The Obama administration said the move reiterated its previously-stated commitment to end the use of torture by its officers, and would protect those who acted within the limits set out by a previous legal opinion.

Mr Obama gave an assurance that "those who carried out their duties relying in good faith upon legal advice from the Department of Justice... will not be subject to prosecution".

One of the documents contained legal authorisation for a list of specific harsh interrogation techniques, including pushing detainees against a wall, facial slaps, cramped confinement, stress positions and sleep deprivation. The memo also authorises the use of "waterboarding", or simulated drowning, and the placing of a detainee into a confined space with an insect.

The release of the memos stems from a request by civil rights group the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).

Mr Parker said the decision to allow the use of insects in interrogation was reminiscent of the Room 101 nightmare described by George Orwell in his seminal novel, 1984.

The approved tactic - to place al-Qaeda suspect Abu Zubaydah, who is afraid of insects, inside a box filled with caterpillars but to tell him they were stinging insects - was never used.

During his first week in office, President Obama issued an executive order officially outlawing the use of harsh interrogation techniques by the CIA, and forcing the agency to adhere to standards laid out in the US Army Field Manual.

"Bottom line here is you've had crimes committed," Amnesty International analyst Tom Parker told the BBC.

the former head of the CIA under former President George W Bush, Gen Michael Hayden, said the White House move would undermine intelligence work and dissuade foreign agencies from sharing information with the CIA. "If you want an intelligence service to work for you, they always work on the edge. That's just where they work," he told the Associated Press.

Mr Vejjajiva said a state of emergency imposed on Sunday in Bangkok would remain in place.

Red-shirted supporters of Mr Thaksin, who is now in self-imposed exile in Dubai, have held protests in recent weeks. The largely peaceful demonstrations that paralysed parts of Bangkok turned violent earlier this week; two people died and more than 100 others were injured. Protest leaders called off the action amid a major military crackdown to quell the riots.

The red shirts took to the streets demanding that Prime Minister Abhisit step down, and fresh elections to be held. They say that he was illegally installed by parliament in December after courts ousted the government led by Mr Thaksin's allies, and dissolved their parties.

The red shirts have expressed anger over the detention of several protest leaders in recent days, while Mr Sondhi and his allies were never prosecuted for their political action. Last year, the yellow shirts occupied Government House for three months and seized Bangkok's two airports for a week, stranding hundreds of thousands of travellers.

North Korea has said that it will reactivate all of its nuclear facilities and go ahead with reprocessing spent fuel.

In addition to ordering the nuclear watchdog out of North Korea, Pyongyang has left six-party talks on its nuclear program and has vowed to bolster its nuclear self-defense capabilities.

Russia's prime minister, Vladimir Putin, sent troops into Chechnya in 1999. His aim was to win back the region, which had enjoyed de-facto independence since the first Chechen war in 1994-1996. The security regime included arbitrary arrests, roadblocks, curfews and restrictions on journalists.

In return for abandoning their struggle for independence, Akhmad Kadyrov and other ex-separatists were granted sweeping powers and autonomy denied to other Russian republics. Moscow also agreed to turn a blind eye to human rights abuses. The policy appeared to work. Chechnya's shell-ridden capital, Grozny, was transformed.

some inside the Kremlin have questioned whether Putin's policy of entrusting power to Chechens - known as "Chechenisation" - has gone too far. Kadyrov has been repeatedly accused of murdering his enemies, including the Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya, a critic who described him as a "coward armed to the teeth". He denies involvement in her death.In January, a Chechen exile, Umar Israilov, who had accused Kadryov of torturing him was shot dead in a street in Vienna. And last month, Sulim Yamadayev, a former Chechen rebel commander who fell out with Kadyrov, was shot dead in Dubai. Police in the United Arab Emirates accused Kadyrov's cousin and heir apparent, Adam Delimkhanov, of ordering the assassination.

Russian newspapers today suggested that some inside the Russian government now believe Kadyrov has grown far too powerful, but have little idea how to keep control of him. One analyst said Chechnya now enjoys the kind of autonomy that its separatist leaders in the 1990s had failed to achieve, while remaining a part of the Russian Federation.

"It would be difficult to describe Chechnya as peaceful. But Kadyrov has achieved 'stability' in the Russian and Chechen definition of the word," Sergei Markedonov, of Moscow's Institute for Political and Military Studies, wrote in theMoscow Times.

