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This study asks which attributes make states the more valuable partners in military coalition operations. Due to the uncertainty inherent in combat in general and coalition operations in particular, successful military cooperation depends on the amount of discretion given to national armed forces. Since democracies usually have more harmonious civil-military relations, restricting the discretion of military agents is a relatively less attractive and needed tool for democratic principals. This in turn makes democratic states the more valuable allies. The argument has two empirical implications: On one hand, a state conducting a military intervention should be more likely to build a coalition with its allies, the more democratic allies it has. On the other hand, military interventions by democratic military coalitions should end more quickly with success for the interveners than interventions by nondemocratic coalitions. These hypotheses are tested and supported using data on military interventions between 1946 and 2001.

"The exposure of alleged coup plots in 2007 has shaken the guardian role of the Turkish military in politics. What were the conditions that led to the exposure of the coups and what is their significance for the future of Turkish democracy? Drawing on insights from southern Europe, the article argues that failed coup plots can lead to democratic civil-military relations especially if they work simultaneously with other facilitating conditions, such as increasing acceptance of democratic attitudes among officers, consensus among civilians over the role of the military, and the influence of external actors, such as the European Union. The article focuses on such domestic and international factors to analyse the transformation of the Turkish military, the splits within the armed forces and the resulting plots. It argues that one positive outcome of the exposed conspiracies in Turkey has been the enactment of new institutional amendments that would eradicate the remaining powers of the military. Yet, a negative outcome of the coup investigations has been an increase in polarization and hostility. Turkish democracy still lacks mutual trust among significant political groups, which creates unfavourable conditions for democratic consolidation."

Comparative analysts argue that democracies spend less on military policies than authoritarian states, a claim that was applied to Brazilian electoral democracy by Hunter (1997). In fact, Brazil behaves as an outlier and military spending has continued to

"The military regimes of 1964-1989 in Chile, Argentina, and Brazil implemented a code of legitimacy that appealed to various secular beliefs rooted in civil society at the same time that they fostered a common myth of religious legitimation-that of defending "Western Christian civilization." It was under this umbrella that military groups and religious actors faced each other and/or established alliances. In this cultural politics, religious actors that had previously been excluded from the power game sought to support and/or be recognized by the state as allies in the construction of a belief in the legitimacy of the dictatorships."

CAIRO | January 21, 2012 Two days before the assembly's first meeting following the thwart of Hosni Mubarak close to 1 year ago, it is apparent that the Muslim Brotherhood Islamists led by the Freedom and Justice Party emerged as the largest group in Egypt's new parliament winning 235 of the 498 elected seats in the lower house. . The new parliament, due to hold its first session on Jan. 23, "is the best celebration of the Egyptian revolution," Freedom and Justice said in a statement according to a report in Bloomberg. A breakdown of election results from party lists: 332 members of parliament Freedom and Justice - 127 Nour party - 96 Wafd party - 36 Egyptian Bloc - 33 The assembly is to select a committee that will write a new constitution, though the exact powers of parliament remain unclear. Protesters that ousted Mubarak continue to call for mass rallies on January 25, the anniversary of the beginning of the Egyptian uprising against Mubarak. And although Egyptians have had seven weeks of democratic elections, it has failed to calm tensions between activists and the military council that took power from the ousted President. The military council has said it would cede power when a president is elected in a national vote by the end of June. Due to the state of unrest and lack of tourism, Egypt's economy has seen better days. Egypt formally requested a $3.2 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund on Jan. 16 to help it support its economy.

There will be "elections" in Burma this year. But we should not be fooled into believing they will be free or fair. They will be a sham and will further entrench the military at the heart of power. The new constitution is harsh and one of the most unfair

Following a 1999 coup, Pakistan's General Pervez Musharraf ruled by decree with the support of the military. He held a presidential referendum and got his party elected. He amended the constitution to legitimize his military rule. His involvement in the w

In certain separatist conflicts there is a greater likelihood of external mediation if the political 'redefinition' of the state insisted upon by the insurgents undergoes a revision, from secession to self-determination, understood as a variant of autonomy. In the same vein, although it may not happen concurrently, insurgent movements become more amenable to external mediation if and when opposing governments revise the preferred conflict outcome from a military defeat of the insurgents to a 'containment' of the movement. These two developments - a revised demand from the insurgents for how the state should be defined and an altered military strategy adopted by the government - can serve as 'objective referents' helping external parties to identify a ripe moment in the conflict and initiate mediation.

Pakistan's 1988 transition to democracy defies most of the conventional wisdom on democratization as well as the bulk of the literature on democratic transitions. This peculiar case can be understood as a case of 'temporary democracy', in which democracy emerges as a short-term outcome that is not likely to be sustained. Pakistan's military leaders chose to democratize because of the high short-term costs of repression coupled with the low long-term costs of allowing democracy. The authoritarian elite agreed to allow democratization knowing that the prospects of democratic consolidation were dim. In this sense, the same factors that made the consolidation of Pakistan's democracy unlikely made the transition possible.

