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"The global rise in interest rates is finally beginning to percolate into the stablecoin sector. One of the effects of this rise is that centralized stablecoins, which by default pay 0% to holders, are introducing backdoor routes for paying interest to large customers. While large stablecoin holders may be benefiting from this trend, small holders of stablecoins are being ignored. Small stablecoin holders need to unite. By working together through a StablecoinDAO, their bargaining power vis-a-vis the big stablecoin issuers improves. They may be able to negotiate the same interest payments that large stablecoin customers are getting... A StablecoinDAO would work along the same lines as a high-interest savings ETF. People would deposit their stablecoins -- USD Coin, Gemini Dollar, Binance USD, USDP, Tether, Dai -- into a smart contract. In return they'd get a new stablecoin called, say, UniteUSD, which would be redeemable on demand into any of the DAO's underlying stablecoins. UniteUSD itself would be useful. It could be used for purchases, deposited into smart contracts, or traded on decentralized exchanges and whatnot. StablecoinDAO would have the authority to swap one underlying stablecoin out with a new one. That potential threat would give the DAO the necessary leverage to negotiate interest payments."

"Currently, there is no overarching regulatory framework for stablecoins in Canada, and no authority has asserted jurisdiction over the operations of their issuers. This article is the first scholarly work to provide a detailed assessment of the jurisdictional perimeter, and risk-informed regulatory design principles, for fiat-backed stablecoins in Canada. It provides two unique and vital contributions to policy formation in stablecoin regulation. First, it analyzes whether stablecoins are securities, investment funds, or derivatives based on statutory definitions and interpretive jurisprudence. Second, it assesses whether a securities-based regulatory framework is sufficient to mitigate the risks that stablecoins pose, or if it leaves gaps that must be filled by banking, payments, and systemic risk regulators. While securities authorities have a reasonable case for legal jurisdiction over stablecoins based on how they are currently used, there are several "gaps" if stablecoins are exclusively regulated under securities law, and while many protections are provided, the full breadth of risks will not be mitigated. If Canadian securities regulators move forward with a stablecoin policy framework, they must do so with an eye to resulting gaps. Ultimately, a comprehensive framework will require inter-agency cooperation, across the financial regulatory landscape, to adequately address all stablecoin risks. It must apply "same risk, same regulation" principles, contextualized to support innovation, financial inclusion, and competition, using tiered parameters, and parallel and complementary inter-agency oversight. It must seek international regulatory cooperation, data-sharing, and contemplate contagion, interconnection, and the consequences of the potential failure of a global stablecoin issuer."

"We develop a dynamic model of stablecoins and crypto shadow banking, where the stablecoin issuer transforms risky assets, including cryptocurrencies, into digital tokens of stable values. Both the stablecoin issuer's reserve assets and users' collateral back the stablecoin. However, even under over-collateralization, a pledge of one-to-one convertibility to a reference currency can be fragile. The distribution of states is bimodal: A fixed exchange rate may persist, but once the stablecoin breaks the buck, the recovery is slow. When negative shocks drain the issuer's reserves, debasement allows the issuer to share risk with users, but it triggers a vicious cycle of depressed stablecoin demand, lower transaction volume and transaction fees, slow rebuild of reserves, and a persistent need for debasement. Stablecoin management requires the optimal combination of strategies commonly observed in practice, such as open market operations, dynamic requirement of users' collateral, transaction fees or subsidies, re-pegging, and issuances of ``secondary units'' that function as the stablecoin issuer's equity. Our model lends itself to an evaluation of regulatory proposals (e.g., capital requirement) and sheds light on the complex incentives behind the stablecoin initiatives led by the network companies (e.g., Facebook)."

A paper by Yiming Ma, Yao Zeng, and Anthony Lee Zhang analyzes the run risk of USD-backed stablecoins and uncover a dilemma between stablecoins' price stability and financial stability. They show that panic runs exist even though general investors only trade stablecoins in secondary markets with flexible prices. Run incentives are reinstated by stablecoin issuers' liquidity transformation and the fixed $1 at which arbitrageurs redeem stablecoins for cash in the primary market. The authors discover that more efficient arbitrage amplifies run risk. This explains why stablecoin issuers only authorize a small set of arbitragers even though it comes at the expense of maintaining a stable secondary price. In other words, the centralization of arbitrage embeds an inherent tradeoff between run risk and price stability. The paper's findings are based on a model and a novel dataset on stablecoin redemptions, trading, and reserve assets. Calibrating the model, the authors find a higher run risk for USDT, the largest stablecoin, compared to USDC, the second-largest stablecoin. However, even USDC bears significant run risk due to its less concentrated arbitrage and more concentrated deposit holdings.

"Although the terminology used to define stablecoins is currently ambiguous, they can be broadly defined as a specific type of crypto-asset that aims to maintain a stable value relative to a specified currency, asset, or pool of currencies/assets. This paper characterises different types of stablecoins according to the stabilisation mechanism used and analyses the current stablecoins' market. It also describes the regulatory framework applicable to stablecoins in a few selected jurisdictions. The main focus of the paper is the identification of the main risks associated with stablecoins, particularly the so-called global stablecoins, i.e., those stablecoins with a potential to be adopted across different jurisdictions and achieve a substantial volume. Finally, the paper concludes that continuous monitoring of the stablecoins' market should be pursued, given their increasing relevance and potential impact on the financial sector."

