authoritarianism in MENA

Sunday's violence will likely prompt the military to further tighten its grip on power.

"The army incites sedition to remain in power," said Mariam Ayoub, a relative of a slain Christian protester, Michael Mosaad, as she stood outside the Coptic hospital. "They tell all of us that this is what happens without emergency laws."

State TV, which has been growing increasingly loyal to the military, appealed on "honorable" Egyptians to protect the army against attacks as news spread of clashes between the Christian protesters and the troops outside the TV building. Soon afterward, bands of young men armed with sticks, rocks, swords and firebombs began to roam central Cairo, attacking Christians. Troops and riot police did not intervene to stop the attacks on Christians.

"It's a school night" said the police captain, "they have homework and they'll go home soon, but you should see it at weekends!"

When I asked Mansour Al-Jamri, the editor of the opposition newspaper Al-Wasat, if he believed that the human rights situation had now improved he gave me a qualified answer. "It marginally improved in that we don't have people dying in custody any more," he said. "The torture to death has stopped, but not the beatings, not the abuses of people during detention or at the time of protest." "I've personally seen one person a few days ago being beaten up by four security officers and they bled him before arresting him. So this is continuing, people are being intimidated and they are being abused."

There may someday be a vision for Syria and the Middle East that draws on their past, where ancient trajectories of the Ottoman Empire stitched together a landscape that often embraced its many identities. There is probably a future in which loyalties are less to the state and more to those antique metropoles like Aleppo, Tripoli, Mosul or Beirut, which often answered questions of community better than the contrived countries that absorbed them. The term might be post-Ottoman, where borders that never made all that much sense are encompassed by connections from Cairo to Istanbul, Maydan to Basra, and Marjayoun to Arish, in which people can imagine themselves as Alawite, Levantine, Arab, Syrian, Eastern — or some hybrid that transcends them all.

A Tunisian Islamist named Said Ferjani told me a few weeks ago that such safeguards and guarantees would require what he called “a charismatic state.” It was the antithesis of all those sempiternal leaders, presiding over imperiums with hollow slogans and manipulating society’s components with cynicism portrayed as principle. A charismatic state could mend itself, reform, adapt and heal when it failed in its fundamental task, delivering the rights and duties of citizenship. And only in citizenship, he told me, could diversity be preserved and protected. Citizenship, he seemed to suggest, would permit us to become greater than our parts. It would allow us to imagine.

entitlement, ownership, power and fear

The story has flipped suddenly fropm being about a repeat of the January uprising to being about splits in the Egyptian political spectrum and then about elections. Even from yesterday to today, the narrative has changed from a high level of concern about elections taking place in the middle of this mess to a recognition of strong voter enthusiasm in what may be the highest participation rate Egypt has experienced in decades.

Egyptian people are eager to participate in the democratic process that may have real meaning for the first time in their lives

It's a sign of support for the democratic process and hope for its improvement. That is a testimony of the Egyptian people's seriousness. But it does not change the fact that these elections were prepared with staggering, perhaps even malicious, incompetence and on that basis alone should not have been held, and that the transition blueprint in general is a bad one.

"If I wasn't a leftist Christian, I would've joined the Brotherhood,"

I pressed Sultan on what, then, separated Freedom and Justice from the Salafis on one side and liberals on the other. "Our party wants to give Egypt a confined freedom within the religion, with respect for Egyptian culture and tradition," he said. Salafis such as those in the Nour Party lack the political experience to be effective in parliament, he argued, while "liberals want to give Egypt a foreign freedom that is adopted from the West, a freedom that is disrespectful for the culture and traditions, and it doesn't really work well with the religion."

"There are still family mafias that are controlling everything. They're influential, own land, hand out favors; it's not necessarily about fear," Abeid said. "Only religious movements are challenging the families. They believe no one is above God, but they're doing it in a very backwards way." The men said Christians were feeling isolated by post-revolution sectarian violence that culminated on Oct. 9 in a bloody Army crackdown on a protest in Cairo at the state television building, known as Maspero, leaving 28 people dead. Minya governorate itself is no stranger to sectarian tension. In the town of Samalout in January -- before the revolution -- an off-duty policeman boarded a train and shot dead one Copt while wounding five others. When Coptic protesters gathered the same day at the Christian hospital where the victims were being treated, police fired tear gas, some of which landed inside the building. In August, Labib said, a church that had been built across the street from a mosque was "surrounded by Salafis" who demanded it be moved. They complained that prayers from both houses of worship were drowning each other out, despite the fact that Christians and Muslims observe different holy days. The crisis was resolved when a Christian agreed to allow the church to use his property if he could live on the church's old grounds, Labib said. He said he wanted to keep his Muslim friends and normal life as long as he could. "A lot of Copts are trying to leave to other countries as refugees," he said, and concerned friends were calling him regularly while he attended his second job as a shopkeeper, warning him not to stay out late. "There's no safety [and] a bad economy. Someone was kidnapped three days ago in Minya, and I don't feel like the country is very secure."

