A "touch limited in scope"? Youv'e got to be kidding. ODF was not defined to be compatible with the billions of MSOffice binary (BIN) documents. Nor was it designed to further interoperability with MSOffice.

Given that there are over 550 million MSOffice desktops, representing upwards of 95% of all desktop productivity environments, this discrepancy of design would seem to be a bit more than a touch limited in scope!

Many would claim that this limitation was due to to factors: first that Microsoft refused to join the OASIS ODF TC, which would have resulted in an expanded ODF designed to meet the interoperability needs of the great herd of 550 million users; and second, that Microsoft refused to release the secret binary blueprints.

Since it turns out that both IBM and Sun have had access to the secret binary blueprints since early 2006, and in the two years since have done nothing to imptove ODF interop and conversion fidelity, this second claim doesn't seem to hold much water.

The first claim that Microsoft didn't participate in the OASIS ODF process is a bit more interesting. If you go back to the first OASIS ODF Technical Committee meeting, December 16th, 2002, you'll find that there was a proposal to ammend the proposed charter to include the statemnt that ODF (then known as Open Office XML) be compatible with existing file formats, including those of MSOffice. The "MSOffice" reference was of course not included because ODF sought to be application, platform and vendor independent. But make no mistake, the discussion that day in 2002 was about compatibility and the conversion of the legacy BIN's into ODF.

The proposal to ammend the charter was tabled. Sun objected, claiming that people would interpret the statement as a direct reference to the BIN's, clouding the charter's purpose of application, platform and vendor independence. They proposed that the charter ammendment be taken up a later time after the OASIS TC members had had a chance to read through the Open Office XML specification proposal.

Later attempts to change the charter (and the specification) to recognize the marketplace needs of compatibility with the BIN's were defeated. These issues came to a head when Massachusetts passed an ODF mandate, and was unable to implement ODF exactly because they couldn't convert existing documents, applications and business processes to an ODF based footing. This in turn lead to a major push within the OASIS ODF TC to ammend the specification and charter. If the compatibility - interoeprability problems with legacy desktop systems could not be resolved, there was no way ODF could succeed in Massachusetts.

That would of course leave the door open for OOXML and the OOXML plug-in for MSOffice as the only means of Massachusetts moving to a highly structured XML document footing. Massachusetts needed to get their desktop documents, applications and business processes into some form of useful XML before they could push forward with their SOA-SaaS-Web 2.0 enterprise infrastucture initiatives.

Between July 12th of 2006, and February 20th of 2007, there were six proposals submitted to the OASIS ODF groups designed to improve ODF compatibility - interoperability with the legacy desktops. Six different proposals! And not one survived the OASIS ODF discussion process.

One last point. The German DIN group was authorized by the EU to write a report for ISO concerning the prospects of harmonizing ODF and OOXML. DIN invited all the players with Microsoft and Novell accepting the challenge, and the ODF contingent led by IBM and Sun refusing to participate. The OASIS ODF TC was also inviited, but so far has waffled and stuttered even thoguh a number of meetings have already been held.

Given this past history, is it reasonable to assume that the OASIS ODF TC would have cooperated with Microsoft at any time in the past five years? There simply isn't any evidence to support claims that the ODF TC supports marketplace needs of compatibility - interoeprability. The evidence is quite to the contrary. And it's substantial.

Will harmonization work?

I don't think so. The problem is that the DIN group is trying to harmonize two application specific formats. OpenOffice has one way of implementing basic document structures, and MSOffice another. These differences are directly reflected in the related formats, ODF and OOXML. Any attempts to harmonize ODF and OOXML will require that the applications, OpenOffice and MSOffice, be harmonized!

There is no other way of doing this unless the harmonized spec has two different methods for implementing basic structures like lists, tables, fields, sections and page dynamics. Not to mention the problems of feature disparities.

If the harmonized spec has two different implementation models for basic structures, interoeprability will suffer enormously. And interoperability is after all the prupose of the standardization effort.