"Nonetheless this stability has come at a very high price. The flip side is that Chechnya's internal political issues are largely resolved without Russia and with minimal adherence to federal laws," he added. "In this sense, a new type of separatism has won out in Chechnya."

Now, as Gaza still smolders, calls for a two-state solution or partition persist. But neither will work.A two-state solution will create an unacceptable security threat to Israel. An armed Arab state, presumably in the West Bank, would give Israel less than 10 miles of strategic depth at its narrowest point. Further, a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip would do little to resolve the problem of refugees. Any situation that keeps the majority of Palestinians in refugee camps and does not offer a solution within the historical borders of Israel/Palestine is not a solution at all.

For the same reasons, the older idea of partition of the West Bank into Jewish and Arab areas, with buffer zones between them, won’t work. The Palestinian-held areas could not accommodate all of the refugees, and buffer zones symbolize exclusion and breed tension. Israelis and Palestinians have also become increasingly intertwined, economically and politically.

In absolute terms, the two movements must remain in perpetual war or a compromise must be reached. The compromise is one state for all, an “Isratine”

A key prerequisite for peace is the right of return for Palestinian refugees to the homes their families left behind in 1948. It is an injustice that Jews who were not originally inhabitants of Palestine, nor were their ancestors, can move in from abroad while Palestinians who were displaced only a relatively short time ago should not be so permitted.

It is a fact that Palestinians inhabited the land and owned farms and homes there until recently, fleeing in fear of violence at the hands of Jews after 1948 — violence that did not occur, but rumors of which led to a mass exodus. It is important to note that the Jews did not forcibly expel Palestinians. They were never “un-welcomed.”

Assimilation is already a fact of life in Israel. There are more than one million Muslim Arabs in Israel; they possess Israeli nationality and take part in political life with the Jews, forming political parties. On the other side, there are Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Israeli factories depend on Palestinian labor, and goods and services are exchanged. This successful assimilation can be a model for Isratine.

living under one roof is the only option for a lasting peace.

Diplomats here said it gave him leverage in keeping African and European leaders listening and their doors open. If Libya sent all the migrants home, they would become a burden to poorer African nations, which would have to absorb them while losing out on the remittances they send home. At the same time, diplomats here said, Libya has made it plain to European countries, especially Italy, that if Libya chose to look the other way, most of those migrants would head for European shores. “It’s a kind of soft power they use,” said one Western diplomat who works on Libyan affairs but requested anonymity for fear of antagonizing Libyan authorities.

By late 2008, though, the global financial crisis was in full swing. The Russian leadership was slow to grasp it, blaming the West for its profligacy and suggesting that Russia would be immune. Soon, however, the country experienced a triple shock: oil dipped below $40 a barrel, demand for Russian exports sank precipitously, and Western financial institutions began calling in their loans.

By February 2009, the ruble had depreciated to 36 rubles to the dollar, illustrating the ongoing loss of faith in the Russian economy. As a result, the cost of dollar-denominated imports increased substantially. The official unemployment rate hit 8.1 percent, and most observers project further increases in the near term. Not surprisingly, public approval of the country's political leadership fell. Although public opinion polls do not yet show massive discontent or unrest, they do show a pronounced downward shift.

Medvedev has always styled himself as something of a reformer. As the crisis has worsened, the president has been especially careful to distance himself from Putin. Policy differences between the two men -- on the response to the financial crisis, the locus of prosecutorial power, the use of force against protesters, the tenure of judges in the courts, and the definition of treason, among others -- are serious and growing.

Meanwhile, Medvedev's popularity is growing. According to a February 2009 national survey, 73 percent of those polled said they trust him, compared with 56 percent in 2006. Although it is impossible to predict what will happen, one thing is certain: The current power dynamic is shifting, and shifting fast. If the trend continues, Medvedev will undoubtedly begin asking himself why he is still playing second fiddle.

The prime minister is undoubtedly a cunning adversary, but he does have vulnerabilities. For instance, Medvedev could be laying the groundwork for a move against Putin by making his war on "legal nihilism" and corruption the centerpiece of his domestic policy.

Mr. Netanyahu said Tuesday that his government would support a “Palestinian security apparatus that will fight terrorism” — apparently a reference to the forces being trained in an American-backed program under the Annapolis framework.