"Libya's contemporary history has been dominated by the interplay of the perpetual dynamics of religion, tribalism, oil and ideology. After 42 years in power Qadhafi was killed at the hands of revolutionaries and the final chapter of his dictatorial reign was terminated. With direct and powerful support from NATO and some Arab governments the revolution, led by the National Transitional Council and military councils in many Libyan cities, was another reflection of the supremacy of the perpetual dynamics. The purpose of this article is to examine the interaction of these dynamics and how they are echoed in post-Qadhafi Libya. An assessment is made of the manifestations related to these dynamics by providing a sketch of existing social and political features. This will help determine the fundamentals that shape the foreseeable future of the country and predict the role of the various political forces interacting in the field. The article is a product of direct research, analysis, eye-witness accounts and interviews in Libya with important personages and representatives of powerful currents now currently competing on the scene and vying for influence in the determination of the future of the country after Qadhafi."

The current US counterinsurgency approach, introduced in 2006, has been highlighted as representing a significant shift in the US military's approach to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Restraint in the use of force, a focus on development projects and increased awareness of local cultures might be interpreted as signalling the emergence of a more reflective and empathetic US military, with greater acceptance of human security principles. This article contests such an interpretation, arguing that US counterinsurgency contains a range of characteristics that render it an unsuitable tool for addressing the underlying social and political problems of Iraq or Afghanistan, as well as an inappropriate platform for the realization of human security principles. Counterinsurgency retains a significant role for high-impact war-fighting, remains firmly embedded within the narrative of the War on Terror, and is likely to lead to the disempowerment of local populations. Taken together, these interlinked characteristics make the US counterinsurgency model an unlikely vehicle for the development of a long-term positive peace in the societies within which it is being applied and risks seriously compromising the credibility of future attempts to help protect the security and well-being of individuals and groups beyond one's own national borders.

Democratization studies have proven that the main difference between autocracy and democracy is, counter-intuitively, not the basic regime structure, but rather, the function and validity of democratic formal institutions defined as rules and norms. 1 For the institutionalist turn in democratization studies, see O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy'; O'Donnell, 'Another Institutionalization'; O'Donnell, 'Polyarchies'; Lauth, 'Informal Institutions'; Merkel and Croissant, 'Formale und informale Institutionen'; Weyland, 'Limitations'; Helmke and Levitsky, Informal Institutions. View all notes In 'defective democracies', 2 Merkel, 'Embedded and Defective'. View all notes or in the grey zone between authoritarian regimes and consolidated democracies, formal institutions disguise specific informal institutions which are usually 'the actual rules that are being followed'. 3 O'Donnell, 'Illusions About Consolidation', 10. View all notes Moreover, scholars have investigated the issue of stateness: 'without a state, no modern democracy is possible'. 4 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 17. View all notes This article sheds light on this grey zone, particularly, on the type of state whose coercive state apparatus is autonomous. Its autonomy results primarily from the interplay between formal and informal institutions in post-transitional settings where 'perverse institutionalization' 5 Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation', 62. View all notes creates and fosters undemocratic informal rules and/or enshrines them as formal codes. If the military autonomy reaches a threshold ranging from high to very high, constitutional institutions become Janus-faced and can enforce a sui generis repertoire of undemocratic informal institutions. Thus, the state exerts formal and informal 'domination', 6 Weber,

"Since the 1990s, India has faced heavy criticism for its realist approach to Burmese affairs. Geopolitical imperatives indeed drove Delhi towards a closer partnership with its military-ruled neighbour. India, however, claims it plays a key role in fostering development in Burma; therefore, consolidating long-term democratization prospects there. This article aims to challenge this view. Using the literature on development and democracy, as well as interviews with Indian policy-makers, it will explore India's recent engagement with the Burmese socioeconomic landscape, and assess its democratizing impact. It argues that, despite an evident discourse shift since cyclone Nargis in 2008, India's development and infrastructure projects remain low-key and peripheral, its education and health assistance marginal and its transnational connections with the emerging Burmese civil society absent. India's own dilemmatic approach combined with Burmese traditional resistance impedes a broader Indian leverage. Unless a more diverse socioeconomic involvement is offered by Delhi in Burma and more knowledge about its evolving polity is nurtured at home, India will neither pave the way for pluralism to grow there nor alleviate its deep-rooted image deficit there."

Recent discourse on U.S. efforts to promote democracy has focused on military activities; especially the strategic and normative perils of democracy promotion at the point of bayonets. This paper explores the United States' use of economic statecraft to f

Over the last twenty years, the ballot box has replaced military coups as a means of political change across Africa, says Professor Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, a political scientist from the University of Ghana. However the results of democratic practices are

How far did the unanimous agreement on the responsibility to protect at the 2005 UN World Summit really mark the international community's acceptance of a new norm supporting collective action - including ultimately military action - when governments thro

As the two-year anniversary of Fiji's military takeover approaches, another international governing body has called the Pacific island nation to hold elections in 2009 as once promised. This time a European Union delegation, led by German legislator Gabr

In Freedom's Battle, Gary J. Bass charts the nineteenth-century pre-history of what today we call humanitarian military invention. He offers richly detailed accounts of the Greek independence struggle of the 1820s, the Western intervention in Syria and th

The author argues that military rule has never been good for Pakistan. Historically it has not helped the fight against extremism, On the contrary, the generals' search for some sort of legitimacy has tended to give encouragement to militant Islam. Certai

Gates reportedly said after meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak that American military assistance to his country is not conditional upon democracy or human rights. I know this only because it is being reported on al-Jazeera. I have not been abl