. Sleeping cells could strike, he warns, drawn from the 2m tribesmen of Libyan origin in Egypt.
  • Yusuf Dawar
  • The struggle over the Gulf of Sirte area, which holds Libya’s main oil terminals and most of its oil reserves, threatens to devastate the country’s primary asset
  • And in the Sahara, where the largest oilfields are, both sides have enlisted ethnic minorities as proxies
  • ibya Dawn has drafted in the brown-skinned Tuareg, southern cousins of the Berbers; Dignity has recruited the black-skinned Toubou. As a result a fresh brawl is brewing in the Saharan oasis of Ubari, which sits at the gates of the al-Sharara oilfield, largest of them all.
  • Oil production has fallen and become much more volatile
  • oil is worth half as much as it was a year ago
  • The Central Bank is now spending at three times the rate that it is taking in oil money
  • The bank is committed to neutrality, but is based in Tripoli
  • Tripoli may have a little more access to cash, but is in bad shape in other ways
  • Fuel supplies and electricity are petering out
  • Crime is rising; carjacking street gangs post their ransom demands on Twitter
  • In Fashloum
  • residents briefly erected barricades to keep out a brigade of Islamists, the Nuwassi
  • “No to Islamists and the al-Qaeda gang” reads the roadside graffiti
  • Libya’s ungoverned spaces are growing,
  • Each month 10,000 migrants set sail for Europe
  • On January 3rd, IS claimed to have extended its reach to Libya’s Sahara too, killing a dozen soldiers at a checkpoint
  • The conflict is as likely to spread as to burn itself out.
  • the Western powers
  • have since been conspicuous by their absence. Chastened by failure in Afghanistan and Iraq, they have watched from the sidelines
  • Obama washed his hands of Libya after Islamists killed his ambassador
  • Italy, the former colonial power, is the last country to have a functioning embassy in Tripoli.
  • Even under Qaddafi the country did not feel so cut off
  • Dignity is supported not just by Mr Sisi but also by the United Arab Emirates, which has sent its own fighter jets into the fray as well as providing arms
  • The UAE’s Gulf rival, Qatar, and Turkey have backed the Islamists and Misratans in the west
  • If oil revenues were to be put into an escrow account, overseas assets frozen and the arms embargo honoured he thinks it might be possible to deprive fighters of the finance that keeps them fighting and force them to the table
  • Until 1963 Libya was governed as three federal provinces—Cyrenaica in the east, Fezzan in the south and Tripolitania in the west
  • The old divisions still matter
  • the marginalised Cyrenaicans harked back to the time when their king split his time between the courts of Tobruk and Beida and when Arabs from the Bedouin tribes of the Green Mountains ran his army
  • Tensions between those tribes and Islamist militias ran high from the start.
  • July 2011 jihadists keen to settle scores with officers who had crushed their revolt in the late 1990s killed the NTC’s commander-in-chief, Abdel Fattah Younis, who came from a powerful Arab tribe in the Green Mountains. In June 2013 the Transitional Council of Barqa (the Arab name for Cyrenaica), a body primarily comprised of Arab tribes, declared the east a separate federal region, and soon after allied tribal militias around the Gulf of Sirte took control of the oilfields.
  • In the west, indigenous Berbers, who make up about a tenth of the population, formed a council of their own and called on larger Berber communities in the Maghreb and Europe for support
  • Port cities started to claim self-government and set up their own border controls.
  • Derna—a small port in the east famed for having sent more jihadists per person to fight in Iraq than anywhere else in the world
  • opposed NATO intervention and insisted that the NTC was a pagan (wadani) not national (watani) council
  • Some in Derna have now declared their allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the caliph of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq.
  • In December the head of America’s Africa command told reporters that IS was training some 200 fighters in the town.
cthomase

Libya joins Iran in snubbing oil freeze: source - 1 views

www.reuters.com/...s-opec-oil-libya-idUSKCN0WO1JJ

war politics iran Libya

shared by cthomase on 23 Mar 16 - No Cached
  • cthomase on 23 Mar 16
     
    Oil is an important aspect of the Libyan economy. Wishing to bring their oil production back to pre-war levels, The Libyan government has opted out of attending an April meeting of OPEC.
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