they do not kill us to restore their state; they kill us because killing and jailing are normal behaviours in their state

It wasn’t only the police of their state who let us down; did the deans of their colleges not share in running over our children? Were we not let down by the bakeries and the gas depots of their state? By the ferries and ports of their state? Were we not let down by its wheel of production that lavishes millions on the director and the consultant while at a standstill but cannot spare a crumb for the worker when turning? Were we not let down by its economy that closes down the textiles factories while the cotton is piled high in the farmers home but keeps the fertilizer plant pouring poison into our water? Were we not let down by its football clubs that let security brutalize the fans if they cheer too noisily but intervenes to shield players when they raise arms? We are let down by all its institutions and every leader in it and tomorrow we will be let down by its parliament and its president.

That you should bury your son rather than he bury you? Is there a worse injustice? Is there a worse imbalance? We kid ourselves and pretend it’s an exceptional event and that it is possible to reform that state, but all the evidence shows that it is a normal event and there is no hope except in the fall of that state.

the National Archive of Egypt continues to be held within the state's coercive grip. State security plays arbiter. Despite the efforts of Egypt's preeminent historian, Khaled Fahmy, it continues to viciously restrict access to the documents to all but a privileged few: These tend to be professional historians whose research is perceived as non-subversive to the state and its narratives, which are overwhelmingly nationalist.

since 1963, when a precedent-setting court decision forced the family of Egypt's nationalist icon, Saad Zaghlul, to "gift" his diaries to the state, private collectors have tended to keep their troves hidden from view. That same year, the Ministry of Culture formed a new Committee for the Writing of Egyptian History, which was tasked with identifying documents of "national importance". Those deemed worthy of the honour were confiscated from their owners and deposited in the National Archive. Rather than having the desired effect of bringing new resources out into the public, the Committee has encouraged owners - be it through inheritance or purchase - to hide away their collections and restrict access to them.

few have faith in the state as custodian of the nation's (particularly modern) heritage. Only days after the Mahfouz affair, thousands of invaluable books were set aflame in the 19th century Institut d'Egypte during an altercation between protesters and the Army. It was only by the intervention of ordinary citizens that the material was salvaged.

“In order to defend ourselves in the future against other totalitarian regimes, we have to understand how they worked in the past, like a vaccine,” said Lukasz Kaminski, the president of Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance.

Reconciling with the past is an issue that has hovered over post-Communist Europe for decades. But today that experience has broader global resonance, serving as a point of discussion across the Arab world where popular revolts have cast off long-serving dictators, raising similarly uncomfortable questions about individual complicity in autocratic regimes. Arab nations are forced to grapple with the same issues of guilt and responsibility that Poland and the rest of Eastern Europe are once again beginning to seriously mine. Time makes the past easier to confront, less threatening, but no less urgent to resolve. The experience here, however, suggests that it may be years, decades perhaps, before the Arab world can be expected to look inward.

The resurfacing a generation later of these issues is not entirely without controversy, often driven by hard-line governments and prompting accusations of score-settling and political opportunism.

Mohamed Bennour, spokesperson of the center-left party Ettakatol, declared that the gathering was a way of misleading the public. “People who attended the event are using Bourguiba’s name to impose their ideas. These people do not care about Bourguiba – where were they when Bourguiba was imprisoned by Ben Ali for 13 years? They were supporting Ben Ali’s decision,” he said.

Samir Ben Amor, a member of the center-left Congress for the Republic party, also saw in the meeting an attempt to move Tunisia back towards the undemocratic ways of Ben Ali’s RCD party. “The meeting conveys that these people want to steal the Tunisian revolution and its aims. It is inappropriate for some opposition figures to refuse to join the coalition government, yet accept to ally with RCD’s legacy parties. It is a failed attempt to bring back the RCD using a different name. It is a shame that they are using Bourguiba’s name to achieve this purpose,” he announced.

Abed Hamid Jelassi, a member of Ennahda’s executive office, stated his belief that the gathering was a way of hijacking the Tunisian revolution, but that he thinks Tunisians are too clever to fall for the trap. “Obviously these people want the return of RCD, they are using the fear that people have against religious extremists to serve their own interests,” he said.

ominous signs that the prime minister intends to overplay his hand

Everyone knows what his push for a stronger president means: Erdogan would jump ship before his term as prime minister ends in 2015 and stand as president himself when the job becomes vacant in 2014.  He would continue leading the country, with more power than ever.