That brings us to a difficult compromise. Should OpenOffice compromise it's "innovative" features and methods in favor of greater interoperability with MSOffice and billions of binary documents? Let me see, 100 million OpenOffice installs vs. 550 MSOffice installs bound to workgroup-workflow business processes - many of which are critical to day to day business operations?

Sun and IBM have provided the anser to this question. They are not about to compromise on OpenOffice innovation! They believe that since their applications are free, the cost of ODF mandated "rip out and replace" is adequately offset.

Events in Massachusetts prove otherwise!

On July 2nd, 2007, Sun delivered to Massachusetts the final version of their ODF plug-in for MSOffice. That night, after reviewing and testing the 135 critical documents, Massachusetts made a major change to their ETRM web site. They ammended the ETRM to fully recognize OOXML as an acceptable format standard going forward.

The Massachusetts decision to overturn the ODF mandate was made after two years of testing and study of ODF implementation proposals. The first year was dedicated to "rip out and replace" initiatives put forward by IBM, Sun and Novell. The second year was dedicated to ODF plug-in for MSOffice efforts, culminating in the July 2nd, 2007 decision.

Simply put, Massachusetts was unable to implement ODF. The failures laregly being due to the fact that ODF was not designed to for a world dominated by MSOffice desktops! If users are unable to convert their documents to ODF, they are left with no other choice but to go forward with OOXML. If ODF plug-in desingers are unable to perfect this conversion, there is no way to repurpose MSOffice as an ODF ready application.

It's that simple.

~ge~

The Burton Group did not recommend that ISO recognize OOXML as a standard! They pointed out that the marketplace is going to implement OOXML by default simply because it's impossible to implement ODF in situations where MSOffice dominates.

ISO should not go down the slippery slope of recognizing application-platform-vendor specific standards. They already made that mistake with ODF, and recognizing OOXML is hardly the fix.

What ISO should be doign is demanding that ODF fully conform with ISO Interoeprability Requirements, as identified in the May 2006 directive! Forget OOXML. Clean up ODF first.

Forget ISO approval of OOXML. I would rather see ISO enforce the current directive that ODF be brought into compliance with existing ISO Interoperability requirements. Then and only then should ISO then consider OOXML.

The reason for this approach? If ODF wiere compliant with existing ISO Interop Requirements, there would probably be some hope of harmonizing ODF and OOXML. Until ODF is stripped of it's application specific settings, and fully documented, we can hardly beging the process of figuring out harmonization.

ODF 1.0 has four gapping holes that must be tended to before ISO proceeds any furhter with either ODF or OOXML. The holes are that ODF numbered lists, formulas and the presentation layer (styles) are woefully underspecified. The fourth problem is that ODF is seriously lacking an interoperability framework.

These ODF problems can of course be traced back to the fact that ODF is application specific and bound to the "semantics and capabilities" of OpenOffice. That creates all kinds of problems. OOXML on the other hand is even worse. OOXML is application, platform and vendor specific!!!!

If ODF were brought up to snuff, we could reasonably start work on harmonization. Thereby eliminating the need to standardize two file formats for the same purposes. Until ODF is fixed, what's the world to do?

~ge~

And here i was betting that the blueprints to the secret binaries would be released the weekend before the September 2nd, 2007 ISO vote on OOXML! Looks like Microsoft saved the move for when they really had to use it; jus tweeks before the February ISO Ballot Resolution Meetings set to resolve the Sept 2nd issues.

The truth is that years of reverse engineering have depleted the value of keeping the binary blueprints secret. It's true that interoperability with MSOffice in the past was near entirely dependent on understanding the secret binaries. Today however, with the rapid emergence of the Exchange/SharePoint juggernaught, interop with MSOffice is no longer the core issue. Now we have to compete with E/S, and it is the E/S interfaces, protocols and document API's and dependencies tha tmust be reverse engineered.

The E/S juggernaught is now surging to 70% or more of the market. These near monopoly levels of market penetration is game changing. One must reverse engineer or license the .NET libraries to crack the interop problem. And this time it's not just MSOffice. Today one must crack into the MS Stack whose core is tha tof MSOffice <> E/S.