In 1996, Mr. Netanyahu prided himself on his establishment of a lean cabinet, with 18 ministers. The government established by Mr. Olmert in May 2006 had 25.

In Israel, however, public criticism has focused on the sheer size of the new cabinet, swelled by Mr. Netanyahu’s attempts to satisfy his coalition partners’ competing demands. With 30 ministers and at least 7 deputy ministers, the cabinet has grown into the largest in Israel’s history, prompting charges that it will prove unmanageable and constitute a waste of public funds during a recession.

Mr. Netanyahu has so far emphasized his plans for economic development in the West Bank. His refusal to endorse the two-state solution has led to skepticism and despondency on the Palestinian side, exacerbated by fears that his government will expedite Jewish settlement expansion in the West Bank.

Meanwhile, not all Israelis accept the gloomy forecasts of strained relations with Washington. “As long as Hamas is in power in Gaza, we are off the hook,” said Efraim Inbar, a professor of political science at Bar-Ilan University. Under these circumstances, “nobody can really pressure Israel to do anything,” he said in a telephone interview.

the opposition within America is potentially substantial, and might be hardened if Obama looks like he is presenting Congress with a fait accompli.There are thought to be as many as 15 Democratic senators who represent "rust-belt" states dependent on coal mining, steel production and heavy manufacturing, all big emitters of carbon.

There have also been suggestions that the cost of any climate change legislation may be higher than the $646bn (£444bn) suggested by the Obama administration.

Gary Samore, a former Clinton administration arms control negotiator who is expected to become Mr. Obama’s nonproliferation czar, has argued that any carrot offered to Iran should be accompanied by a bigger stick.

Aides to Mr. Obama say that Mr. Samore has favored offering Tehran warmer relations with the United States, including lifting certain American sanctions against Iran and assuring the Iranian leadership that the United States will not pursue regime change. (Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. said in the past that he thought the United States should assure Iran that it would not pursue regime change.) But Mr. Samore has also argued that such an offer is not enough unless it comes backed by the threat of stronger sanctions from the United States, Europe, Russia and China, like, for instance, a ban on foreign investment in Iran’s oil and gas industry.

United Against Nuclear Iran, an organization dedicated to stopping Iran from getting nuclear weapons

Several European diplomats said that France, Britain and Germany might be willing to consider sanctions if the Obama administration makes an effort to improve the atmosphere with Iran first.

American policy toward Iran is also likely to be complicated by presidential elections scheduled for June. An overture by the United States would raise two kinds of risks, experts say: that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran would benefit politically from such a gesture, and that he may choose to rebuff Washington to score political points before the voting.

“Coming out of the barrel like a jack-in-the-box, saying, ‘Meet us in two days in Geneva for talks,’ would be a mistake,” said Thomas R. Pickering, a former undersecretary of state for political affairs

“The most important goal is to prevent Mr. Ahmadinejad from re-election, not to get Mr. Khatami elected,” Mr. Leylaz said. “The chances of getting a reformist president elected would decrease if we have several candidates running.”

In the meeting on Sunday, Mr. Khatami told campaign staff members that Mr. Moussavi might stand a better chance of winning than he would, the Mehr news agency reported.“Opponents want to divide my supporters and supporters of Moussavi,” Mr. Khatami was quoted as saying. “It is not in our interest. Also, some conservatives are supporting Moussavi.”He added, “Moussavi is popular and will be able to execute his plans, and I prefer he stays in the race.”

Mr. Leylaz said that Mr. Moussavi’s announcement to run came unexpectedly last week, even though Mr. Khatami had consulted with him before announcing his own bid for the office on Feb. 8. Before the announcement, Mr. Khatami had said that he would run only if Mr. Moussavi did not, to avoid diluting the reformist vote.“Mr. Khatami was offended and felt betrayed,” Mr. Leylaz said.

Mr. Khatami, 65, won a landslide victory in 1997 and was in office for two terms until 2005. A charismatic leader, he was expected to draw considerable support in the coming election. More than 20,000 supporters showed up at his speech last week in the southern city of Shiraz, despite government restrictions.

Mr. Moussavi was the country’s prime minister from 1980 to 1988. He is well remembered by many Iranians for managing the country during its eight-year war with Iraq. His presidential platform is not yet clear, but in the past he supported protectionist economic policies.

