Malaysian Airways - 0 views

• 
  #1 Rolando Joyce on 07 Apr 12

   

  No hearth warnings, visible or audible had been alerted by instruments on the flight deck. A afterwards replay of the Flight Info Recorder showed that extreme vibrations experienced occurred in the No.1 (left) engine, jointly with indications of an erratic admirer velocity, a rise in exhaust temperature and a low, variable gas flow (AAIB, 1980 145).
  
  Captain Hunt took manage of the aeroplane and disengaged the autopilot. He later claimed that the engine instrumentation did not give him any very clear indication of the supply of the malfunction. He also later on mentioned that he imagined that the smoke was coming forward from the passenger cabin which, from his knowledge of the 737's air conditioning system, led him to feel that the smoke was in simple fact coming from the No two (appropriate) engine. Consequently the command was issued to throttle back again the No.two motor. As a result of this procedure the plane rolled slowly and gradually to the left by way of sixteen degrees but the commander manufactured no corrective actions of either rudder or aileron.
  
  The commander later on claimed that lowering the throttle of No.2 motor decreased the smell and indicators of smoke and but he afterwards remembered that the significant vibration continued following the No.2 throttle was shut.
  
  Following throttling back again the No.2 engine, London Air Site visitors Manage had been quickly suggested of an unexpected emergency circumstance with appeared to be an motor fire. Forty-3 seconds following the onset of the vibration the commander ordered 1st Officer McClelland to "shut it down". The shut down was delayed at the First Officer responded to radio messages from London Air Targeted traffic Handle asking which option airport they wished to land at. Shortly following shutting down No.two engine BMA Functions requested the plane divert to the East Midland Airport (AAIB,1980 forty).
  
  As soon as the No.two engine experienced been shut down, all proof of smoke cleared from the flight deck which further convinced the Commander that he had created the correct determination, not the very least in that No.1 engine confirmed no symptoms of malfunctioning and ongoing to run albeit at reduced power and with increased gasoline stream.
  
  Passengers ended up informed of smoke and of smells similar to "oil" or "rubber" in the cabin. Some passengers noticed proof of fireplace from the left motor, and numerous cabin attendants observed fireplace from the No.one motor as nicely as mild coloured smoke in the cabin.
  
  Despite indication that the fireplace was emanating from the other motor neither passengers nor cabin crew alerted the flight crew to this fact. This may possibly have been owing to general confusion at the time, allied with a belief that the pilot eventually understood what he was performing.
  
  At 8.20 p.m. at a height of 3 thousand toes energy was enhanced on the No.1 motor. The aircraft was then cleared to descend to two thousand toes and, immediately after signing up for the centre line at two thousand feet higher than ground amount (agl) the Commander called for the landing gear to be lowered and fifteen degrees to be utilized to the flaps. At 9 hundred feet there was a sudden decrease in power from the No.1 motor. Hartsfield limousine service, Hartsfield limousine service

   

  <div class="cArrow"> </div><div class="cContentInner">No hearth warnings, visible or audible had been alerted by instruments on the flight deck. A afterwards replay of the Flight Info Recorder showed that extreme vibrations experienced occurred in the No.1 (left) engine, jointly with indications of an erratic admirer velocity, a rise in exhaust temperature and a low, variable gas flow (AAIB, 1980 145).<br /><br />Captain Hunt took manage of the aeroplane and disengaged the autopilot. He later claimed that the engine instrumentation did not give him any very clear indication of the supply of the malfunction. He also later on mentioned that he imagined that the smoke was coming forward from the passenger cabin which, from his knowledge of the 737's air conditioning system, led him to feel that the smoke was in simple fact coming from the No two (appropriate) engine. Consequently the command was issued to throttle back again the No.two motor. As a result of this procedure the plane rolled slowly and gradually to the left by way of sixteen degrees but the commander manufactured no corrective actions of either rudder or aileron.<br /><br />The commander later on claimed that lowering the throttle of No.2 motor decreased the smell and indicators of smoke and but he afterwards remembered that the significant vibration continued following the No.2 throttle was shut.<br /><br />Following throttling back again the No.2 engine, London Air Site visitors Manage had been quickly suggested of an unexpected emergency circumstance with appeared to be an motor fire. Forty-3 seconds following the onset of the vibration the commander ordered 1st Officer McClelland to "shut it down". The shut down was delayed at the First Officer responded to radio messages from London Air Targeted traffic Handle asking which option airport they wished to land at. Shortly following shutting down No.two engine BMA Functions requested the plane divert to the East Midland Airport (AAIB,1980 forty).<br /><br />As soon as the No.two engine experienced been shut down, all proof of smoke cleared from the flight deck which further convinced the Commander that he had created the correct determination, not the very least in that No.1 engine confirmed no symptoms of malfunctioning and ongoing to run albeit at reduced power and with increased gasoline stream.<br /><br />Passengers ended up informed of smoke and of smells similar to "oil" or "rubber" in the cabin. Some passengers noticed proof of fireplace from the left motor, and numerous cabin attendants observed fireplace from the No.one motor as nicely as mild coloured smoke in the cabin.<br /><br />Despite indication that the fireplace was emanating from the other motor neither passengers nor cabin crew alerted the flight crew to this fact. This may possibly have been owing to general confusion at the time, allied with a belief that the pilot eventually understood what he was performing.<br /><br />At 8.20 p.m. at a height of 3 thousand toes energy was enhanced on the No.1 motor. The aircraft was then cleared to descend to two thousand toes and, immediately after signing up for the centre line at two thousand feet higher than ground amount (agl) the Commander called for the landing gear to be lowered and fifteen degrees to be utilized to the flaps. At 9 hundred feet there was a sudden decrease in power from the No.1 motor. <a rel="nofollow" href="http://www.nplimo.com/atlanta-limousine.html">Hartsfield limousine service</a>, <a rel="nofollow" href="http://www.nplimo.com/atlanta-corporate-limo.html">Hartsfield limousine service</a></div>

  ...

  Cancel

To Top