The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) published a paper that shows how stablecoins can maintain a constant price even though they face run risk and pay no interest. Stablecoin holders are indirectly compensated for stablecoin run risk because they can lend the coins to levered traders. Levered traders are willing to pay a premium to borrow stablecoins when speculative demand is strong. Therefore, the stablecoin can support a $1 peg even with higher levels of run risk. However, when speculative demand falls, stablecoin issuers can keep their debt trading at par only by moving to a safer portfolio or allowing redemptions. Such reallocation or change in stablecoin supply can cause disruptions in the real economy. Stablecoin issuers will need to adjust quickly if expected returns for cryptocurrencies fall; otherwise, they face the risk of collapse. These adjustments can cause disruptions in the markets they invest in, like the commercial paper market that provides financing to the real economy.

This European Central Bank (ECB) paper summarises the outcome of an analysis of stablecoins undertaken by the ECB Crypto-Assets Task Force. At the time of writing, the stablecoin debate lacks a common taxonomy and unambiguous terminology. This paper applies a definition that distinguishes stablecoins from existing forms of currencies - regardless of the technology used - and characterises stablecoin arrangements based on the functions they fulfil. This approach emphasises the role of technology-neutral regulation in preventing arbitrage, as well as comprehensive Eurosystem oversight, irrespective of stablecoins' regulatory status. Against this background, this paper assesses stablecoins' implications for the euro area based on three scenarios for the uptake of stablecoins.

NY Fed staff investigated similarities and differences between stablecoins and money market funds (MMFs), comparing investor behavior during the stablecoin runs of 2022 and 2023 to investor behavior during the MMF runs of 2008 and 2020. They found that, similarly to MMF investors, stablecoin investors engage in flight to safety, with net flows from riskier to safer stablecoins during run periods. However, whereas in MMFs, run risk has historically materialized only in prime funds, with stablecoins, runs occurred in different stablecoin types across the 2022 and 2023 episodes. The analysis also shows that, similarly to intrafamily flows in MMFs, stablecoin flows tend to be within blockchains. A discrete "break-the-buck" threshold of $0.99 was identified, below which redemptions accelerate.

"How does stablecoin design affect market behavior during turbulent periods? Stablecoins attempt to maintain a "stable" peg to the US dollar, but do so with widely varying structural designs. The spectacular collapse of the TerraUSD (UST) stablecoin and the linked Terra (LUNA) token in May 2022 precipitated a series of reactions across major stablecoins, with some experiencing a fall in value and others gaining value. Using a Baba, Engle, Kraft and Kroner (1990) (BEKK) model, we examine the reaction to this exogenous shock and find significant contagion effects from the UST collapse, likely partially due to herding behavior among traders. We test the varying reactions among stablecoins and find that stablecoin design differences affect the direction, magnitude, and duration of the response to shocks. We discuss the implications for stablecoin developers, exchanges, traders, and regulators."

"Circle's Gordon Liao recently sketched out a new distinction between 'payment stablecoins' and 'trading stablecoins,' and then places Circle's stablecoin, USD Coin, in the former category, while confining competitors Tether, Dai, and Binance USD to the trading bucket. For the time being, I think that a payments stablecoin is a fable. Everyone wants to be in that category, but an actual payments stablecoin, one who's main use-case is remittances and POS payments, doesn't exist. Stablecoins remain primarily used for trading, gambling, and speculation."

Whether a stablecoin needs dollar reserves depends on its actual or potential use in the conventional payments system. A stablecoin used only within the crypto ecosystem wouldn't need 100% dollar reserves. It would only need sufficient dollar liquidity to maintain its peg - and if exchanges are compliant and redemptions restricted, that might not be very much. However, stablecoins could replace conventional rails for international payments, potentially making them faster, cheaper and available 24/7. Stablecoins used for this purpose would need to be fully exchangeable for U.S. dollars or other fiat currencies on demand 24/7, and would therefore either need 100% dollar reserves or access to central bank liquidity. [Hence,] rather than wasting time and energy trying to regulate crypto-only stablecoins as if they are banks or money market funds, regulators should concentrate on ensuring that stablecoins that are, or show signs of becoming, payment media within the conventional financial system have 100% reserves and/or are licensed banks.