Mr. Ahmadinejad is supported by the conservative Iranian establishment, but his economic policies have unleashed inflation of over 25 percent, and two major setbacks last week suggested that he might be losing support ahead of elections.

Last week, Parliament rejected a major element of his proposed budget to cut energy subsidies and to distribute the money directly among the poor.

Iran is not simply a medium-sized regional power that can be ordered around at will. Ironically, America's disastrous war in Iraq has allowed its fierce adversaries in Tehran to benefit from a massive shift of power in the Middle East.

Before his ascent to the office of president, not even diplomats stationed in Tehran and familiar with all of the ins and outs of Iranian politics were familiar with this short man with the sparse beard and piercing eyes. The fiery revolutionary, hardworking to the point of exhaustion and filled with contempt for earthly wealth, rose to power from humble beginnings and became the hope of all "Mostasafin," the disenfranchised millions without whom the Islamic Republic probably would not exist today and for whom Ahmadinejad has fashioned himself into an Iranian Robin Hood.

This places the Americans before the virtually impossible task of joining forces with Iran to resolve the classic Middle East conflict and its 30-year conflict with Tehran itself. For this reason, the Iraq question is also becoming increasingly urgent for Washington.

Obama knows that the United States could derive substantial benefits from cooperation with Tehran. Without Iran, for example, it will be almost impossible to bring peace to Afghanistan in the long term. In Afghanistan and Pakistan -- the center of conflict that Washington describes in its new strategic concept as a single unit known as "AfPak" -- the Americans and Shiite Iran have many interests in common. Tehran's rulers battled the Sunni Taliban radicals, whom they have always seen as dangerous neighbors and ideological foes, before the Americans did.

And Tehran, with the world's second-largest natural gas reserves and its third-largest oil reserves, has the capacity to do a great deal of damage to the international economy -- or help it overcome the global economic crisis.

Conversely, rapprochement with the United States and Europe would also bring enormous benefits to the Iranians. Without know-how from the West, the country will hardly manage to achieve the modernization it needs so urgently. With inflation approaching 30 percent and real unemployment exceeding 20 percent (12 percent, according to official figures), and more than a million drug addicts -- a distressing world record of addiction -- the country faces practically insurmountable problems.

Whether the internally divided Palestinians will manage to come to terms and form a unified government for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank is no longer in the hands of the inconsequential negotiators in Cairo, but will be decided instead by Hamas's patrons in Tehran. Tehran also decides whether the Lebanese Hezbollah or Hamas's extremists use primarily words to express their hostility toward Israel or, as is currently the case, resume their bloody terrorist attacks instead.

Ahmadinejad feels obligated to the permanently downtrodden members of society. As if he were one of them, he campaigned for president four years ago in Tehran's massive poor neighborhoods, traveled to the country's most remote places and promised the underprivileged their share of Iran's riches. He told them that he would fill their empty plates with the proceeds from the sale of oil, and that he would declare war on corruption and nepotism. The "era of oppression, hegemonic regimes, tyranny and injustice has reached its end," Ahmadinejad told supporters after his election.

But the political achievements of President Ahmadinejad have been more miserable than stellar. In addition to isolating his country even further in the world, he has ruined its economy with his chaotic economic policies. In the devastating assessment of Ali Larijani, the president of the Iranian parliament and Ahmadinejad's biggest domestic rival, whom he previously removed from his position as Iran's chief nuclear negotiator with the West: "The confusion is the result of the government arbitrarily dissolving offices and dismissing experts, ignoring parliamentary resolutions and stubbornly going its own way."

Nevertheless, it is quite possible that this man, who has probably done more damage to his country than any other president in the 30-year history of the Islamic Republic, will enter a second term this summer -- simply because he lacks a convincing and courageous opponent.

Moussavi is of a significantly more robust nature than Khatami. As prime minister during the years of the Iraq war, he successfully managed the country's wartime economy. Critics note, however, that Moussavi's tenure was marked by a sharp rise in arrests and repression. He has not held any public office in 20 years and is virtually unknown among younger Iranians, who make up about 60 percent of the population.

On the surface, the elegant Moussavi would undoubtedly represent Iran more effectively on the international stage than Ahmadinejad. He appears to be more open to negotiations with the Americans. And yet, when it comes to the central nuclear conflict, the new candidate is just as obstinate as the current president. At a press conference in Tehran just last Monday, he noted that he too would not back down on the issue.