Most Turks agree that the country needs a new charter — one that would finally enshrine individual rights and provide for greater accountability and government transparency. In the view of many, the current Constitution concentrates too much power in the hands of an unelected state apparatus

Will any civilian winner be able to demilitarize the Egyptian state?

the discourse of presidential candidates avoids even acknowledging this situation, much less making a case for demilitarizing the state.

As Mubarak was grooming his son, Gamal, for presidency, he tried to ensure the loyalty of the military and stave off potential dissent by hiring military officers for economic and bureaucratic positions. The last 14 months, since the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) assumed power following Mubarak's departure, has seen a rapid increase in the number of officers in the civilian positions.

Article 5: Articles of the draft constitution should be reached by consensus among assembly members. If this proves impossible, articles should be determined by vote

Many Tunisians do not share Lassaad’s confidence in the country’s recent record-keeping. Rumors have circulated widely since the revolution that the Interior Ministry archives have been strategically cleaned and those of the ATCE, the ministry charged with targeting propaganda to foreign media, simply destroyed.

Jallab confirmed that much of the archives of the ATCE were indeed largely destroyed shortly after the revolution. Additionally, the files of certain municipalities and local police bureaus, as well as most regional branches of the RCD, Ben Ali’s ruling party, have also disappeared

there is indeed still interference by government officials in the work of archivists at Tunisian ministries

On May 8, Erdogan said he is “disturbed” by the unending raids against current and former military officers, after the arrest of army personnel for allegedly plotting to remove the government in 1997. He urged the prosecution to get their investigation “over and done with” -- backtracking from earlier expressions of support when he said the case should be pursued “as far as it needs to.”Fadi Hakura, an analyst at Chatham House research institute in London, said he’s skeptical whether Erdogan’s comments mark a change of course, saying he may be seeking to assuage domestic and external critics of the investigations, which have been slammed by the European Union and rights groups. The government has shown in the past that it can remove prosecutors from cases when it isn’t happy with their direction, and that hasn’t happened with the 1997 coup probe, he said in a phone interview.Still, the comments earned Erdogan a rebuke from Gulen’s media outlets. They will be “etched into history as not befitting a prime minister,” wrote Bulent Kenes in the Gulen- backed newspaper Today’s Zaman. “The masses, who are the main makers of history and the main power driving the ruling AKP, do not agree with the prime minister in this respect.”

when the premier was off work sick last year, “we saw guys around him battling Gulen’s people,” Ash said, referring to a row over legislation on soccer match-fixing late last year. Factional disputes could intensify and become “a big issue for Turkey” if the presidency takes Erdogan away from day-to-day politics, he said.

Erdogan has for now succeeded in his aim of taming the "Pashas", officers, who disdain his Islamist roots. But as coup trials stutter over technical appeals, his position ranging over a demoralized military has its perils.

An annual European Union survey showed Turks trust in the military slid from 90 percent in 2004 to 70 percent in 2010.

resignations allowed Erdogan to install a chief of staff of his choice, General Necdet Ozel

From the moment the military seized control from President Hosni Mubarak, the generals “certainly” never intended to relinquish authority before supervising a new Constitution, Judge Gebali said

Judge Gebali said her own direct contacts with the generals began in May last year, after a demonstration by mostly liberal and secular activists demanding a Constitution or at least a bill of rights before elections. “This changed the vision of the military council,” she said. “It had thought that the only popular power in the street was the Muslim Brotherhood.”

The planned decree “was thwarted every time by all the noise, the popular mobilization, the ‘million-man marches,’ ” Judge Gebali said, blaming the Islamists even though they were only one part of the protests.

Shafiq’s campaign was based on ‘asabiyya (group solidarity), he said. “We have reintegrated the big families of Gharbiyya,” he explained, rattling off the names of 11 clans that urged a vote for Shafiq

the brigadier left the room mumbling, “All this trouble over one vote.”

Thus far the SCAF has departed from the rigged elections of the Mubarak era, when a key objective was to depress the vote. Now the generals need buy-in from the electorate to offset the ongoing popular mobilization in streets and workplaces, so they seek to drive up turnout in elections that appear clean.

In spite of the fact that Tunisia’s political police were officially dissolved shortly after the revolution, several politicians, activists, and journalists have claimed that this secret body continues to operate in Tunisia. The Ministry of the Interior was not available to provide further clarification.