The European Banking Authority (EBA) launched consultations on draft stablecoin regulatory requirements. Smaller stablecoins must hold at least 30% of their reserves at commercial banks (for significant stablecoins it's 60%). (A significant stablecoin is one with at least €5 billion in reserves or more than ten million users.) Also, no more than 10% can be held at one bank (5% if the bank is a small one), and deposits from a single stablecoin can't make up more than 2.5% of a bank's assets. There are also rules on the maturity of assets. Plus there are requirements for non cash liquid assets (government, local or quasi-government debt) and restrictions on the maximum exposure to a single issuer. https://www.ledgerinsights.com/eu-stablecoin-reserves-consultation/

Stablecoins are often discussed with regard to their "stability." It is usually questioned whether a stablecoin is sufficiently backed with money or other assets. Undoubtedly, it is a very important aspect of stablecoin value. But, does it make sense if the legal terms of a stablecoin do not give you, the stablecoin holder, the legal right to redeem that digital record on blockchain for fiat currency? This article aims to look into the legal terms of the two largest stablecoins - Tether (USDT) by Tether and USD Coin (USDC) by Centre Consortium, established by Coinbase and Circle - to answer the question: Do they owe you anything? The short answer is no.

"The crypto ecosystem relies on stablecoins as a cheap and plentiful form of dollar liquidity. If all stablecoins were classed as securities, dollar liquidity for onshore crypto exchanges and platforms would dry up as stablecoin issuers either went offshore or out of business. It is very hard to see what would replace it, at least in the short term: U.S. dollars (and other fiat currencies) are not liquid on crypto exchanges, because to move them around requires banks, and non-USD stablecoins have gained little traction thus far. So trading crypto onshore would become much more expensive and considerably riskier. The dollar liquidity drought could also severely impact DeFi, because that relies on stablecoins (or derivatives of stablecoins) as collateral. So the SEC's action could bring down the onshore crypto ecosystem. "

An article by Circle Chief Economist Gordon Liao distinguishes stablecoins' use in trading versus payment activities and their impact on financial stability. Payment stablecoins like Circle's USDC have lower speculation exposure than trading stablecoins like Tether's USDT, MakerDAO's DAI, and Binance's BUSD. Two measures are presented as evidence; the total crypto trading volume facilitated by the stablecoin in question versus the amount of it in circulation, and the correlation between the change in stablecoin circulation and crypto-asset returns. Dai shows the highest correlation with crypto-asset returns because it is collateralized with crypto-assets, so a decrease in the asset collateral's value can prompt the forced redemption of the stablecoin.

"In this paper, we discuss the current use cases and growth opportunities of stablecoins, and we analyze the potential for stablecoins to broadly impact the banking system. The impact of stablecoin adoption on traditional banking and credit provision can vary depending on the sources of inflow and the composition of stablecoin reserves. Among the various scenarios, a two-tiered banking system can both support stablecoin issuance and maintain traditional forms of credit creation. In contrast, a narrow bank approach for digital currencies can lead to disintermediation of traditional banking, but may provide the most stable peg to fiat currencies. Additionally, dollar-pegged stablecoins backed by adequately safe and liquid collateral can potentially serve as a digital safe haven currency during periods of crypto market distress. "

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) published a paper that provides an overview of the evolution of the stablecoin market and examines whether stablecoins are actually "stable". It studies 68 stablecoins and shows that none of them have been able to maintain parity with their pegs at all times. Moreover, it argues that there is currently no guarantee that stablecoin issuers could redeem users' stablecoins in full and on demand. For these reasons, it concludes that the current crop of stablecoins don't meet the key criteria for being a safe store of value and a trustworthy means of payment in the real economy. The paper also highlights some significant data gaps.

Anticipation of Bitcoin's halving could be driving the issuance of stablecoins. A record $3 billion of stablecoins were deposited on exchanges this year. Stablecoins are increasingly being used to enable Asian trade finance. Businesses in Malaysia and Indonesia, for example, are using stablecoins to pay their suppliers in China, transferring funds via ETH wallets. But stablecoins are still mainly used for crypto trading and enabling capital flight out of China.

The Bank of Thailand (BoT) has issued a warning against baht-denominated stablecoin Thai Baht Digital (THT), citing a sixty-year-old law, that makes the "creation, issuance, usage or circulation of any material or token for money is a violation of Section 9 of the Currency Act 1958." "Although THT is currently not used as a medium of exchange, it could cause fragmentation to the Thai currency system should THT or other similar stablecoins come to replace, substitute or compete with Baht issued by the BOT," the BoT noted. THT stablecoin is issued on the Terra platform which has produced various other stablecoins including the TerraUSD and TerraKRW. The Terra platform is also behind the chai payment app, an e-commerce wallet that is mainly used in Asia and powered by stablecoins. https://www.bot.or.th/English/PressandSpeeches/Press/2021/Pages/n1564.aspx

OCC Issue First Regulatory Clarifications for Stablecoins The U.S. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) clarified national banks' and federal savings associations' authority to hold reserves on behalf of issuers of certain stablecoins. Stablecoin issuers have been using U.S. banks for years, but in an unclear regulatory environment. The clarification addresses the use of stablecoins backed by a single fiat currency on a one-to-one basis where the bank verifies at least daily that reserve account balances meet or exceed the number of the issuer's outstanding stablecoins. It applies only to situations where there is a hosted wallet, meaning wallets controlled by a trusted third party, as opposed to unhosted wallets that are controlled by the individual user who owns the cryptos being stored. https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2020/nr-occ-2020-125.html