Which candidate the powerful religious leader Khamenei ends up supporting will likely be the decisive question. When Ahmadinejad came into office, he kissed Khamenei's hand. The two men were long considered extremely close ideologically, although since then Khamenei has more or less openly criticized Ahmadinejad's economic policies. Only recently, however, the religious leader spoke so positively about the president that many interpreted his words as an endorsement of his candidacy. Many observers of Iranian politics believe Ahmadinejad, because of his lasting popularity in rural areas, will be elected to a second term.

There are no questions that the Iranian president does not answer with questions of his own. He insists, most of all, on a few core concepts. One of them is justice, but he defines what justice is. Another is respect. He claims that he and his country are not afforded sufficient respect. This desire for recognition seems almost insatiable.

In Ahmadinejad's view, "hagh chordan," or the act of trampling on the rights of the Iranians, is a pattern that constantly repeats itself and comes from all sides, leading to a potentially dangerous mix of a superiority and an inferiority complex -- but not the irrationality of which the president is so often accused, especially by the Israelis.

He was firmly part of the political inner circle after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, serving as editor of Jomhuri Eslami, which was the state newspaper at the time. He then was prime minister from 1981-89 — spanning nearly the entire eight-year war with Iraq that left an estimated 1 million dead and plunged Iran into a crippling economic crisis. There were early hints, however, that he chafed against the system even as he was hailed as a revolutionary patriot.

Since leaving office, he has generally stayed in the background in advisory roles and as a member of the Expediency Council, which mediates between the parliament and the non-elected Guardian Council, which is directly influenced by the supreme leader.

"To hard-liners, Mousavi is a more acceptable version of Khatami. And to reformists, Mousavi is a moderate who won't seek profound changes," said Hasan Vazini, a political commentator at the conservative Tehran-e-Emrooz newspaper. But others believe that this type of middle ground approach will do little to shake Iran's establishment. "(Mousavi) is Ahmadinejad without the invective or anger," said Patrick Clawson, deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "He does not appear to be a bold reformer."

Political analyst Vazini said that "with Khatami out of the race, conservatives are not so likely anymore to support Ahmadinejad as their sole candidate." The Islamic Iran Participation Front, the country's largest reformist party, quickly threw its support behind Mousavi, a trained architect who is known as an accomplished amateur painter.

The findings of other intelligence agencies in the Middle East also indicate that Iran is sending weapons and explosives to Hezbollah in Lebanon and to the Palestinian radical group Hamas, which controls the Gaza Strip. The latest indication of this kind of support came with a failed attack on a shopping center in the Israeli port of Haifa on Sunday, March 22. Security forces managed to disable several dozen kilograms of explosives that had been loaded into a car parked outside the mall. Both Palestinian and Israeli experts who cooperated on the case believe that the attempted attack was the work of Iranian-backed Hezbollah.

Meanwhile, the Israelis have carried out aerial attacks in Sudan in an attempt to halt the delivery of weapons to Hamas -- including rockets with a range of 70 kilometers, far enough to reach Tel Aviv from the Gaza Strip. The Israeli Air Force bombed a convoy of 17 trucks travelling through the Sudanese desert which were attempting to deliver weapons to Gaza via Egypt. The two bombing raids in January and February killed more than 30 people, including Sudanese, Ethiopians and Eritreans. Last Thursday a Sudanese government official confirmed the attacks took place and on Friday the New York Times quoted unnamed US officials saying Israeli warplanes had attacked the convoy.

The level to which Iran is intervening politically in the region is made evident by the failure of attempts so far to achieve reconciliation between the rival Palestinian factions.

Sources close to the Egyptian mediation efforts say that an agreement between the two sides has been tentatively close on several occasions. There had even been a deal to release 450 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails in exchange for the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit who is being held hostage by Hamas. However, even the veteran Egyptian mediators had underestimated Iran's influence.

Khaled Mashaal is regarded as Tehran's man in Hamas. The politburo chief lives in exile in Damascus but in recent months he has been frequently on the move, with Iran one of his most important destinations. Many Fatah officials, such as Ibrahim Abu al-Nasha from Gaza City who has known Mashaal for over 30 years, are convinced that the Hamas leader allowed the talks to fail under pressure from Tehran.