So why not release the secret binary blueprints? If that's the cost of getting the application, platform and vendor specific OOXML through ISO, then it's a small price to pay for your own international standard.

This article discusses how Microsoft might change their ways and save the company. This particular quote concerns Microsoft support for standards, and their fight to push MS OOXML through ISO as an alternative to ISO approved ODF 1.0.

The thing is, ODF was not designed for the conversion of MSOffice documents, of which there are billions. Nor was ODF designed to be implemented by MSOffice. ODF was designed exactly for OpenOffice, which has a differnet model for impementing basic docuemnt structures than MSOffice.

So a couple of points regardign this highlight:

The first is that IBM's Lotus Symphony is NOT Open Source. IBM ripped off the OpenOffice 1.1.4 code base back when it was dual licensed under both SSSL and LGPL. IBM then closed the source code adding a wealth of proprietary eXtensions (think XForms and Lotus Notes connections). Then IBM released the proprietary Symphony as a free alternative to the original Open Source Community "OpenOffice.org".

If Microsoft had similarly ripped off an open source community, there would be hell to pay.

Another point here is the mistaken assumption that users can easily switch from MSOffice to an on-line product like Google Docs or ZOHO "without having to rip our and replace their entire desktop infrastructure."

This is a ridiculous assumption defied by the facts on the ground. Massqchusetts spent two years trying to migrate to ODF and couldn't do it. Every other pilot study known has experienced the same difficulties!

The thing about Web 2.0 alternatives is that these services can not be integrated into existing business processes and MSOffice workgroup bound activities. The collaborative advantages of Web 2.0 alternatives are disruptive and outside existing workflows, greatly marginalizing their usefulness. IF, and that's a big IF, MSOffice plug-ins were successful in the high fidelity round trip conversion of workflow documents, there could in fact be seamless integration of Web 2.0 services into existing business processes. But that's not the case. As Massachusetts discovered.

It's impossible to harmonize two application specific file formats. The only way to establish an effective compatibility between ODF and OOXML would be to establish a compatibility between OpenOffice and MSOffice.

The problem is that neither ODF or OOXML were developed as generirc file formats. They are both application specific, directly reflecting the particular implementation models of OOo and MSOffice.

Sun and the OASIS ODF TC are not about to compromise OpenOffice feature sets and implmentation methods to improve interop with MSOffice. Sun in particular will protect the innovative features of OpenOffice that are reflected in ODF and stubbornly incompatible with MSOffice and the billions of binary documents. This fact can easily be proven be any review of the infamous "List Enhancement Proposal" that dominated discussions at the OASIS ODF TC from November of 2006 through May of 2007.

So if Sun and the OASIS ODF TC refuse to make any efforts towards compatibility and imporved interop with MSOffice and the billions of binary docuemnts seekign conversion to ODF, then it falls to Microsoft to alter MSOffice. With 550 million MSOffice desktops involved in workgroup bound business processes, any changes would be costly and disruptive. (Much to the glee of Sun and IBM).

IBM in particular has committed a good amount of resources and money lobbying for government mandates establishing ODF as the accepted format. this would of course result in a massively disruptive and costly rip out and replace of MSOffice.

Such are the politics of ODF.

What Heintzman is refering to here is the incredibly disastrous "ODF Interoperability WorkShop" held at the OpenOffice Confernece in Barcelona, Spain.

The Interop WorkShop was organized by IBM's Rob Weir. Incredilby he still has his job. RW put on display for all to see that special brand of ZERO interop unique to ODF. What's really surprising is that in the aftermath of this tragic display of interop illiteracy, RW initiated a new interoperabilitysub committee at the OASIS ODF Adoption TC!

Interop is a technical problem, as was embarassingly demonstrated in Barcelona. Yet here they are setting up the interop solution at a marketing group! Which is a strong indication that rather than taking on the politically difficutl and vendor adverse task of binding an interoperability framework to the ODF specification, they've decided to shout down anyone who might point out that the emperor indeed has no clothes.

What a sad day for ODF.