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In the FMCT you have another oddity. It only bans the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for military weapons. That means that you could still make those materials if you claimed they were for civil purposes.

It [the Fissile Material Treaty] only bans states that are non-weapons states from continuing to make materials. The problem is that if you are Iran and you're a non-weapons state, and you see weapons states being able to continue to make nuclear fuel for civil purposes under loose inspection procedures, you've got to raise your voice and say, "I don't even have weapons, why can't I make enriched uranium for civil purposes like the weapons states under the loose inspection procedures that they are obligated to? Why are you picking on me?"

There are three concerns raised by critics, and those are the three concerns that Republicans are going to focus on. The first is that the law currently requires the administration to lay out a ten-year plan with budget estimates about how they intend to keep our nuclear weapons reliable, safe, and up to date. The administration has not yet done this, as I understand it. So the Senate is going to ask for that almost certainly. Second, the numbers permitted are lower than what some people wanted them to be. The critics of this agreement are not happy that the numbers went a little bit lower than were forecast initially.

what you see in the press is that the number of warheads should be no more than 1,550, but they should be on delivery systems that when deployed are no more than seven hundred. You can have another hundred that are not operationally deployed. But we're told the counting rules for what constitutes a weapon are a little complex. A bomber, for example, carrying many bombs would only count as one weapon

both sides can engage in "limited missile defenses." The words "limited missile defenses" would be consistent with this treaty, and if one goes beyond limited missile defenses, [the other] would have the right to leave. So, first question is, "What is a limited defense program consistent with this treaty?"

Britain did not wait for the elections to announce action. Bank of England Governor Mervyn King said the country would launch a scheme to provide cheap long-term funding to banks to encourage them to lend to businesses and consumers.

King said the euro zone's problems were causing a crisis of confidence in Britain that was leading to a self-reinforcing weaker picture of growth."The black cloud has dampened animal spirits so that businesses and households are battening down the hatches to prepare for the storms ahead," he said.

Faced with Greek defiance, officials said the euro zone would not tear up the main targets of the bailout no matter who wins the elections, but it might consider giving a new government in Athens some leeway on how it reaches them.

"The headline targets cannot be changed," one senior EU official told Reuters. "There could be some tweaks to the path to get there, but not the goals.

One euro-zone official said that the main concern, if SYRIZA overwhelmingly won the election, was the risk of large capital outflows from Greece if depositors worry their savings in euros could later be frozen or converted into new drachmas."It is not even about a bank run on Monday morning after the elections. People can now log on to Internet banking and make transfers on Sunday evening as well," an official said, explaining the rationale of the ministerial call.

Visiting Rome, Hollande called for the euro zone to adopt bold new mechanisms to insulate member states and their banks from market turmoil, such as a joint fund to pay down debt, putting him on a collision course with Berlin."We need imagination and creativity to find new financial instruments," Hollande told a news conference. "To deepen financial union, there are many options such as a financial transactions tax and joint debt issuance, including euro bonds, euro bills or a debt redemption fund."

However, Merkel rejected "miracle solutions" such as issuing joint euro bonds or creating a Europe-wide deposit guarantee scheme. Such proposals were "counterproductive" and would violate the German constitution, she told parliament.

She warned against overstraining the resources of Europe's biggest economy, saying: "Germany is putting this strength and this power to use for the well-being of people, not just in Germany but also t

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Would the traditional deterrence mechanisms no longer function in that case? Janning: They would still function for the "old" nuclear powers. These states are, and will continue to be, capable of striking any location on the Earth's surface with nuclear weapons to the extent that life can no longer exist there any more. That is not, however, the case for the "new" nuclear powers. They can only threaten an attacker with the risk of a retaliatory nuclear strike whose effect is not entirely predictable. This in itself is likely to negatively affect the so-called "extended deterrence" of today's nuclear powers. (Editor's note: Under extended deterrence, a state threatens nuclear retaliation in the event of a nuclear attack on its allies e.g. other NATO members.) In other words, America's allies can no longer be certain that a US security guarantee offers them adequate protection against a nuclear attack by third parties. Washington might, after all, decide that the cost of intervening under these conditions is just too high.

Janning: As a deterrent, the possession of nuclear weapons is certainly effective. But this protective shield has got holes in it. If countries like North Korea can only respond to a limited conventional attack by firing nuclear missiles against targets in the enemy's homeland, then nuclear weapons lose some of their effectiveness, as their use would mean responding to a limited regional conflict with the threat of total mutual destruction. But it's true that as long as states, especially politically isolated regimes, see their security interests at risk, the goal of voluntary renunciation of nuclear military technology will remain virtually unattainable. The effects of sanctions on Iran and North Korea up until now show that the best that can be achieved is only to delay or slow down the weapons programs.